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Abstract 
Anxiety disorders are common and debilitating, and there are substantial research efforts to 
better understand and treat them. These efforts are characterized by two leading trends: an 
emphasis on the role of attentional biases in their development and persistence, and an 
emphasis on mindfulness as a means of ameliorating them. However, there are substantial 
problems with both lines of research. Fist, research on attentional biases to threat (ABT) has 
yielded highly inconsistent findings with respect to the nature of the biases and when they 
occur. Most studies to date have failed to account for factors that influence attentional 
deployment, such as motivation to approach vs. avoid threat, and almost no studies have 
examined attentional biases that occur when people are occupied with an attentionally 
demanding task, which far more resembles what happens in real life when faced with a threat. 
There is emerging evidence showing that visual attention to threat varies substantially 
according to motivation, and that clinically significant anxiety may be characterized more by 
ambivalence about where to deploy attention in face of threat. Second, mindfulness is now 
widely recommended as a treatment for anxiety disorders despite the absence of a viable 
theory as to the mechanism of action by which it is effective. This is especially concerning 
given the current hype about its effects. Research has clearly demonstrated that anxiety is 
associated with a narrow scope of attention (the one frowning face in an audience) as 
opposed to a broad scope of attention (the entire crowd). New theories proposed that a 
function of mindfulness is to broaden perspective, which may explain how mindfulness 
ameliorates anxiety.  
This program of research aimed to address these issues in three studies. The first 
study was designed to assess the impact of motivation to attend to vs. avoid attending to an 
external threat (a live tarantula) in people who were high in spider fear, while they completed 
a competing attentionally demanding task. The second study was designed to better 
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understand ambivalent motivation by selecting a sample and stimuli that may yield a high 
degree of approach-avoidance conflict; in this study, individuals who self-identified as 
restrained eaters underwent a passive viewing task in which they were exposed to high 
calorie food vs. neutral images while their eye movements were tracked. The third study 
examined the extent to which a brief mindfulness intervention influenced the scope of 
perceptual attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires.  
Results from Studies 1 and 2 revealed a significant impact of motivation on 
attentional deployment, such that different motivational groups demonstrated different 
patterns of attentional biases to threat. This calls into question the conceptualization of ATB 
as a homogenous construct, as it would seem anxious individuals may engage in different 
types of attentional deployment when confronting threat. Results also revealed that 
individuals who showed high motivation to both look at and to avoid looking at the tarantula 
(that is, participants who were ambivalent) did not show a decrease in fear of the spider 
whereas all other participants did. In Study 2, individuals who reported high motivation to 
both look at and to avoid looking at high calorie food endorsed more restrained eating 
behaviours and stronger pathological beliefs, such that even looking at food could make one 
gain weight. Thus, ambivalent motivation may be a characteristic of greater 
psychopathology. In Study 3, it was found that for participants whose baseline attentional 
scope was narrow, mindfulness was associated with the broadening of attentional scope and 
an improvement in mood state. Theoretical and clinical implications for understanding and 
treating anxiety were discussed.  
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Chapter 1 
Anxiety and Attentional Biases to Threat 
1.1 Introduction 
Anxiety is a fundamental human emotion that can have a tremendous impact on our 
physical and psychological wellbeing. When dealing with objectively life-threatening 
objects (e.g., a poisonous snake) or situations (e.g., natural disasters), it is extremely 
adaptive to experience anxiety, as it triggers human defence mechanisms (e.g., fight 
or flight response) and increases our chances of survival. Anxiety leads to a sudden 
increase in adrenaline, which in turn activates the Sympathetic Nervous System and 
produces a series of physiological reactions (e.g., increased arousal, tightening of 
muscles, shutting down the digestive system, etc.) that prepare the human body for 
taking strenuous and quick actions in response to objective threat (Bateson, Brilot, & 
Nettle, 2011). However, some individuals frequently experience anxiety in the 
absence of objective threat (e.g., feeling extremely anxious upon seeing a harmless 
spider). Although not warranted by their immediate external environment, this anxiety 
will trigger the same physiological responses, and trigger maladaptive behaviours 
(e.g., inspecting every room for spiders, avoiding outdoor activities altogether), which 
can interfere with their normal functioning. When anxiety causes significant distress, 
it is no longer adaptive. Instead, it is considered symptomatic of an anxiety disorder, 
as defined by leading diagnostic classificatory systems such as the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2013).  
Anxiety disorders account for one of the most common types of psychological 
difficulties. The global prevalence rate of anxiety disorders has been estimated to be 
7.3% (Baxter, Scott, Vos, & Whiteford, 2013). It was reported that the one-year and 
lifetime prevalence rates of anxiety disorders are 10.6% and 16.6%, respectively 
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(Somers, Goldner, Waraich, & Hsu, 2006). Anxiety disorders also cause substantial 
disability, accounting for 3.5% of the overall burden of all diseases (Baxter, Vos, 
Scott, Ferrari, & Whiteford, 2014). Therefore, there is an imperative need to 
understand factors that contribute to anxiety disorders.  
Decades of psychological research have shown that anxiety is characterized by 
unique information processing patterns, particularly processing of threat information 
(see Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Among the many different cognitive processes, 
attentional deployment to threat stimuli has attracted the most research focus to date. 
Individuals with anxiety difficulties typically present with attentional biases to threat 
(ATB), which include facilitated attention to threat cues, difficulty disengaging from 
threat cues, and avoidance of threat cues (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, 
& Wiersema, 2006). There is a general consensus that these biases play a central role 
in the development and persistence of anxiety disorders (Yiend, 2010). However, with 
respect to the nature of these biases, there are various theoretical accounts and 
inconsistent empirical findings (for a review, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007). The primary purpose of this 
chapter was to critically evaluate the current literature on attentional biases to threat 
among individuals with anxiety difficulties. Of interest in the current program of 
research was the extent to which attentional biases to threats that signal bodily harm 
(e.g., a spider for people who are afraid of spiders) mirror attentional biases to threat 
that interfere with personal goals (e.g., images of high calorie food in people who 
identify as restrained eaters). Hence, another purpose of this chapter was to review 
research on attentional biases to spider stimuli and to food stimuli.  
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1.2 Defining Attentional Biases to Threat  
In general, attentional biases to threat refer to the observation that attention is 
deployed differently towards threatening compared to neutral stimuli (Cisler, Bacon, 
& Williams, 2009). The operationalization of attentional biases to threat, on the other 
hand, is much more nuanced. Attentional biases to threat can present with very 
different characteristics at different stages of information processing and as measured 
by different experimental paradigms. As concluded by Cisler and Koster (2010), three 
types of attentional biases to threat are commonly observed in research literature, 
including facilitated attention to threat, difficulty disengaging from threat, and 
attentional avoidance of threat.  
Facilitated attention to threat refers to the relative ease with which attention is 
drawn to a threat stimulus. This  attentional bias is characterized by faster attentional 
capture for threat vs. neutral stimuli, (e.g., Yiend & Mathews, 2001). Difficulty 
disengaging from threat refers to the degree to which attention remains fixed on threat 
such that when attention is allocated to threat, latency to shift attention to other 
stimuli is longer (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001). Attentional avoidance of 
threat refers to the preferential allocation of attention directly away from threat and 
towards neutral stimuli such that when both threat and neutral stimuli are present, 
attention is intentionally directed towards stimuli other than threat (e.g., Koster et al., 
2006). 
In addition, there is emerging evidence which suggests that each type of 
attentional bias to threat might be tied to a specific stage of information processing 
(for a review, see Cisler et al., 2009; Cisler & Koster, 2010). Facilitated attention to 
threat is said to occur at an earlier, more automatic stage of information processing 
(Ohman, 2005), whereas difficulty disengaging from threat and attentional avoidance 
4	
of threat are said to take place at a later, more strategic stage of information 
processing (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). It has been proposed that, 
neurologically, facilitated attention represents a bottom-up process, and difficulty 
disengaging and attentional avoidance reflect a top-down process.   
   
1.3 Attentional Biases to Threat in Anxiety: Empirical Findings 
Attentional biases to threat have been consistently observed in anxious populations 
(Bar-Haim et al., 2007). As noted by Yiend (2010), most studies have examined 
whether emotional stimuli are processed differently in anxious individuals as 
compared to non-anxious individuals, hypothesizing that attentional biases to threat 
should be present in anxious individuals but absent in non-anxious individuals. The 
following sections reviewed three major findings in the current literature: (1) 
attentional biases to threat are observed among anxious individuals across different 
experimental tasks; (2) attentional biases to threat are observed across different 
anxiety diagnoses; and (3) treating anxiety reduces attentional biases to threat, and 
vice versa.  
 
1.3.1 Experimental Tasks 
Attentional bias to threat is usually assessed with one of the following paradigms: 
modified Stroop task, visual search task, dot probe task, spatial cueing task, and eye 
movement tasks.  
In the modified Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), participants are presented with 
different types of words (e.g., threatening and neutral) that are printed in different 
colours. Participants are asked to ignore the word itself, and focus on naming the 
colour of the ink in which words are written of each as quickly as possible, either 
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verbally or by key press. The underlying assumption is that in order to name the 
colour of the words, individuals need to inhibit their automatic tendency to read the 
content of the words. Individuals with anxiety difficulties are expected to exhibit 
slower response times in naming the colour of threat words relative to neutral words, 
as there will be facilitated attention to the semantic (i.e., threatening) nature of the 
word. A meta-analysis of 70 emotional Stroop studies (Phaf & Kan, 2007) revealed 
that latency to colour-name threat words was, indeed, longer in individuals with 
anxiety disorders and those with high trait anxiety. 
In the visual search task (e.g., Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001), participants 
identify a target stimulus that is embedded in a matrix of distracting stimuli. For 
example, a picture of a spider might be presented within an array of pictures of neutral 
objects. Faster response times to detect the spider in a matrix of neutral pictures 
relative to response times to detect a neutral object in a matrix of neutral pictures 
would indicate facilitated attention to threat. Conversely, a picture of a neutral object 
might be displayed within a matrix of spider pictures. In this case, slower response 
times to detect a neutral object in a matrix of spider pictures relative to response times 
to detect a neutral object in a matrix of neutral pictures would indicate difficulty 
disengaging from threat. Both attentional biases to threat have been observed in a 
variety of studies, e.g., spider stimuli among spider-fearful individuals (Ohman et al., 
2001; Rinck, Reinecke, Ellwart, Heuer, & Becker, 2005), and faces bearing negative 
emotional expressions among individuals with social anxiety disorder (Eastwood et 
al., 2005; Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999).  
The dot probe task is one of the most commonly used paradigms in measuring 
attentional biases to threat (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). In this task, 
participants are first presented with two stimuli (e.g., words or pictures) on a 
6	
computer screen. After a short duration, these two stimuli disappear and a dot probe 
appears in one of the two locations previously occupied by the stimuli. Participants 
then need to press a button to indicate which of the two stimuli the probe has 
replaced. Faster response times to probes that replace threatening stimuli relative to 
probes that replace neutral stimuli indicate facilitated attention to threat. There is a 
body of research showing the presence of attentional biases to threat using the dot 
probe task (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). However, more recent 
studies have revealed a number of important methodological problems with the dot 
probe task and concerns about how dot probe data is analyzed (Fox, 2004; Koster, 
Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004).  
In the spatial cueing task (Posner, 1980), participants focus on a fixation point 
located between two rectangles. A threatening stimulus then appears in one of two 
rectangles, followed by the appearance of a target stimulus in the same (i.e., 
congruent) or opposite rectangle (i.e., incongruent). Participants are asked to press a 
button to indicate the rectangle in which the target stimulus is located. Faster response 
times to congruent threat-cued trials relative to neutral-cued trials indicate facilitated 
attention to threat whereas slower response times to incongruent threat-cued trials 
relative to neutral-cued trials indicate difficulty disengaging from threat. Both types of 
attentional bias have been observed among individuals with anxiety disorders (Mogg, 
Bradley, & Williams, 1995; Mogg, Mathews, & Eysenck, 1992) and individuals high 
in trait anxiety (Fox, 1993; MacLeod & Mathews, 1988).  
Unlike other tasks that use response times to infer attentional biases, eye 
movement tasks provide more direct measures of attention. The assumption is that 
where we look reveals what is on our mind (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2013). To assess 
attentional biases to threat, most studies have used a free viewing paradigm in which 
7	
participants are first asked to fixate on a central location, and then look at image pairs 
(e.g., a neutral stimulus paired with a threat stimulus) for a limited duration while 
their eye movements are tracked in real time (e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Nelson, 
Purdon, Quigley, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015). A number of studies have demonstrated 
that anxious individuals show facilitated attention to threat, as indicated by a greater 
probability of making first fixations on threat and faster first fixations towards threat 
(e.g., Calvo & Avero, 2005; Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007). However, other studies 
failed to detect evidence of facilitated attention (Quigley, Nelson, Carriere, Smilek, & 
Purdon, 2012). With respect to difficulty disengaging, Mogg and Bradley (2006) 
proposed that it is exhibited by longer gaze durations on threat images initially fixated 
upon, relative to neutral images initially fixated on. Research findings on difficulty 
disengaging from threat have been inconsistent (Quigley et al., 2012). Attentional 
avoidance of threat is exhibited by a greater proportion of viewing time on neutral 
than threatening stimuli. Although a few studies found that anxious individuals 
exhibited a bias away from threat images at 2000 – 3000ms after stimulus onset 
(Calvo & Avero, 2005; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 1999), others did not 
(Gamble & Rapee, 2010; Waechter, Nelson, Wright, Hyatt, & Oakman, 2013).  
 
1.3.2 Anxiety Diagnoses 
Attentional biases to threat have been observed in almost all anxiety disorders, 
including in individuals with social anxiety disorder (Amir, Elias, Klumpp, & 
Przeworski, 2003), obsessive-compulsive disorder (Cisler & Olatunji, 2010), 
generalized anxiety disorder (Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Rinck, Becker, Kellermann, & 
Roth, 2003), panic disorder (Buckley, Blanchard, & Hickling, 2002), post-traumatic 
stress disorder (Bryant & Harvey, 1995), and spider phobia (Rinck et al., 2005). In 
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addition, attentional biases to threat have been found in individuals with significant 
eating-related anxiety, such as those who present with an eating disorder or engage in 
disordered eating behaviours (Brooks, Prince, Stahl, Campbell, & Treasure, 2011).  
Results from a meta-analysis of 172 studies (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) confirmed 
that there is a robust link between attentional bias to threat and anxiety, with a low-to-
medium effect size of 0.45. Interestingly, this meta-analysis also revealed that 
attentional biases to threat appear to occur in equal magnitude in all anxiety disorders. 
Hence, attentional biases to threat might not be a feature of any specific anxiety 
disorder but rather a component of elevated trait anxiety.  
 
1.3.3 Anxiety Treatment  
If we assume that attentional biases to threat is a symptom of anxiety disorder, then 
treating anxiety would be sufficient to attenuate attentional biases to threat. Similarly, 
if we consider attentional biases to threat as a cause for anxiety disorder, then 
attenuating attentional biases to threat would lead to a reduction in anxiety. The exact 
nature of the relation between attentional biases and anxiety is not of direct interest to 
the current program of research. However, if there is evidence confirming either of 
these hypotheses, it will provide further support to the close link between attentional 
biases to threat and anxiety. As observed by Browning, Holmes, and Harmer (2010), 
there are three lines of anxiety treatment: pharmacological methods, therapeutic 
methods, and experimental methods. 
A wide range of antidepressant and anxiolytic medications has been found to 
attenuate attentional biases to threat. In one study, healthy participants were randomly 
assigned to receive either a single dose of serotonergic antidepressant citalopram or a 
placebo. A single dose of citalopram led to facilitated attention to positive words, as 
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compared to the placebo condition (Browning, Reid, Cowen, Goodwin, & Harmer, 
2007). Similarly, a single dose of citalopram reduced initial orientation towards 
negative facial expressions in healthy individuals (Kerestes et al., 2009). Healthy 
participants who received citalopram for seven days showed less initial orientation to 
fearful faces (Murphy, Yiend, Lester, Cowen, & Harmer, 2009).  
Psychotherapy that does not directly address attentional bias to threat also 
attenuates attentional biases to threat. After seven sessions of Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy, individuals with anxiety disorders no longer displayed facilitated attention to 
threat measured through a modified Stroop task and a visual search task (Mathews, 
Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995). Similarly, individuals with Obsessive-Compulsive 
Disorder exhibited less facilitated attention toward threat-related words after three 
weeks of daily exposure to obsessional concerns (Foa & McNally, 1986). The 
attenuating effect of psychotherapy has also been observed in individuals with spider 
phobia (Lavy, van den Hout, & Arntz, 1993), social anxiety (Pishyar, Harris, & 
Menzies, 2008), and post-traumatic stress disorder (D'Andrea & Pole, 2012).  
Finally, there are some cognitive tasks have been developed to directly 
attenuate attentional biases to threat. This approach is referred to as Attention Bias 
Modification, which typically utilizes variants of the dot-probe task to train an 
attentional bias away from threat by presenting targets at the location of the neutral 
stimuli more often. Attention Bias Modification has been found to be effective in 
reducing trait anxiety in sub-clinical populations and anxiety symptoms in individuals 
with anxiety diagnoses (for a review, see Bar-Haim, 2010). 
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1.4 Attentional Biases to Threat in Anxiety: Theoretical Models 
Different lines of research have all revealed a robust link between attentional biases to 
threat and anxiety. To account for the role of attentional biases to threat in anxiety 
disorders, many theoretical models have been proposed in the literature.  
 
1.4.1 Williams, Watts, MacLeod, and Mathews, 1988 
Williams et al. (1988; 1997) proposed one of the first models to account for 
information processing biases in anxiety. In their model, there are two important 
systems: Affective Decision Mechanism and Resource Allocation Mechanism. They 
postulated that all individuals are constantly assessing the valence and threat value of 
stimuli in their environment. The Affective Decision Mechanism determines the threat 
value of any incoming stimuli. If stimulus input is deemed highly threatening, the 
Resource Allocation Mechanism will be activated, which directs attentional resources 
to threat. However, if stimulus input is deemed low threatening, attentional resources 
will be allocated to the current task and away from the new stimulus input. Central to 
their theory is their proposition that the Resource Allocation Mechanism is moderated 
by trait anxiety—individuals with high trait anxiety are more likely to allocate 
attention to threat, whereas individuals with low trait anxiety are more likely to ignore 
threatening information.   
 
1.4.2 Beck and Clark, 1997 
Beck and Clark (1997) proposed that anxiety is characterized by biases at three 
different stages of information processing: (1) an initial orienting mode, (2) the 
immediate activation of a primal mode, and (3) the secondary activation of a 
metacognitive mode. At the first stage, anxious individuals are in an orienting mode, 
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which involves automatic identification of threat. Once threat is detected, anxious 
individuals enter a primal mode, which involves a series of cognitive (e.g., thoughts), 
affective (e.g., fear), physiological (e.g., arousal), and behavioural (e.g., fight or 
flight) responses that serve to maximize the chances of survival. At the final stage 
(i.e., a metacognitive mode), anxious individuals engage in effortful and elaborative 
processing of threat, such as evaluating one’s ability to cope with a potential threat. 
The central argument is that anxious individuals tend to over-estimate the value of 
threat. Hence, mild threat stimuli can easily activate the orienting mode as well as the 
primal mode, which prevents the individual from entering the metacognitive mode. 
 
1.4.3 Mogg and Bradley, 1998 
Mogg and Bradley (1998) considered facilitated attention to threat a normal and 
adaptive mechanism as it improves our chances of survival upon encountering 
imminent dangers. In their model, attention biases to threat are determined by two 
systems: (1) a Valence Evaluation System, and (2) a Goal Engagement System. 
Incoming stimuli, together with contextual factors and the individual’s prior learning, 
are first appraised by the Valence Evaluation System in an automatic fashion. If a 
stimulus is deemed highly threatening, then the Goal Engagement System will 
interrupt current behaviours and direct attention to the stimulus input. However, if a 
stimulus is deemed low threatening, then current behaviours will not be interrupted 
and attention will be maintained at ongoing tasks.  
According to this model, both anxious and non-anxious individuals will show 
attentional biases to highly threatening information. While anxious individuals will 
appraise mild threatening information as highly threatening and attend to this 
information, non-anxious individuals will appraise it as low threatening and ignore 
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this information. In addition, Mogg and Bradley (1998) proposed that for anxious 
individuals, attentional biases to threat follow a vigilant-avoidant pattern. Anxious 
individuals develop increased attentional vigilance towards mild threat, which evokes 
high state anxiety. In an attempt to reduce this high state anxiety, anxious individuals 
replace this vigilance with avoidance.  
 
1.4.4 Matthews and Mackintosh, 1998 
Mathews and Mackintosh (1998) proposed that attentional biases to threat only occur 
when threat has to compete with other stimuli or task demands. It was further 
postulated that attentional biases to threat are a result of two systems: (1) a Threat 
Evaluation System, and (2) an Effortful Task Demand System. If the stimulus input is 
appraised as highly threatening by the Threat Evaluation System, attention will be 
oriented towards the perceived threat, thus causing interference with the current task. 
To counter this distraction caused by threat, the Effortful Task Demand System will be 
activated, which leads to increased effort to attend to targets from the task at hand. 
According to this model, the threshold of the Threat Evaluation System is moderated 
by trait anxiety level, such that anxious individuals would have lower thresholds than 
non-anxious individuals. Hence, highly threatening stimuli will attract attention in 
everyone, whereas mild threat will only evoke attentional biases in highly anxious 
populations.  
 
1.4.5 Eysenck, Derekshan, Santos, and Calvo, 2007 
Eysenck et al. (2007) proposed an attentional control theory to account for the impact 
of anxiety on attentional processes. Central to their theory is the hypothesis that 
anxiety impairs two executive functions related to attentional control: (1) inhibition, 
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which refers to the ability to inhibit a dominant and automatic response, and (2) 
shifting, which refers to the ability to shift attention between different tasks. Their 
model further posits that anxiety increases the stimulus-driven bottom-up processing 
while decreasing the goal-driven top-down regulatory control. Increased bottom-up 
processing leads to facilitated attention to threat, whereas decreased top-down 
regulation results in a difficulty to disengage from threat. 
 
1.4.6 Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, and van 
IJzendoorn, 2007 
Bar-Haim et al. (2007) developed a multidimensional model in which attentional 
biases to threat can occur at any of the following four stages of information 
processing: (1) the Pre-attentive Threat Evaluation System, which automatically 
evaluates the threat value of any incoming stimulus; (2) the Resource Allocation 
System, which activates physiological alertness, interrupts ongoing activity, and 
orients attention to the location of the stimulus, once a stimulus is deemed highly 
threatening; (3) the Guided Threat Evaluation System, which further assesses the 
threat value of the stimulus by taking into account the current context, prior 
experience and memory, and coping mechanisms; and (4) the Goal Engagement 
System, which continues to interrupt ongoing activity and direct attention towards the 
threat, if the stimulus is still appraised to have a high threat value. This model posits 
that anxiety can lead to attentional biases to threat through each of the four systems: 
(1) anxious individuals tend to appraise mild threat stimuli as highly threatening, (2) 
anxious individuals are more likely to orient to threat, (3) anxious individuals tend to 
be skewed in their elaborative evaluation of threat, and (4) anxious individuals may 
have deficits in disengaging from threat.  
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1.4.7 Cisler and Koster, 2010 
In their review paper, Cisler and Koster (2010) outlined three distinct mechanisms 
that mediate each of the three types of attentional biases to threat: (1) a Threat 
Detection System, which evaluates the threat value of any incoming stimuli and 
underlies facilitated attention to threat, (2) Attentional Control, which refers to the 
individual’s ability to regulate their attentional allocation and modulates difficulty 
disengaging from threat, and (3) Emotion Regulation Strategies/Goals, which refers to 
the individual’s ability to influence their emotional experience and modulates 
attentional avoidance of threat. Their model further posits that these mechanisms 
operate at different stages of information processing and are embodied by different 
neural networks: Threat Detection System operates during automatic processing and is 
centered around the amygdala, whereas Attentional Control and Emotion Regulation 
Strategies/Goals operate during strategic processing and are centered around the 
prefrontal cortex and related structures. This was the first model to conceptualize 
attentional biases to threat as a multi-component phenomenon that can be modulated 
by different mechanisms, thus introducing much more complexity into this field of 
research. 
 
1.5 Attentional Biases to Threat in Spider-Related Anxiety 
Some stimuli, such as spiders, signal bodily harm and are considered universally 
threatening. In fact, spiders are considered one of the most common phobic stimuli 
(Ohman & Mineka, 2001). According to the Preparedness Theory of Phobias 
(Seligman, 1971), spiders receive priority from our brain because they may carry 
venom and can potentially pose survival threats to human species. Hence, we would 
expect spiders to elicit more biases in the automatic stage of information processing.  
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An extensive amount of research has demonstrated the presence of facilitated 
attention towards spider-related stimuli. Ohman et al. (2001) developed a visual 
search task in which participants had to detect either a spider picture in a matrix of 
neutral distractors, or a neutral picture in a matrix of spider-related distractors. It was 
found that spider-fearful individuals were significantly faster to detect the spider 
picture than the neutral one in a matrix of discrepant stimuli. In a subsequent study, 
Mogg and Bradley (2006) had participants high or low in spider fear complete a 
visual probe task. Results showed that spider-fearful individuals were faster to 
respond to the dot probe that replaced a spider picture compared to a cat picture, but 
only when stimuli were present for a short duration (e.g., 200ms). Vrijsen, Fleurkens, 
Nieuwboer, and Rinck (2009) replicated this finding using a modified dot-probe task. 
It was found that spider-fearful individuals were faster in responding to the probe that 
replaced a moving spider than a moving neutral object.  
There is less research showing the presence of difficulty disengaging from 
spider-related stimuli. Wilson, Russell, and Helton (2015) had university students 
complete two versions of the Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; 
Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997). The SART is an 
experimental paradigm where participants are asked to respond to frequent Go stimuli 
and withhold responses to infrequent No-Go stimuli. Participants had to inhibit 
responses to a particular number (e.g., pressing the spacebar for any number but “3”) 
in one version of the SART, and withhold responses to a particular picture (e.g., 
pressing the spacebar for spider pictures but not neutral pictures) in the other version. 
Interestingly, participants showed fewer commission errors and slower response times 
in the picture version of the SART, indicating a difficulty in switching attention from 
spider to neutral pictures (Wilson et al., 2015). Paulitzki, Risko, Oakman, and Stolz 
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(2008) presented spider-fearful individuals with spider pictures and asked them to 
either describe the texture of the spider (referred to as “the spider task”) or identify an 
associated digit (referred to as “the neutral task”). Fearful participants were faster to 
switch into the spider task relative to the neutral task but slower to switch out of the 
spider task relative to the neutral task, suggesting difficulty disengaging from threat.  
In addition, there is increasing evidence suggesting that attentional biases to 
spiders follow a vigilance-avoidance pattern. Hermans et al. (1999) conducted a study 
in which participants with or without spider anxiety watched a series of spider 
pictures paired with flower pictures while their eye movements were recorded. 
Spider-fearful individuals spent more time looking at the spider for the first 500ms of 
the trial and as time progressed, they spent more time looking at the flower for the last 
1000ms of the trial. Rinck and Becker (2006) had individuals with or without spider 
anxiety watch four pictures presented simultaneously (a spider, a butterfly, a dog, and 
a cat) for one minute while their eye movements were recorded. Compared to non-
anxious individuals, those with spider anxiety spent more time looking at the spider 
for the first 500ms and less time looking at the spider for the remainder of the trial.  
 
1.6 Attentional Biases to Threat in Eating-Related Anxiety 
Whereas some stimuli (e.g., spiders) signal bodily harm and are considered 
universally threatening, others signal a threat to personal goals and only certain 
populations will perceive them to be threatening. One such stimulus is high calorie 
food. For most people, a rich moist chocolate cake would most likely produce 
appetite. For individuals with eating-related anxiety (such as those who have an eating 
disorder), the sight of a chocolate cake might be viewed as a threat. According to 
Webb et al. (2011), eating-related anxiety is broadly defined as experiencing a 
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significant fear of weight gain and subsequently engaging in a variety of disordered 
eating behaviours to control weight (including restrained eating, excessive exercising, 
and purging). Hence, eating-related anxiety is present in individuals with anorexia 
nervosa (e.g., restricting and being significantly underweight), bulimia nervosa (e.g., 
binge eating and purging regularly), and restrained eaters (e.g., restricting food 
intake).  
For individuals with eating-related anxiety, one reason a chocolate cake might 
be threatening is that even looking at an image of a high calorie food can cause some 
people to feel more “fat” (Coelho, Baeyens, Purdon, Pitet, & Bouvard, 2012). This 
phenomenon has been identified by Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, and Rachman (1999) 
as “thought-shape fusion”, and is similar to the construct of “thought-action fusion” 
observed in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (Rachman, 1993), in which thinking a 
negative thought is viewed as the moral equivalent of committing the deed 
represented in the thought, and that thinking about an event makes it happen. Unlike 
spiders, high calorie food may elicit different attentional biases from different 
individuals, depending on their personal goals regarding eating and weight.  
Most of the studies to date have used the Stroop task, in which participants are 
shown words that are either neutral or food-related, and asked to name the colours of 
the ink in which the words are printed (see Fairburn, Cooper, Cooper, McKenna, & 
Anastasiades, 1991). The rationale is that the food-related words will give rise to 
emotional processing, which interferes with colour naming. A meta-analysis of 28 
Stroop studies (Dobson & Dozois, 2004) concluded that facilitated attention to food 
and body/weight stimuli is consistently found in bulimia nervosa, less consistently 
observed in anorexia nervosa, and trivial to modest for restrained eaters. In a more 
recent meta-analysis, Brooks et al. (2011) reviewed 25 Stroop tasks that exclusively 
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measured facilitated attention to food stimuli. Results showed that the pooled effect 
size was medium for individuals with bulimia nervosa, and small for individuals with 
anorexia nervosa and for restrained eaters.  
Studies that adopted the visual dot probe task have revealed conflicting 
findings. In a study conducted by Veenstra, de Jong, Koster, and Roefs (2010), both 
restrained and disinhibited eaters showed a tendency to direct attention away from 
pictures of high fat food relative to neutral pictures presented for 500ms, but no 
attentional biases were found when pictures were presented for 1500ms. In a follow-
up study, Veenstra and de Jong (2012) compared a group of patients who were 
diagnosed with restrictive eating disorders and a group of matched healthy 
individuals. Results showed that participants with restrictive eating disorders 
displayed stronger attentional engagement with low fat food and attentional avoidance 
of high fat food. In a more recent study, Shank et al. (2015) asked youth to engage in 
a visual probe task where images of high palatable food, low palatable food, and 
neutral objects were shown. For those who endorsed lack of control eating (e.g., binge 
eating), leaner participants exhibited attentional avoidance of high palatable food, 
while heavier ones demonstrated facilitated attention towards high palatable food.  
There is some emerging evidence suggesting that attentional biases to food 
may follow a vigilance-avoidance pattern. According to Mogg and Bradley (1998), 
anxious individuals initially exhibit facilitated attention to threat, which is then 
replaced by attentional avoidance of threat. Werthmann et al. (2011) had overweight 
and healthy-weight females complete a visual dot-probe task, in which they were 
presented with palatable food images paired with neutral images and their eye 
movements were measured. They found that overweight participants showed an initial 
orientation towards food images, followed by diminished durations of fixations on 
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food images, representing attentional avoidance of threat. These findings were 
replicated by Hollitt, Kemps, Tiggemann, Smeets, and Mills (2010) in a group of 
restrained eaters. It was observed that retrained eaters were disproportionately faster 
to detect a food-related word amongst neutral distractors compared to a neutral word 
amongst neutral distractors. Moreover, restrained eaters were disproportionately faster 
to detect a neutral word amongst food distractors compared to a neutral word amongst 
neutral distractors, suggesting attentional avoidance of food cues.   
 
1.7 Summary 
Attentional biases to threat are a well-established phenomenon in the domain of 
anxiety disorders. When encountering threat stimuli, anxious individuals exhibit 
attentional biases, including facilitated attention to threat, difficulty disengaging from 
threat, and attentional avoidance of threat. Attentional biases to threat as a general 
phenomenon has been reliably documented using a variety of experimental tasks and 
in different anxiety diagnoses. However, the exact nature of attentional biases to 
threat remains unclear. In fact, different studies using different experimental tasks and 
different threatening stimuli have revealed rather inconsistent findings. Many theories 
have been proposed to account for attentional biases to threat in anxiety. However, 
there is a huge variability in terms of how attentional biases to threat are 
conceptualized and operationalized in each of these theories. More recent models 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010) seem to share a consensus that 
top-down processes such as emotion regulation strategies and goals can moderate 
attentional biases to threat. 
There is also a growing trend in the research literature to conceptualize 
attentional biases to threat as a multi-dimensional construct instead of a simple by-
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product of anxiety. Generally speaking, there are two types of threat stimuli: one that 
is a universal threat and signals bodily harm (e.g., a spider), and the other that is 
specific to certain populations and signals a threat to personal goals (e.g., high calorie 
food in people who are restrained eaters or have eating disorders). Interestingly, while 
both stimuli elicit attentional biases, the pattern of biases observed in different groups 
of people with eating disorders (e.g., high vigilance in binge eaters, high avoidance in 
restrained eaters) suggests that motivation to attend or avoid the cue may be of 
considerable importance in understanding attentional biases. 
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Chapter 2 
Motivation and Anxiety 
2.1 Introduction 
Research on attentional biases to threat is still in its early stage. Previous studies have 
mainly focused on the validity and reliability of this construct. It was only until 
recently did researchers begin to understand the complexity of this construct, i.e., 
factors that may influence attentional biases to threat. In fact, the newest model 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010) proposed that emotion regulation strategies and goals may 
modulate attentional biases to threat. If we consider attentional biases as an 
observable epiphenomenon (i.e., how one allocates attentional resources in response 
to threatening stimuli), it should be subject to the influence of high-level mental 
processes, such as motivation and goals (Anderson, 2011).  
Motivation is a fundamental, universal determinant of behaviour and functions 
as a strategic process through which individuals determine their responses to external 
stimuli. There are two fundamental motivation systems: rewards elicit approach 
motivation, and punishments elicit avoidance motivation. In current cognitive theories 
of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998), motivation is considered a 
central component in determining how individuals respond to threatening stimuli.  
The purpose of this chapter was to review and critically evaluate the current 
literature on approach and avoidance motivation among individuals with various 
anxiety difficulties. Of interest in the current program of research was the extent to 
which motivation towards stimuli that are universally threatening (e.g., a spider for 
people who are afraid of spiders) mirror motivation towards stimuli that signal a 
threat to personal goals (e.g., images of high calorie food in people who restrict their 
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eating). Hence, another purpose of this chapter was to review research on approach 
and avoidance motivation to spider stimuli and to food stimuli.  
 
2.2 A Two-Factor Model: Approach and Avoidance Motivation 
 
It is widely acknowledged that human behaviour is determined by two motivational 
systems: one is approach motivation and the other is avoidance motivation. As 
summarized by Elliot and Thrash (2002), approach motivation refers to a behavioural 
predisposition towards positive stimuli, whereas avoidance motivation refers to a 
behavioural predisposition away from negative stimuli. The distinctions between 
approach and avoidance motivation are not only present in major psychological 
tradition but also supported by empirical research.  
 From an evolutionary perspective, it is adaptive that positive stimuli elicit 
approach motivation and negative stimuli elicit avoidance motivation. In a series of 
landmark experiments, Chen and Bargh (1999) asked participants to respond to a 
variety of positive and negative words by either pushing or pulling a response lever. It 
was found that positive words elicited approach-like muscle movements, i.e., pulling 
the object towards oneself. Negative words, however, elicited avoidance-like muscle 
movements, i.e., pushing the object away from oneself. In a recent meta-analysis, 
Phaf, Mohr, Rotteveel, and Wicherts (2014) reviewed 29 studies that examined the 
relation between emotional stimuli and motivation. Results showed a small-to-
medium effect of positive stimuli on approach motivation and a similar effect of 
negative stimuli on avoidance motivation. 
 Gray (1970) proposed that approach and avoidance motivation utilize two 
different nervous systems. The Behavioural Activation System (BAS) facilitates 
behaviours and generates positive affect, and is therefore considered a positive 
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motivational system. The Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS) inhibits behaviours 
and generates negative affect, and is therefore considered a negative motivational 
system. Evidence from neuroimaging research generally supports this differentiation. 
In a seminal study, Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, and Friesen (1990) measured 
electroencephalogram (EEF) activity when participants engaged in facial expression 
of different emotions. It was found that approach-based positive affect was associated 
with greater activation in the left side of the prefrontal and anterior temporal regions. 
Avoidance-based negative affect was associated with greater activation in the right 
side of the prefrontal and anterior temporal regions.  
 
2.3 Approach and Avoidance Motivation in Anxiety: Theoretical Models  
Anxiety, as a general sense of negative affect, is usually considered a natural response 
to threats (see Beck & Clark, 1997). Most threatening stimuli are perceived to be 
negative and would involve negative consequences. Hence, according to motivational 
models, threat should elicit a tendency to avoid. While the correspondence between 
threat and avoidance motivation is self-evident, this does not exclude a potential link 
between threat and approach motivation.   
There are a few reasons why threats may elicit approach motivation. Firstly, 
there are benefits in paying attention to threats and staying alert. Take spiders as an 
example; for those who are highly afraid of spiders and live in areas where spiders are 
more populated, it is adaptive to watch out for spiders and check common hiding 
places for spiders (e.g., bushes, shrubs, plants, etc.), which prepares for rapid actions 
if necessary (e.g., fight or flight). In life-threatening situations (e.g., policemen 
pursuing a gunman, homeowner fighting an intruder), approach behaviours can be 
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critical to our or other’s survival and hence, approach motivation may even override 
avoidance motivation.  
 Secondly, some threatening stimuli can be appetitive and aversive at the same 
time. Take high calorie food as an example; for those who engage in restrained eating, 
high calorie food is threatening, as it hinders their dieting goals. At the same time, 
high calorie food can be rewarding, as food is essential for human survival and 
restrained eaters are particularly deprived of energy. Hence, there might be situations 
where individuals are motivated to approach and avoid threats at the same time, thus 
experiencing an ambivalent motivation. In fact, as Schlund et al. (2016) argued, it is 
common for anxious individuals to experience a conflict between approach and 
avoidance motivation (i.e., ambivalence). The notion that threatening stimuli can 
activate different motivational systems is an important element to many current 
theories of anxiety. 
 Mogg and Bradley (1998) developed a cognitive-motivational model of 
anxiety, which consists of two essential components: a Valence Evaluation System, 
which assesses the threat value of a stimulus, and a Goal Engagement System, which 
determines the allocation of resources for cognitive processing. According to this 
model, when a stimulus is deemed moderately threatening, it will trigger avoidance 
motivation, as avoiding helps to maintain attention on current goals and preserve a 
positive mood state. However, when a stimulus is tagged as high threat, it will 
activate approach motivation, which allows risk monitoring and rapid response. 
 Bar-Haim et al. (2007) offered an integrative model based on results of their 
meta-analysis. If a stimulus is perceived to be threatening, it feeds forward into a 
Resource Allocation System, which triggers physiological alert and leads to a more 
elaborate, conscious assessment of risk. Subsequently, if this stimulus is considered a 
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low-to-moderate threat, it will result in a strong motivation to avoid. However, if this 
stimulus is deemed high threat, it will result in a strong motivation to approach and 
monitor.  
Overall, both models suggest that threatening stimuli can activate different 
motivational systems, depending on the subjective evaluation of the presenting threat.  
 
2.4 Approach and Avoidance Motivation in Spider-Related Anxiety 
Some stimuli, such as spiders, signal bodily harm and are considered universally 
threatening. Such stimuli tend to trigger more avoidance than approach motivation, as 
avoidance would increase our chances of survival. Surprisingly, very few studies have 
explicitly measured motivation in spider-related anxiety. Some looked at the readiness 
to approach and avoid spider stimuli, and others examined the actual approach and 
avoidance behaviours. The majority of research to date has paid exclusive attention to 
avoidance motivation and how exposure can reduce such a tendency to avoid spider 
stimuli (for a review, see Siegel & Warren, 2013).  
 Two tasks are commonly used to measure approach and avoidance tendencies 
in spider-related anxiety: one is the approach-avoidance task developed by Rinck and 
Becker (2007), and the other is the classic implicit association test developed by 
Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). In the approach-avoidance task, 
participants are presented with a variety of pictures and have to respond to each 
picture by either pushing or pulling a joystick that is connected to the computer. The 
size of the picture changes in accordance with the movement of the joystick: pulling 
increases the picture size and creates the visual impression that the picture is coming 
closer, while pushing decreases the picture size and creates the impression that the 
picture is moving away. The hypothesis is that spider-fearful individuals have an 
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automatic tendency to avoid spider stimuli and would show a preference in pushing 
spider pictures away. In a series of experiments, Rinck and Becker (2007) found that 
spider-fearful individuals were indeed quicker to push spider picture away than to pull 
them closer, even when they were explicitly asked not to pay attention to the content 
of the pictures. In another study, Klein, Becker, and Rinck (2011) had a group of 
children complete the approach-avoidance task. It was found that all participants, 
regardless of their level of spider fear, showed an automatic readiness to avoid spider 
pictures but not pictures of butterflies.  
In the implicit association task, participants are presented with two pairs of 
category labels on the computer screen and have to decide which pair fits the given 
stimulus better. For example, participants might see a picture of a spider and have to 
decide whether it belongs to “spider” and “danger” or “snake” and “safety”. The 
hypothesis is that spider-fearful individuals automatically associate spider stimuli 
with danger. Teachman and Woody (2003) found that spider-fearful individuals were 
faster in their response when spider stimuli were matched with “danger” as compared 
to “safety”. In another study, Teachman (2007) observed that spider-fearful 
individuals were faster in responding to spider pictures when they were matched with 
“afraid” and this automatic association predicted behavioural avoidance of a live 
spider.  
 
2.5 Approach and Avoidance Motivation in Eating-Related Anxiety 
Whereas some stimuli (e.g., spiders) are considered universally threatening and elicit 
mostly avoidance motivation, others (e.g., high calorie food) are only threatening to 
certain populations and may evoke different motivation in different individuals. 
Unfortunately, similar to spider-related anxiety, there are very few studies that have 
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explicitly examined motivation in eating-related anxiety. The majority of studies have 
exclusively focused on approach motivation through manipulating craving in a 
laboratory setting.  
 There is an abundance of research showing that individuals are highly 
motivated to approach food stimuli when they are deprived of food. In a study 
conducted by Kemps and Tiggemann (2009), self-identified chocolate cravers 
demonstrated a higher tendency to approach chocolate-related pictures but not 
pictures of other highly desired food (e.g., pizza). Moreover, these self-identified 
chocolate cravers reported higher craving ratings and even more so after being 
deprived of chocolate for 24 hours. Using a pictorial implicit association task, Kemps, 
Tiggemann, Martin, and Elliott (2013) found that chocolate cravers were more likely 
to associate chocolate with “approach”. More interestingly, when participants were 
trained to associate chocolate images with “approach”, they reported more cravings 
(Kemps et al., 2013).  
 Research on the relation between restrained eating and motivation is rather 
inconclusive. Ahern, Field, Yokum, Bohon, and Stice (2010) conducted a study in 
which participants completed a visual probe task where food images were paired with 
neutral images, and a food reinforcement task where points could be earned towards a 
snack food. No difference was found between restrained eaters and non-restrained 
eaters in their processing of food stimuli as well as their sensitivity to food rewards. 
Ahern et al. (2010) concluded that these null findings might be a result of an 
ambivalent motivation towards food cues. Restrained eaters may experience a high 
level of food craving (i.e., approach motivation), but they may also find this 
experiencing anxiety-provoking, which activates their dieting goals (i.e., avoidance 
motivation). In fact, in a recent review, Werthmann, Jansen, and Roefs (2015) 
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proposed that restrained eaters may be torn in a standoff between craving and dieting 
goals. These individuals are motivated to approach food cues, as they want to eat 
them. At the same time, they are also motivated to avoid food cues, as they intend to 
diet. Werthmann et al. (2015) proposed that this ambivalent motivation might account 
for the observed null findings.  
 
2.6 Summary 
Motivation is a fundamental psychological process that determines how human beings 
respond to external stimuli. It has been long established in psychological research that 
approach and avoidance motivation are two distinct systems. Anxiety is usually 
considered as resulting from a dominance of avoidance motivation over approach 
motivation. Indeed, stimuli that are considered universally threatening (e.g., spiders) 
elicit a predominant motivation to avoid such stimuli. However, stimuli that signal a 
threat to personal goals (e.g., high calorie food in individuals who are restrained eaters 
or have an eating disorder) might evoke equally strong motivation to approach and 
avoid such stimuli at the same time, thus creating an ambivalence. Hence, the relation 
between motivation and anxiety seems to be more nuanced than initially anticipated 
(e.g., Fowles, 1987). Unfortunately, research on this topic is scarce and the majority 
of studies have not explicitly measured motivation. 
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Chapter 3 
Integrating Attentional Biases to Threat and Motivation in Anxiety 
3.1 Introduction 
As outlined in the first two chapters, decades of research have clearly demonstrated an 
intrinsic link between attentional biases and anxiety, and between motivation and 
anxiety. Attentional biases play a central role in the development and maintenance of 
anxiety (see Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Williams et al., 1988; Yiend, 2010). 
Anxious individuals exhibit three types of attentional biases, including facilitated 
attention to threat, difficulty disengaging from threat, and attentional avoidance of 
threat. Motivation is also considered a central component in determining how 
individuals respond to emotional stimuli (see Eysenck, 1992, 1997). There are two 
fundamental motivational systems: approach motivation and avoidance motivation. 
Anxiety is traditionally conceptualized as a dominance of avoidance over approach 
motivation. More recent evidence suggests that some anxious people might 
experience an approach-avoidance conflict when encountering threat.   
 To summarize, there is abundant research on both attentional biases to threat 
and motivation within anxiety literature. However, little attention has been paid to the 
integration of these two constructs. In light of Cisler and Koster’s (2010) proposed 
modulating effect of emotion regulation goals (e.g., motivation in response to threat) 
on attentional biases to threat, a synthesis of these two lines of research is particularly 
important. Moreover, most studies to date have not explicitly measured motivation in 
anxious populations, nor have they explored the potential approach-avoidance 
conflict. This leaves a significant gap for more integrative research. The purpose of 
this chapter was to review theoretical and empirical research on the integration of 
attentional biases to threat and motivation, and the integration of approach and 
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avoidance motivation in anxiety disorders. If anxious populations indeed can be 
separated into different subgroups based on their motivation to approach and avoid 
threat, this heterogeneity might account for, at least partially, the inconsistent and 
sometimes contradictory findings on attentional biases to threat.  
 Also of interest in the current program of research was the interplay between 
approach and avoidance motivation in different types of threat stimuli. For stimuli 
that are considered universally threatening (e.g., spiders), is it possible for individuals 
to feel motivated to approach and avoid the spider at the same time? For stimuli that 
are only threatening to certain populations (e.g., high calorie food for individuals who 
are restrained eaters or have an eating disorder), are there situations where anxious 
individuals experience a conflict between approach and avoidance motivation? 
Another purpose of this chapter was to review research on approach and avoidance 
motivation towards spider stimuli and food stimuli. 
 
3.2 The Modulating Effect of Motivation on Attentional Biases to Threat 
As suggested by Gross (1998), motivation can be conceptualized as a top-down 
process through which individuals exert influence over their experience of and 
response to emotional stimuli. If we consider attentional biases to threat as an 
observable, overt epiphenomenon, then it might be subject to the influence of various 
high-level processes including motivation. Cisler and Koster (2010) proposed two 
mechanisms through which attentional biases to threat can be modulated: one is 
attentional control, and the other is emotion regulation goals (e.g., motivation 
regarding emotional stimuli). According to Cisler and Koster (2010), emotion 
regulation goals are distinct from attentional control because it is not an ability per se, 
but rather it reflects one’s strategy for coping with emotional stimuli. There has been 
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some evidence supporting the modulating effect of motivation on attentional biases to 
threat. 
 D. R. Johnson (2009) presented participants with pairs of angry and happy 
faces in a dot-probe task. Some participants were instructed to pay attention to happy 
faces and avoid angry faces, while others received no instruction. Results showed that 
participants who were asked to pay attention to happy faces showed reduced 
facilitated attention towards angry faces as well as increased attentional avoidance of 
angry faces. Furthermore, participants who were asked to approach happy faces 
showed less frustration in reaction to a stressful anagram task and persisted longer in 
this task. In a study conducted by Richeson and Trawalter (2008), participants were 
first tested on their motivation to respond without prejudice towards black individuals. 
Participants then completed a dot-probe task in which they were presented with pairs 
of white and black male faces, bearing either a neutral or happy facial expression, for 
either 30ms or 450ms. Interestingly, participants who were highly motivated to 
respond without prejudice demonstrated facilitated attention towards neutral black 
faces presented at 30ms and attentional avoidance of neutral black faces at 450ms.   
In addition, Dunning and Hajcak (2009) conducted two experiments in which 
participants were presented with neutral and unpleasant pictures and their late positive 
potential (LPP), a brain electrical activity indicating attentional vigilance to stimuli, 
was recorded. Some participants were instructed to view the pictures passively, while 
others were asked to direct their attention to more or less arousing parts within the 
unpleasant pictures. They found that unpleasant pictures were generally associated 
with facilitated attention under passive viewing instructions, indicated by an increased 
LPP. However, for those who were instructed to pay attention to non-arousing parts of 
the unpleasant pictures, they displayed reduced facilitated attention, indicated by a 
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decreased LPP. Combined, these studies have provided some preliminary evidence 
showing that motivation may modulate attentional biases to threat.  
 
3.3 Integrating Approach and Avoidance Motivation in Anxiety 
If we consider approach and avoidance motivation as two distinctive systems (Elliot 
& Thrash, 2002), each individual can theoretically endorse a high or low motivation 
to approach or avoid threat. In fact, multiple theoretical models posit that threat 
stimuli can elicit either approach or avoidance motivation (Bar-Haim, 2010; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998) and sometimes both (Schlund et al., 2016). Hence, we can divide 
anxious individuals into the following four groups: (1) a high motivation to approach 
threat combined with a high motivation to avoid threat, i.e., ambivalent; (2) a high 
motivation to approach threat combined with a low motivation to avoid threat, i.e., 
engagers; (3) a low motivation to approach threat combined with a high motivation to 
avoid threat, i.e., avoiders; and (4) a low motivation to approach threat combined with 
a low motivation to avoid threat, i.e., indifferent. This classification system provides a 
theoretical framework as such anxious individuals can engage in approach motivation, 
avoidance motivation, ambivalent motivation, or no motivation in response to 
threatening stimuli.  
Traditionally, anxiety has been characterized as a dominance of avoidance 
motivation over approach motivation, i.e., anxious individuals are highly motivated to 
avoid threat while experiencing little or no motivation to approach threat. This 
avoidance motivation would lead to avoidance behaviours (e.g., running away from 
threat, looking away from threat), which provides a temporary relief, thus reinforcing 
their avoidance behaviours. While such an account is empirically supported 
(Rachman, 2004), it also implies that anxious individuals are a homogenous 
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population with little within-group variance. Indeed, most research to date has mainly 
focused on avoidance motivation and even when both approach and avoidance 
motivations were included in the same study, they were considered mutually 
exclusive constructs (D. R. Johnson, 2009; Richeson & Trawalter, 2008). Very little 
research attention has been paid to the potential interplay between approach and 
avoidance motivation. Furthermore, there may be an important difference between 
physical responding and attentional responding. Whereas physically people may be 
more likely to avoid threat, mentally they may be highly motivated to engage with 
threatening stimuli in order to monitor and process the information. However, very 
little research has addressed approach/avoidance motivation within the context of 
attentional deployment. 
Amongst all four groups that we proposed here, the most intriguing is those 
who are ambivalent. On one hand, they are motivated to approach threat. There may 
be several reasons for this: some threating stimuli are inherently rewarding (e.g., high 
calorie food to restrained eaters), or it is adaptive to watch out for danger (e.g., a 
moving spider). At the same time, they are motivated to avoid threat, as doing so 
preserves a positive mood, prevents further deterioration of mood, or sustains their 
performance on the current task. Hence, we would argue that ambivalent individuals 
are locked into an approach-avoidance conflict so that they cannot decide on how to 
allocate their attentional resources in response to threat. This ambivalence will not 
result in any resolution to the perceived threat. Instead, the inability to make a 
decision may add to cognitive load and compromise performance on other tasks, and 
may make the experience especially unpleasant, which in turn sustains anxiety.  
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3.4 Going Beyond Avoidance Motivation in Anxiety: Theoretical Models  
Some leading theories of anxiety, such as Behavioural Inhibition System theory (Gray 
& McNaughton, 2000) and the Attentional Maintenance model (Fox et al., 2001; 
Yiend & Mathews, 2001), have attempted to integrate approach and avoidance 
motivation by conceptualizing anxiety as a result of an approach-avoidance conflict.  
In their animal model, Blanchard and Blanchard (1990) made a strong 
distinction between fear (when a predator is immediately present) and anxiety (when a 
predator may or may not be present). For animals, the actual presence of a predator 
will activate fear, which is then followed by avoidance behaviours (e.g., running 
away). However, as part of hunting process (i.e., looking for food), animals have to 
enter potentially dangerous places where their predator may also be present, which 
will in turn activate anxiety. Gray and McNaughton (2000) advanced this animal 
model and proposed that anxiety originates from a conflict between approach and 
avoidance goals, i.e., animals might be motivated to obtain food (approach goal), but 
at the same time, they do not want to become food for their predator (avoidance goal). 
In this case, as proposed by McNaughton and Gray (2000), anxiety will lead to 
an inhibition of approach behaviour (e.g., standing still) rather than an activation of 
avoidance behaviour (e.g., escaping). They further proposed that the Behavioural 
Inhibition System is particularly sensitive to conflicts between approach and 
avoidance goals, thus acting as the underlying neural mechanism for anxiety. When 
individuals experience an approach-avoidance conflict (e.g., wanting to eat a delicious 
chocolate cake and wanting to lose weight at the same time), their behavioural 
inhibition system will be activated, which then generates the feeling of anxiety and 
inhibits approach behaviours (e.g., ordering something lighter).  
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The Attentional Maintenance model was proposed to explain the difficulty 
anxious individuals experience in disengaging from threats (Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001). According to this model, difficulty disengaging from threat 
originates from a conflict between approach and avoidance goals. Early in viewing, 
anxious individuals are drawn to threatening stimuli, because there is value in 
attending to them (e.g., to evaluate risk and to prepare for further actions). However, 
paying attention to threating stimuli makes them uncomfortable, which promotes 
avoidance motivation. When individuals are transitioning from facilitated attention to 
attentional avoidance, they likely experience a conflict between approach and 
avoidance motivation, which manifests as difficulty disengaging from threat.  
 
3.5 Going Beyond Avoidance Motivation in Anxiety: Empirical Findings  
There is, however, very limited empirical research aimed at integrating approach and 
avoidance motivation in the context of anxiety difficulties. To the author’s best 
knowledge, only one study published so far has directly examined approach and 
avoidance motivation in relation to attentional biases to threat (Nelson, Purdon, 
Quigley, Carriere, & Smilek, 2014). In this study, participants with high, medium, and 
low trait anxiety completed a free-viewing Eye Movement Attention Task (EMAT), 
in which they were presented with emotional images paired with neutral images for 3 
seconds per trial and asked to look at these images as they wished. In addition, 
participants also received a mood induction procedure prior to and during the EMAT 
(either calming or anxiety-provoking), reported their anxiety level before and after the 
EMAT, and indicated their level of motivation to approach and to avoid each type of 
images.  
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The correlation between motivation to attend to threat and motivation to avoid 
attending to threat was -.37 in this study, suggesting that the two valences of 
motivation do not track each other well. Nelson et al. (2014) were able to divide 
participants into four groups based on their motivation ratings: ambivalent (high 
motivation to look at threat combined with high motivation to avoid looking at threat), 
engagers (high motivation to look at threat combined with low motivation to avoid 
looking at threat), avoiders (low motivation to look at threat combined with high 
motivation to avoid looking at threat), and indifferent (low motivation to look at threat 
combined with low motivation to avoid looking at threat). They found that the 
ambivalent group showed the greatest facilitated attention to threat in the first 500ms, 
the engagers showed the greatest facilitated attention to threat between 1500ms and 
5000ms, and the avoiders showed the lowest facilitated attention to threat between 
2500-5000ms. Most importantly, the ambivalent group demonstrated eye movements 
that were similar to the indifferent group and yet reported significantly higher anxiety.  
 
3.6 Integrating Attentional Biases and Motivation: Spider-Related Anxiety 
Some stimuli, such as spiders, signal bodily harm and are considered universally 
threatening. As reviewed in the previous chapter, fear of spiders has been viewed as 
being driven by a constant, unreasonable tendency to avoid spiders. The majority of 
past research has attempted to understand spider anxiety as a disorder of extreme 
avoidance.  
To the author’s best knowledge, only one study published to date has 
examined the interplay between approach and avoidance motivation in face of spider 
stimuli. Pittig, Brand, Pawlikowski, and Alpers (2014) had spider-fearful individuals 
and non-anxious controls complete a gambling task that involved spider stimuli. In 
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this gambling task, participants were presented with four decks of cards and had to 
choose one card in each trial. Two decks were considered disadvantageous as they 
yielded high immediate gains but higher occasional losses. The other two decks were 
considered advantageous as they yielded small immediate gains but small occasional 
losses. The rationale was that participants could use feedback of gains and losses to 
learn which decks were advantageous and which were disadvantageous.  
In one version of the gambling task, spider pictures were depicted on the back 
of the advantageous decks and butterfly pictures on the disadvantageous decks. In the 
other version, the position of pictures was reversed. Interestingly, this study created a 
situation in which spider-fearful individuals would experience ambivalence: when 
spider pictures were loaded on the advantageous decks, participants should be 
motivated to approach them because they yield higher overall gains, but they should 
also be motivated to avoid them because they induce anxiety. Results confirmed the 
presence of ambivalence: participants showed initial avoidance of spider pictures and 
despite some improvements over time, they were impaired in the learning of 
advantageous decks across both versions of the gambling task.  
 
3.7 Integrating Attentional Biases and Motivation: Eating-Related Anxiety 
Unlike spiders, other stimuli signal a threat to personal goals and are only perceived 
to be threatening by certain populations. Such stimuli (e.g., high calorie food) are 
more likely to elicit different motivation. In fact, in the domain of eating-related 
anxiety, there is increasing evidence showing that people who engage in restrained 
eating (e.g., dieting) tend to experience an ambivalent motivation.  
Stroebe, Mensink, Aarts, Schut, and Kruglanski (2008) proposed a Goal 
Conflict Model of Eating. According to this theory, restrained eaters are subject to a 
38	
chronic conflict between two incompatible goals—one is eating enjoyment, and the 
other is weight control. When facing high calorie food, restrained eaters experience a 
high degree of ambivalence in their attitude: they want to eat it because it tastes good, 
and they also want to restrict eating it because it leads to potential weight gain. They 
hypothesized that this ambivalent attitude towards food plays a key role in the 
development of disordered eating.  
Stroebe et al. (2008) conducted a series of experiments to test their Goal 
Conflict Model of Eating. In the first experiment, they had a group of female 
university students report their attitude towards food. It was found that restrained 
eaters indeed experienced a conflict between the goals of eating enjoyment and 
weight control. In two subsequent experiments, participants were first presented with 
either eating enjoyment or neutral words and then completed a lexical decision task in 
which they had to decide whether or not a presented word was related to dieting. 
Results showed that restrained eaters were slower in recognizing dieting-related 
words when primed with eating enjoyment, suggesting a conflict between eating 
enjoyment and dieting goals.  
In a separate study, Papies, Stroebe, and Aarts (2008) conducted two 
experiments to examine the extent to which priming food cues and dieting goals 
influences attentional processing of palatable food. In the first experiment, 
participants were first primed with either food or neutral words and then completed a 
visual probe task in which food images were presented. It was found that priming 
food cues elicited facilitated attention towards palatable food in restrained eaters. The 
second experiment was identical to the first one except that half of the participants 
who were primed with food words were also primed with dieting words. Interestingly, 
those who were primed with dieting goals failed to show facilitated attention to food. 
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3.8 Current Program of Research: Study 1 and Study 2 
The current program of research was designed to bridge the gap between theoretical 
advances and empirical research, with a particular focus on integrating attentional 
biases and motivation, and integrating approach and avoidance motivation in the 
context of anxiety. Attentional biases to threat, as a general construct, are well 
established in research literature. However, the exact nature of attentional biases to 
threat remains unclear. More recent models proposed that motivation, as an emotion 
regulation strategy, might modulate attentional biases to threat. Unfortunately, little 
research has been done to examine the extent to which motivation influences 
attentional biases to threat. Moreover, anxiety has been traditionally conceptualized as 
a dominance of avoidance motivation towards threat and little effort has been made to 
integrate approach and avoidance motivation, despite the increasing evidence showing 
that anxiety may originate from an approach-avoidance conflict (i.e., ambivalent 
motivation).  
Hence, the current program of research aimed to answer the following 
research questions: Can we divide anxious individuals into different groups based on 
their motivation to approach and avoid threat? If anxious individuals can be 
categorized based on their motivation, do they engage in different types of attentional 
biases? Do some anxious individuals experience an approach-avoidance conflict when 
encountering threat? Does this ambivalent motivation towards threat exacerbate 
anxiety? 
In general, there are two types of threat stimuli both of which have been 
thoroughly studied in the anxiety literature. Some stimuli, such as spiders, signal 
bodily harm and are considered universally threatening. Others signal a threat to 
personal goals and are only perceived to be threatening by certain populations, e.g., 
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high calorie food in individuals who are restrained eaters. These two particular stimuli 
(e.g., spiders and high calorie food) also have good ecological validity in that using 
these stimuli in a laboratory setting triggers the same responses as would be expected 
outside of the laboratory. Taking these into account, the current program of research 
aimed at assessing the relation between attentional biases to threat and motivation, 
and between approach and avoidance motivation in spider-related anxiety and eating-
related anxiety respectively.  
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Chapter 4 
Attentional Scope in Anxiety and the Broadening Effect of Mindfulness 
4.1 Introduction 
Whereas attentional biases describe where attention is being directed, attentional 
scope refers to how attention is being deployed. By definition, attentional scope refers 
to the extent to which the attentional field is focused broadly or narrowly and can 
occur at both perceptual and conceptual levels (for a review, see Friedman & Förster, 
2010). It is believed that individuals with a narrow attentional scope tend to focus on 
local details (e.g., trees), whereas those with a broad attentional scope are more likely 
to see the big picture (e.g., forest).  
Attentional scope, as a construct, has attracted much research attention due to 
its close link with emotions (for a review, see Huntsinger, 2013). This research 
originates from the Easterbrook (1959) hypothesis that negative emotions narrow the 
scope of attention. Decades of empirical research have consistently demonstrated a 
close link between anxiety and a narrowed scope of attention. Mindfulness 
meditation, a practice that finds its origin in Buddhist teachings, has become 
increasingly popular as an effective treatment for anxiety disorders (see Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Vollestad, Nielsen, & Nielsen, 2012). There is some, 
albeit mixed, evidence supporting the use of mindfulness in broadening the scope of 
attention. The purpose of this chapter was to review current literature on attentional 
scope and mindfulness-based intervention in the context of anxiety. 
 
4.2 Defining Attentional Scope 
Attentional scope is a loosely defined construct and involves a broader range of 
attentional systems. Leading models (see Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 
42	
2006; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) propose that there are three levels to attentional 
scope: perceptual attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires. The 
scope of perceptual attention is defined as the extent to which attention is focused 
upon central versus peripheral information. The scope of conceptual attention refers to 
the extent to which mental representations are activated with lower versus higher 
accessibility. The scope of thought-action repertoires is characterized by the relative 
breadth of thoughts and action tendencies one is prepared to pursue (Fredrickson, 
1998).  
A variety of visual paradigms have been used to measure the scope of 
perceptual attention. The most commonly used one is the Navon Letter Task (Navon, 
1977). In this task, participants are presented with a series of larger, global letters that 
are composed of smaller, local letters (e.g., a large T made of small Fs). In each trial, 
a fixation cross will first appear in the centre of the screen, which is then followed by 
the composite letter. There are generally two variants of this task. In one version (for 
an example, see Förster et al., 2006; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010), participants are 
told to respond to each stimulus as quickly as possible by pressing one computer key 
if they see one target letter but another computer key if they see a different target 
letter. There are two target letters and only one will occur in a given stimulus. 
However, this target letter can occur at either the global or local level. For example, 
the target letters can be H and L, and in each trial, only one of them will be present as 
either the global or local letter. Hence, it might be a large H made of small Ts, a large 
L made of small Ts, a large T made of small Hs, or a large T made of small Ls. These 
trials can be divided into two categories: global trials where the large letter is the 
target letter (e.g., a large H or L made of small Ts), and local trials where the small 
letter is the target letter (e.g., a large T made of small Hs or Ts). Faster responses to 
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global trials would indicate a broad focus of attention, while faster responses to local 
trails would indicate a narrow focus of attention.  
In the other version of the Navon Letter task (for an example, see Navon, 
1977; Yovel, Revelle, & Mineka, 2005), participants are asked to focus their attention 
on one of the levels (global or local) and decide which of the two target letters is 
present at the specified level, while ignoring the other level. In each trial, there is 
always a target letter occurring at the specified level, but the other target letter might 
appear at the opposite level or might not appear in the stimulus at all. For example, 
the target letters can be H and L. If the participant is asked to focus on the global 
level, the correct answer for a big H made of small Ls should be H. However, if the 
participant is asked to focus on the local level, the correct answer for the same 
stimulus will be L. Hence, trials can be divided into three categories: consistent trials 
where the same target letter appears at both the global and local levels, inconsistent 
trials where two target letters appear at different levels, and neutral trials where an 
non-target letter appears at the unattended level. In this case, a broad focus of 
attention will be indicated by: (1) the global precedence effect, where participants 
identify the target letter faster when the global level is specified, and (2) the global 
interference effect, where participants are distracted by the global, inconsistent letters 
when the local level is specified.  
For the scope of conceptual attention, the most commonly used measure is the 
Categorization Task (Isen & Daubman, 1984). In this task, participants are asked to 
rate items on a 10-point scale, indicating the degree to which they feel each item 
belongs or does not belong to a given general category. Participants are further 
instructed that a breakpoint exists between 5 and 6: while 5 indicates that the item 
does not belong to the category but is very similar to members of that category, 6 
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indicates that the item does belong to the category but is not a very good example of 
it. In every trial, participants are presented with a general category at the top of the 
screen, together with a specific item and the 10-point scale. Within each category, 
there are weak exemplars, moderate exemplars, and strong exemplars. For example, 
the general category can be “vehicle”, and exemplars can be “tank” (weak), “boat” 
(moderate), and “car” (strong). In the Categorization Task, the critical items are the 
weak exemplars. A broad scope of conceptual attention is indicated by a tendency to 
rate weak exemplars as members of a given category (see Price & Harmon-Jones, 
2010; Smith & Trope, 2006). 
There are other measures for assessing the scope of conceptual attention. One 
is the Remote Associates Task (Rosch, 1975). In this task, participants are given a 
series of three-word sets and have to generate a one-word solution that relates to all of 
the words. For instance, the correct answer to “fountain”, “baking”, and “pop” should 
be “soda”. Those who correctly generate the word solution are hypothesized to have a 
broad scope of conceptual attention, as these word associations are unusual and this 
task requires creative problem solving. Another measure is the Unusual Use Task 
(Guilford, 1967). This task involves generating as many unusual uses for a common 
object (e.g., a brick). Answers will then be analyzed on the basis of uniqueness, which 
then provides an index of divergent, inclusive thinking (Torrance, 2008).  
There are fewer tasks that allow for measuring the scope of thought-action 
repertoires. One such measure is the Twenty Statement Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 
1954). This task was originally designed to identify and measure self-attitudes. In the 
original version, participants are given twenty blanks and have to write as many 
answers to the question “Who am I?” in the blanks. Fredrickson and Branigan (2005) 
developed a modified version of this Twenty Statement Test. In this version, 
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participants are asked to imagine being in a given situation and based on their felt 
emotions, list all the things they would like to do right now. Participants are given 
twenty blank lines that begin with “I would like to ____”. The number of completed 
statements is tallied, ranging from 0-20. A higher number indicates a larger thought-
action repertoire, i.e., a wider range of action tendencies.   
 
4.3 Attentional Scope and Anxiety 
When facing threatening stimuli, anxious individuals are likely to display a narrowed 
attentional scope (for a review, see Barry, Vervliet, & Hermans, 2015). This 
constriction of attentional scope can be functional, as it helps anxious individuals 
focus on the problem at hand and prepares them for emergency. However, a narrow 
scope of attention can also be detrimental, as it prevents anxious individuals from 
processing information from the periphery and learning that not everything is as 
negative as they anticipate. In fact, there is overwhelming research demonstrating a 
close link between anxiety and a narrowed scope of attention (see Friedman & 
Förster, 2010).  
 Derryberry and Reed (1998) were among the first to study attentional scope in 
anxious individuals. They conducted two experiments in which participants were 
asked to identify one target letter that might appear at either a global or local level. 
Participants were placed in two conditions: they either received positive incentives for 
accurate responses or were punished for inaccurate responses. Results revealed that in 
both experiments, anxious individuals only showed faster processing of local 
information when they were punished for inaccurate responses, indicating a narrowed 
scope of attention under stress. Similar results were obtained by Caparos and Linnell 
(2012). In their study, participants completed a flanker task in which they had to 
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identify target letters while ignoring irrelevant distractors occurring at a varying 
distance from the target. Results showed that individuals with high trait anxiety were 
less distracted by stimuli presented in the periphery, suggesting narrowed spatial 
attention.  
Anxious individuals also experience difficulties in expanding their attentional 
scope. In a study conducted by Najmi, Kuckertz, and Amir (2012), participants had to 
identify targets that were shown in boxes and these boxes might increase or decrease 
in their size from trial to trial. Anxious individuals were impaired in their ability to 
expand attentional scope from a small area to a large one. Interestingly, this difficulty 
to broaden attentional scope was only related to anxious, but not depressive 
symptoms. The narrowing effect of anxiety also applies to the scope of conceptual 
attention. Mikulincer, Kedem, and Paz (1990) found that individuals with high trait 
anxiety were more likely to reject non-typical exemplars from a given category and 
perceived less relatedness between exemplars that belonged to the same categories, 
both of which indicated a narrower scope of concepts. In a separate paper, Mikulincer, 
Paz, and Kedem (1990) reported similar findings. They observed that individuals with 
high trait anxiety were less inclusive in categorizing exemplars and perceived less 
similarity among semantic stimuli that belonged to the same categories.  
 
4.4 Mindfulness: Definition and Treatment for Anxiety 
Mindfulness, a concept that is central to Buddhist philosophy has attracted growing 
scientific interest in the last few decades (McIntosh, 1997). Jon Kabat-Zinn provided 
one of the earliest modern definitions of mindfulness as “paying attention in a 
particular way, on purpose, in the present moment, and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-
Zinn, 1994, p. 4). As summarized by Bishop et al. (2004), mindfulness has been 
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operationalized as a combination of: (1) self-regulation of attention, such as sustained 
attention, attention switching, and inhibition, and (2) a particular orientation towards 
one’s experience, including curiosity, openness, and acceptance.  
Mindfulness training was first introduced as a behavioural intervention for 
patients with chronic pain, in the form of Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction 
(MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) . Since then, mindfulness has steadily gained momentum 
in the medical and psychological literature. Following the establishment of MBSR, 
three other mindfulness-based interventions have been developed, including the 
Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), 
Dialectical Behavioural Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), and Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).  
There is extensive research supporting the use of mindfulness-based 
interventions in the treatment for anxiety disorders. A few comprehensive reviews 
have been conducted in the past decade. Hofmann et al. (2010) conducted a meta-
analysis of 39 mindfulness studies. It was estimated that the effect size (Hedge’s g) 
was 0.97 for patients with diagnosed anxiety disorders, and 0.67 for individuals with 
undiagnosed, elevated levels of anxiety symptoms. More importantly, these effect 
sizes were robust, as they were unrelated to publication year, treatment length, or 
study quality. Similar results were reported in another meta-analysis by Vollestad et 
al. (2012). They selected 19 empirical studies in which mindfulness- and acceptance-
based therapies were administered to patients with anxiety disorders. It was estimated 
that the within-group effect size for anxiety symptoms from pre- to post-treatment 
was 1.09 (Hedge’s g). These effect sizes remained robust when controlling for 
publication bias. A review of acceptance-based behavioural therapies (e.g., MBSR, 
ACT, and DBT) by Roemer, Williston, Eustis, and Orsillo (2013) revealed consistent 
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findings. It was concluded that the effectiveness of acceptance-based behavioural 
therapies has the most empirical support for generalized anxiety disorder and 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and is considered promising for social anxiety 
disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder.  
The next question is whether mindfulness-based interventions produce 
comparable effects to traditional CBT for anxiety disorders. Arch et al. (2012) 
conducted a randomized clinical trial in which they compared ACT to CBT for 
heterogeneous anxiety disorders. In this study, community participants who were 
diagnosed with one or more anxiety disorders completed 12 weekly individual 
sessions of either ACT or CBT. ACT and CBT showed comparable effects on anxiety 
symptoms from pre- to post-treatment and at a one-year follow-up. Another 
randomized clinical trial by Arch et al. (2013) compared CBT to an adapted MBSR 
for a sample of veterans who were diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. Treatment was 
delivered through ten weekly group sessions. Again, CBT and MBSR showed 
comparable improvements from pre- to post-treatment and at a three-month follow-
up.  
 
4.5 Mindfulness as a Strategy for Broadening Attentional Scope 
There is ample evidence supporting a robust link between anxiety and a narrowed 
scope of attention. Similarly, a wealth of clinical studies has shown the effectiveness 
of mindfulness-based interventions in treating anxiety. It is possible that through 
practicing mindfulness, anxious individuals might be able to broaden their scope of 
attention, which will in turn reduce anxiety symptoms. In fact, one of the original 
goals of practicing mindfulness, according to classic Buddhist literature, was to 
broaden one’s perspective and develop insight into the transient nature of suffering 
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(Bodhi, 2011). The hypothesis that mindfulness training can broaden one’s scope of 
attention is consistent with clinical observations (Stelter, 2009) and seems plausible 
from a theoretical perspective.  
 A few conceptual models have been proposed to distinguish mindfulness from 
other mental states on the basis of attentional scope. Dane (2010) defined mindfulness 
as high on present-moment orientation and wide on attentional breadth, e.g., 
individuals are focused on the present environment and attuned to a relatively wide 
range of external and internal stimuli. Dreyfus (2011) made an interesting distinction 
between mindfulness and concentration: while mindfulness expands the scope of 
attention so that one can be aware of and hold together various aspects of the objects, 
concentration stabilizes the mind on a chosen object and restricts what else can be 
considered.  
Garland, Farb, Goldin, and Fredrickson (2015) developed a mindfulness-to-
meaning theory. In this model, mindfulness is considered an emotion regulation 
strategy that disrupts negative mood state and cultivates positive psychological 
processes. It was proposed that mindfulness facilitates a decentering from 
maladaptive appraisals of stressful events and an understanding that distressing 
thoughts and emotions are transient events. By accepting adversity instead of 
perseverating on it, distressed individuals can broaden their attentional scope and start 
to focus more on pleasant and meaningful events that have been previously ignored. 
Hence, they can develop more positive reappraisals of stressful life events, and 
engage in life with a sense of meaningfulness, thus reducing their stress level.  
Empirical research, on the other hand, is lagging behind theoretical advances. 
First of all, only a handful of studies to date have looked into the broadening effect of 
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mindfulness training on attentional scope in the general population. Secondly, 
research findings from these studies are far from conclusive.  
There is some preliminary evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
mindfulness training broadens attentional scope. Slagter et al. (2007) had a group of 
experienced meditators undergo a three-month retreat during which they practiced 
insight-focused meditation 10-12 hours per day. Participants were also given an 
attentional blink task before and after intervention, during which they had to identify 
two target numbers embedded in a stream of distractor letters. Results showed that 
participants were better at detecting the second target after retreat, indicating an 
expanded scope of perceptual attention. In another study, Moore and Malinowski 
(2009) had experienced meditators and novices complete a timed test in which they 
had to discriminate and cancel out targets from visually similar distractors. Meditators 
outperformed novices and demonstrated more accurate processing of peripheral 
information. Wenk-Sormaz (2005) randomly assigned participants to a 20-minute 
meditation, a cognitive control condition (learning a mnemonic strategy), and a 
resting control condition. It was found that following meditation, participants reported 
more atypical responses in a word production task, indicating a broader scope of 
conceptual attention.  
Other studies have revealed contradictory findings. For instance, Chan and 
Woollacott (2007) found no difference between experienced meditators and novices 
in their scope of perceptual attention as measured by a modified Navon Letter Task. 
Instead, both groups responded faster to global targets, indicating a global focus of 
attention. Similarly, Braboszcz et al. (2013) observed that after a three-month 
intensive meditation retreat, participants did not show a broadened scope of attention 
and instead demonstrated a local focus of attention. This finding was replicated by 
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Colzato, van der Wel, Sellaro, and Hommel (2016). In their study, novice participants 
practiced focused attention meditation in one session and open monitoring in the other 
session, and completed the Navon Letter Task. Results demonstrated that meditation 
had no impact on the global precedence effect.  
One caveat with the above-mentioned studies is that they have all adopted a 
general mindfulness practice (e.g., breathing meditation, mindfulness of thoughts) 
rather than a mindfulness practice specifically developed to broaden one’s 
perspective. Mountain meditation is one such practice in which practitioners are 
explicitly asked to extend their perspective beyond their own body and cultivate a 
broader sense of time and space (Kabat-Zinn, 2014). Specifically, practitioners are 
asked to first visualize a mountain, then imagine being this mountain themselves, and 
observe various weather patterns, storms, and seasons passing before this mountain 
while noticing being grounded in the earth. The goal of mountain meditation is to 
enable practitioners to view their own thoughts, emotions, and life challenges as 
external, fleeting, and impersonal events, in a manner that is similar to changing 
weather patterns experienced by the mountain (Minor, Carlson, Mackenzie, Zernicke, 
& Jones, 2006). Unfortunately, no study to this date has examined the extent to which 
mountain meditation influences the scope of attention. Hence, it is impossible to 
conclude if the inconsistent findings noted above are due to particular types of 
mindfulness practice or mindfulness practice as a whole. 
 
4.6 Current Program of Research: Study 3 
Decades of research have shown a close link between anxiety and a narrow scope of 
attention. In addition, anxious individuals also experience difficulty in expanding their 
attentional scope. Therefore, the broadening of attentional scope is of particular 
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importance in the treatment of anxiety disorders. There is some preliminary evidence 
suggesting that mindfulness may be a promising strategy for broadening attentional 
scope. However, research findings on this topic are rather inconclusive. No study to 
date has examined whether or not mountain meditation, a particular mindfulness 
practice designed to expand one’s perspective, can broaden attentional scope, thus 
leaving a significant research gap. 
The current program of research was designed to clarify the specific impact of 
mountain meditation on various aspects of attentional scope, including perceptual 
attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoire. Given it still remains 
unclear whether or not mindfulness practice broadens attentional scope in the general 
population, we decided to follow the approach of previous studies and recruit 
unselected participants instead of anxious individuals. This would allow us to 
compare our results to those from past studies and help us reach a conclusion 
regarding the broadening hypothesis of mindfulness. Furthermore, we aimed to 
examine if the broadening effect of mindfulness meditation extends beyond that of 
relaxation and a passive control condition.  
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Chapter 5 
Study 1: Attentional Biases to Threat and Motivation in Spider-Related Anxiety 
5.1 Introduction 
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the impact of motivation on attentional biases 
to threat, and the relation between approach and avoidance motivation in the context 
of spider-related anxiety. A considerable amount of research has shown that spider-
fearful individuals exhibit a range of attentional biases to spider stimuli. However, 
little is known about the factors that moderate attentional biases to spider stimuli. 
Historically, spider-related anxiety has been conceptualized as a dominance of 
avoidance motivation over approach motivation. However, results from more recent 
studies suggest that spider-fearful individuals may experience an approach-avoidance 
conflict (Pittig et al., 2014). Hence, it is possible that spider-fearful individuals may 
vary in their motivation to attend to vs. avoid attending to the same spider stimuli, 
and, subsequently, exhibit different attentional biases. Unfortunately, most studies to 
date have not taken motivation into account, nor have they examined the extent to 
which motivation influences attention to threat.  
In real life, spider stimuli may cause the most distress when individuals 
encounter them while they are in the middle of an important task (e.g., writing an 
exam). In this situation, there is a significant cost to physical avoidance (e.g., running 
away from the spider means failing the exam) and attentional avoidance (e.g., the 
spider might creep up on you), but there is also a significant cost to physical approach 
(e.g., the spider might crawl onto you or bite you) and attentional engagement (e.g., it 
might increase anxiety and disgust, might make it harder to concentration on the 
exam). Some may choose to engage because they have made the decision that 
defending personal safety is more important than the exam. Some may choose to 
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avoid because they have made the decision to focus on the exam, even if that leaves 
them vulnerable to a surprise close-up encounter with the spider.  
However, ambivalent individuals are those who perhaps cannot make the 
decision to compromise exam performance by monitoring the spider, or forgo 
protecting their sense of security by ignoring the spider. Furthermore, whereas the 
engagers and avoiders have the potential to succeed in their goals (safety, and exam 
performance, respectively), people who are ambivalent, and whose attention is 
frequently shifting between the spider and the exam, may feel that they are satisfying 
neither the goal for safety nor the performance goal. They may also expend 
considerable cognitive resources towards trying to decide how best to cope, thus 
leading to more distractions and poorer performance on the current task. The fact that 
there is no ideal solution to the dilemma may also cause them to feel trapped and may 
enhance anxiety.  
 Taking all factors into account, the current study aimed to address the 
following questions in an eye-tracking experiment: (1) do spider-fearful individuals 
experience significant differences in their motivation to attend to vs. avoid attending 
to a spider? (2) do spider-fearful individuals exhibit significant differences in their 
attentional biases to threat? (3) do ambivalent individuals experience more persistent 
spider fear and more negative mood state? and (4) when spider stimuli are presented 
together with an attentionally demanding task, do ambivalent individuals experience 
more spider-related thoughts and perform more poorly on the task? 
In Study 1, individuals with significant spider fear were introduced to a live 
tarantula and then completed the Metronome Response Task (MRT), which is a 
sustained-attention task, with the spider in view. The MRT simply presents the beats 
of a metronome and participants are instructed to press the keyboard space bar in time 
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with the metronome. Performance disruption is reflected in response variability, i.e., 
the extent to which key presses are asynchronous with the metronome. Participants 
first rated their spider fear and mood state, were then shown the tarantula, and 
completed the MRT while their eye movements were recorded with a portable eye 
tracker. During the MRT, 12 thought probes were presented at random intervals. At 
each thought probe the task ceased and participants recorded, verbatim, the thought 
that they had experienced just prior to the probe and rated their motivation to attend to 
the spider, to avoid attending to the spider, and to perform well on the task.  
We tested the following hypotheses in the current study: (1) a sample of 
spider-fearful individuals could be assigned to different groups based on their 
motivation to attend to vs. avoid attending to the spider (i.e., ambivalent, engagers, 
avoiders, and indifferent); (2) the sample as a whole would exhibit attentional biases 
to threat that are different from some of the motivational groups; (3) different 
motivational groups would exhibit attentional biases to threat that are different from 
one another; (4) relative to other groups, ambivalent individuals would experience 
more persistent spider fear and more negative mood state at the end of the study; and 
(5) relative to other groups, ambivalent individuals would report more spider-related 
thoughts and show greater performance disruption during the MRT. 
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5.2 Methods 
5.2.1 Participants 
University students (N = 98) who endorsed significant fear of spiders were recruited 
from the University of Waterloo. Participants received course credits or cash 
remuneration (ten Canadian dollars per person) in exchange for their participation. In 
order to enhance motivation to perform well on the MRT, participants were told that 
they would receive a ten-dollar gift certificate if they responded to at least 90% of the 
trials in the Metronome Response Task. All 98 participants fulfilled this requirement 
and received an additional gift card. This study was advertised through an online sign-
up system and posters on campus. Before signing up for this study, potential 
participants were asked to complete the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; 
Szymanski & O'Donohue, 1995) online as to determine their eligibility. Only those 
who scored in the top 15th percentile on the FSQ (i.e., with a minimum total score of 
80) were invited to participate in this study. A cut-off score of 80 on the FSQ is a 
close approximation of individuals diagnosed with clinically significant spider phobia 
(see Muris & Merckelbach, 1996).  
Out of the original 98 participants, two participants did not complete all study 
procedures and were therefore excluded. Hence, the final sample consisted of 96 
participants (15 males) with a mean age of 19.8 years (SD = 1.4). With regards to eye 
movement data, we excluded 10 participants due to failed calibration of the eye 
tracker, six participants due to a low tracking ratio of the eye tracker (i.e., lower than 
50%), three participants due to unusable data (i.e., stimuli of interest were not present 
in the visual field), and one participant due to missing data. Therefore, there were 76 
participants with available eye movement data for analysis. Outliers on self-report 
measures, MRT measures, and eye movement indices (i.e., three standard deviations 
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above or below the means) were corrected by replacing them with the next highest or 
lowest values. All participants were informed that the purpose of this study was to 
examine how individuals perform on a cognitive task in the presence of a spider. The 
protocol received ethical clearance from the Office of Research Ethics at the 
University of Waterloo and all participants provided informed consent. 
 
5.2.2 Self-Report Measures 
5.2.2.1 Fear of Spiders Questionnaire  
Participants completed the Fear of Spiders Questionnaire (FSQ; Szymanski & 
O'Donohue, 1995) online as part of the screening process and only those who scored 
80 or above were invited to participate in this study. The FSQ is an 18-item scale that 
assesses individuals’ fear of spiders in several domains, including cognitive, 
behavioural, physiological, negative attitudes, and fear of harm by spiders. On an 8-
point Likert scale (from 1 “totally disagree” to 7 “totally agree”), participants rated to 
what extent they agree with each statement (e.g. “Spiders are one of my worst fears”). 
This measure has demonstrated satisfactory psychometric properties in past studies 
(Muris & Merckelbach, 1996; Teachman & Woody, 2003).  
 
5.2.2.2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
Participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) at three different time points—in the beginning of the study, 
immediately after seeing the spider, and at the end of the study. The PANAS consists 
of 20 items measuring mood state (i.e., how the individual is feeling at the moment). 
This measure generates two subscales: one measuring positive affect and the other 
measuring negative affect (10 items per scale). Using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 
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“very slightly or not at all” to 5 “extremely”), participants rated the extent to which 
each item was consistent with their current mood state. The PANAS has demonstrated 
good validity and reliability (Crawford & Henry, 2004). The PANAS was included to 
assess changes to participants’ mood state throughout the study. 
 
5.2.2.3 Subjective Units of Distress Scale 
Similar to PANAS, participants completed the Subjective Units of Distress Scale 
(SUDS) at three different time points—in the beginning of the study, immediately 
after seeing the spider, and at the end of the study. The SUDS is a single item 
question measuring participants’ level of spider fear. On a 10-point Likert scale (from 
0 “No fear whatsoever”, to 5 “A moderate but tolerable amount of fear”, to 10 “An 
extremely high, intolerable amount of fear”), participants responded to the question 
“how much do you fear the spider at this moment?”. The SUDS is a self-report 
measure commonly used in clinical practice (Siegel & Warren, 2013). The SUDS was 
included to assess changes to participants’ spider fear throughout the study. 
 
5.2.3 Metronome Response Task Measures 
5.2.3.1 Metronome Response Task  
The Metronome Response Task (MRT; Seli, Cheyne, & Smilek, 2013) is a sustained-
attention task in which participants have to respond to a periodic metronome tone 
presented through the speakers. On each MRT trial, participants were presented with 
650 ms of silence, followed by a metronome tone lasting 75 ms, and then another 575 
ms of silence. Participants were instructed to press the spacebar in synchrony with the 
metronome so that their key-press was made at the exact time at which each 
metronome tone was presented. Participants completed one block of the MRT on a 
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computer using the E-Prime software (Psychology Software Tools, 2007), which 
included 20 practice trials and 600 testing trials.  
 
5.2.3.2 Thought Probes and Motivation Ratings 
To assess the extent to which participants were distracted by the tarantula, we 
intermittently presented “thought probes” throughout the MRT. These probes are 
simply task interruptions that require participants to report on their thoughts in the 
moment just prior to the presentation of each probe. One probe was randomly 
presented within every set of 50 MRT trials. Hence, there were 12 thought probes in 
total. The MRT was structured in a way that there was a minimum interval of 10 trials 
between any of the two thought probes. Upon the presentation of each thought probe, 
the MRT temporarily stopped and the computer gave the prompt: “what was the 
thought you were having just prior to this moment”. Participants were to type their 
thought(s), verbatim. Next, participants provided three separate reports of motivation: 
(1) “how motivated were you to attend to the spider?”, i.e., approach motivation; (2) 
“how motivated were you to avoid attending to the spider?”, i.e., avoidance 
motivation; and (3) “how motivated were you to perform well on this task?”, i.e., 
performance motivation, using a 9-point Likert scale (from 1 “No motivation at all” to 
9 “Very strong motivation”), 
Three independent judges were recruited to code reported thoughts. Each 
thought was rated on spider-relatedness (i.e., whether the thought was related to a 
spider) and assigned to one of the two categories: (1) spider-related thoughts, e.g., 
“the spider is moving”, and (2) other thoughts, e.g., “which gift card I should choose”. 
Inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s kappa) ranged from 0.95 to 0.97, suggesting excellent 
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reliability across coders. Inter-rater averages were calculated and significant 
discrepancies were resolved through discussion.  
 
5.2.3.3 Performance Measures 
The Rhythmic Response Time (RRT) was first calculated as the absolute difference 
between the time of the key-press and the onset of the metronome tone. A higher RRT 
variance indicates less synchronous responding, which in turn reflects poorer 
performance (Seli, Carriere, & Smilek, 2015). Variance data was highly skewed in the 
positive direction, which is typical to studies using the MRT. Hence, we followed 
established procedures and adjusted the RRT variance using a natural logarithm 
transform (see Seli et al., 2013). Mean RRT variance was calculated by using a 
moving window of the current and preceding four trials across all trials except the 
very first five trials and the five trials following each thought probe. Mean RRT 
variance serves as an indicator of participants’ overall performance on the MRT. We 
also calculated the proportion of spider-related thoughts for each participant, which 
measures the extent to which participants were distracted by the tarantula during the 
MRT.  
 
5.2.4 Materials and Stimuli  
Participants were seated at a table over the entire course of the MRT. A 15-inch 
desktop computer monitor was placed in the centre of the table. A terrarium 
measuring 10cm in width, 10cm in length, and 12cm in height, and a basket-shaped 
pencil holder measuring 8cm in diameter and 12cm in height were placed to the left 
and right of the computer monitor (with an approximately 10° visual angle, 
counterbalanced across participants). The terrarium contained a live, Chilean Rose 
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tarantula, which acted as our threat stimulus. The pencil holder carried a variety of 
gift certificates, which was similar in size to the terrarium and acted as our control 
stimulus. In this study, participants were seated approximately 90cm away from the 
computer monitor, and 85cm away from the terrarium and pencil holder. These 
distances were held constant across participants.  
 
5.2.5. Eye Movement Measures 
5.2.5.1 Eye-Tracking Procedure 
We used the iView XTM head-mounted eye-tracking device system (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, 2009) to record participants’ eye movements during the completion of 
the MRT. Participants were asked to sit in a chair, have the chinstrap securely 
fastened, and minimize their head movement during the study. Participants first 
underwent a process known as calibration, which required participants to gaze at five 
dots on a black board while the position of their eye was determined. Once the 
cameras were calibrated, participants proceeded to the MRT during which their eye 
movements were recorded. A range of stimuli, including the computer screen, caged 
spider, and gift certificates, were placed within participants’ visual field. 
 
5.2.5.2 Eye Movement Indices 
Eye movement data was coded using the BeGazeTM software (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, 2014). For each participant, there were 12 thought probes embedded in 
the MRT. Hence, the recording of each participant’s eye movements was interrupted 
12 times, leaving 13 segments of data for coding. Due to the structuring of the 
Metronome Response Task, the first thought probe could occur shortly after the start 
of the task. Similarly, the last thought probe could take place immediately before the 
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end of the task. Therefore, we discarded the first segment (from the beginning of the 
Metronome Response Task to the start of the 1st thought probe) as well as the last 
segment (from the end of the 12th thought probe to the end of the Metronome 
Response Task) due to their short durations. We also discarded the second last 
segment (from the end of the 11th thought probe to the start of the 12th thought probe) 
due to a technical problem we encountered with the BeGazeTM software, which 
prevented us from accessing this segment of eye movement data for 15 participants. 
Therefore, there were 10 segments of eye tracking data for each participant 
(e.g., from the end of the 1st thought probe to the start of the 2nd thought probe, from 
the end of the 2nd thought probe to the start of the 3rd thought probe, etc.). We then 
defined the following two areas of interest (AOIs) by annotating the relevant spatial 
regions in the BeGazeTM software: (1) the terrarium that contains the spider, and (2) 
the pencil holder that contains gift certificates. For each AOI, we generated the 
following eye movement indices: (1) proportion of viewing time (PVT), i.e., 
percentage of time spent on looking at a particular AOI; (2) average fixation duration 
(AFD), i.e., average duration of fixations on a particular AOI; (3) probability of first 
fixation (PFF), i.e., the probability of having the first fixation on a particular AOI in 
the beginning of any given segment; and (4) first fixation duration (FFD), i.e., average 
duration of the first fixations on a particular AOI. These four indices allow us to 
examine: (1) initial orienting of attention, as a greater PFF indicates an attentional 
bias towards the current stimulus; (2) maintenance of attention, as a higher AFD and a 
higher FFD both indicate sustained attention towards the current stimulus; and (3) 
selective attention, as a higher PVT indicates more attention being paid to the current 
stimulus. In addition, we also calculated the PVT for each of the ten time segments, 
which allows the examination of the time-course of attentional allocation. 
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It should be noted that some of these eye tracking measures (e.g., PVT on 
spider vs. PVT on gift certificates) are not redundant to one another, as there were 
additional stimuli to the tarantula and gift certificates (e.g., computer screen, wall, 
table, etc.) and participants generally spent a substantial amount of time viewing their 
surrounding environment.     
 
5.2.6 Procedures 
Participants first completed the FSQ online and only those with a total score of 80 or 
higher were invited to participate in this study. Participants were tested individually in 
the laboratory. Upon their arrival, participants first completed the PANAS and SUDS 
ratings in the absence of the tarantula. Following the baseline measures, a transparent 
terrarium containing a live tarantula was placed in the lab and the researcher 
demonstrated that the tarantula was alive by prodding it gently with a pen to evoke 
movement. Participants then completed the PANAS and SUDS ratings for the second 
time, after which they were calibrated on the eye tracker and underwent the MRT. In 
order to enhance motivation to perform well on the MRT task, participants were told 
that in addition to the standard remuneration (course credit or cash) they would 
receive an additional reward of a ten-dollar gift certificate of their choice if they 
responded to at least 90% of the trials in the MRT, which is actually the performance 
level student samples typically achieve. At random intervals, the task was interrupted 
and participants reported the content of their thoughts immediately prior to the probe 
and provided ratings of their motivation to attend to the spider, to avoid attending to 
the spider, and to do well on the MRT task. After the MRT, participants completed 
the PANAS and SUDS ratings for the third time. In total, the procedure lasted roughly 
60 minutes. 
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5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Do Spider-Fearful Individuals Experience Significant Differences in Their 
Motivation to Attend to Vs. Avoid Attending to the Spider? 
At each of the 12 thought probes, participants rated their motivation to attend to the 
spider (i.e., approach motivation), motivation to avoid attending to the spider (i.e., 
avoidance motivation), and motivation to perform well on the task (i.e., performance 
motivation). For each participant, all 12 reports were aggregated and the average was 
calculated for each rating. Overall, there was no significant correlation between 
approach and avoidance motivation, r = -.05, p = .662, suggesting that approach and 
avoidance motivation are indeed distinct constructs. Performance motivation, on the 
other hand, was significantly correlated with avoidance motivation, r = .249, p = .015, 
but not approach motivation, r = .071, p = .490.  
To test our fist hypothesis, we divided the sample into four groups based on 
their motivation ratings, as per Nelson et al. (2015): (1) ambivalent, i.e., those who 
scored 5 or above on both motivation to attend and motivation to avoid attending (N 
=16); (2) engagers, i.e., those who scored 5 or above on motivation to attend and 
below 5 on motivation to avoid attending (N = 18); (3) avoiders, i.e., those who 
scored 5 or above on motivation to avoid attending and below 5 on motivation to 
attend (N = 22); and (4) indifferent, i.e., those who scored below 5 on both motivation 
to attend and motivation to avoid attending (N = 40). Means and standard deviations 
of motivation ratings for each group are presented in Table 1. Hence, our first 
hypothesis was confirmed: a sample of spider-fearful individuals can be assigned to 
different groups based on their motivation towards the spider.  
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Table 1. Study 1: Motivation Ratings by Group 
 N Approach motivation Avoidance motivation Performance motivation 
     
All Participants 96 4.24 (2.28) 4.50 (2.59) 7.77 (1.40) 
     
    Ambivalent 16 6.96 (1.21) 7.22 (1.24) 8.29 (0.77) 
     
    Engagers 18 6.74 (1.18) 2.42 (1.21) 7.58 (1.53) 
      
    Avoiders 22 2.47 (1.16) 7.44 (1.03) 8.10 (1.23) 
     
    Indifferent 40 3.01 (1.23) 2.73 (1.21) 7.47 (1.56) 
     
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. 
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5.3.2 Do Spider-Fearful Individuals Exhibit Significant Differences in Their 
Attentional Biases to Threat? 
We aimed to test the following two hypotheses: (1) the sample as a whole would 
exhibit attentional biases to threat that are different from some of the motivational 
groups, and (2) different motivational groups would exhibit attentional biases to threat 
that are different from one another. Based on the design of the current study, there 
were two ways to measure attentional biases to threat. One was to aggregate eye 
movement data collected in each segment of the MRT and look at the overall pattern 
of eye movements. The other was to directly examine the time-course of eye 
movements within each segment of the MRT (e.g., proportion of viewing time). We 
followed both approaches in testing each of our hypotheses.  
We first aggregated eye movement data across segments of the MRT and 
calculated the following eye movement indices: Proportion of Viewing Time (PVT); 
Average Fixation Duration (AFD); Probability of First Fixation (PFF); First Fixation 
Duration (FFD). Means and standard deviations of these indices are presented in 
Table 2. Collectively (when all four groups were combined), participants spent a 
greater proportion of time looking at the spider than gift certificates, t (75) = 6.33, p 
< .001, and had significantly longer fixations on the spider than gift certificates, t (71) 
= 2.50, p = .015. In addition, participants were more likely to have their first fixations 
on the spider than gift certificates, t (74) = 3.99, p < .001, and their first fixations were 
significantly longer on the spider than gift certificates, t (75) = 4.35, p < .001. In 
general, our sample of spider-fearful individuals demonstrated facilitated attention to 
the spider. 
To examine the impact of motivation on initial orienting of attention, we 
conducted a 2 (Stimulus: spider vs. gift certificates) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. 
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engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed ANOVA on PFF. This analysis revealed 
a significant main effect of stimulus, F (1, 71) = 43.18, η2p = .378, p < .001, a 
significant main effect of group, F (3, 71) = 18.39, η2p = .437, p < .001, and a 
significant stimulus by group interaction, F (3, 71) = 20.84, η2p = .468, p < .001. 
Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that while participants were more likely to 
have their first fixations on the spider than gift certificates for the ambivalent group, 
t(10) = 2.93, p = .015, and engagers group, t(14) = 4.61, p < .001, there was no such 
bias for the indifferent group, t (30) = 0.69, p = .498. The avoiders group, on the other 
hand, demonstrated no first fixations on either spider or gift certificates, thus not 
entered for the paired-sample t-test (due to zero variance).  
To examine the impact of motivation on maintenance of attention, we 
conducted the same 2 (Stimulus: spider vs. gift certificates) x 4 (Group: ambivalent 
vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed ANOVA on AFD and FFD, 
respectively. For AFD, we observed a significant main effect of stimulus, F (1, 68) = 
10.41, η2p = .133, p = .002, no main effect of group, F (3, 68) = 0.54, p = .659, and a 
significant stimulus by group interaction, F (3, 68) = 3.85, η2p = .145, p = .013. For 
FFD, we observed a significant main effect of stimulus, F (1, 72) = 15.42, η2p = .176, 
p < .001, no main effect of group, F (3, 72) = 1.35, p = .266, and no stimulus by group 
interaction, F (3, 72) = 0.53, p = .664. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that 
while participants had longer fixations on the spider than gift certificates for the 
ambivalent group, t (11) = 2.30, p = .042, and avoiders group, t (165) = 2.33, p = .035, 
there was no such bias for the engagers group, t (14) = -0.52, p = .609, and indifferent 
group, t (29) = 0.59, p = .560. First fixations were significantly longer on the spider 
than gift certificates for the engagers group, t (14) = 2.56, p = .023, and indifferent 
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group, t (30) = 2.87, p = .007, but not for the avoiders group, t (17) = 1.21, p = .243, 
and ambivalent group, t (11) = 2.00, p = .071. 
To examine the impact of motivation on selective attention, we conducted a 2 
(Stimulus: spider vs. gift certificates) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. 
avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed ANOVA on PVT. This analysis showed a significant 
main effect of stimulus, F (1, 72) = 60.32, η2p = .456, p < .001, a significant main 
effect of group, F (3, 72) = 5.85, η2p = .196, p = .001, and a significant stimulus by 
group interaction, F (3, 72) = 7.04, η2p = .227, p < .001. Follow-up paired-sample t-
tests showed that participants had higher proportions of viewing time on the spider 
than gift cards for the ambivalent group, t (11) = 3.09, p = .010, engagers group, t (14) 
= 4.54, p < .001, avoiders group, t (17) = 2.35, p = .031, and indifferent group, t (30) 
= 3.89, p < .001. 
We then separated eye movement data into each individual segment (as 
separated by thought probes) and calculated the proportion of viewing time (PVT) for 
spider and gift certificates within each segment. Means and standard errors of 
proportion of viewing time are presented in Table 3. Collectively (when all four 
groups were combined), participants demonstrated a consistent viewing pattern over 
the course of the MRT. We conducted a 2 (Stimulus: spider vs. gift certificates) x 10 
(Time: S1-10) repeated measures ANOVA on PVT. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for main effect of time, χ2 (44) = 198.35, p 
< .001, and stimulus by time interaction, χ2 (44) = 209.42, p < .001, therefore degrees 
of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .628 for 
time, and ε = .634 for stimulus by time). This analysis revealed a significant main 
effect of time, F (5.65, 423.96) = 2.70, η2p = .035, p = .016, and a trending stimulus 
by time interaction, F (5.70, 427.70) = 2.12, η2p = .028, p = .053. Follow-up paired-
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sample t-tests showed that participants spent significantly more time looking at the 
spider than gift certificates during each of the segments (all ps < .001). In general, our 
sample of spider-fearful individuals demonstrated facilitated attention to the spider 
throughout the MRT.  
Next, we examined if different motivational groups demonstrated different 
trends in their eye movements over the course of the MRT. We first conducted a 2 
(Stimulus: spider vs. gift certificates) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. 
avoiders vs. indifferent) x 10 (Time: S1-10) repeated measures ANOVA on 
proportion of viewing time. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated for main effect of time, χ2 (44) = 174.15, p < .001, and stimulus by 
time interaction, χ2 (44) = 181.84, p < .001, therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .679 for time, and ε = .681 
for stimulus by time). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of stimulus, F 
(1, 72) = 62.36, η2p = .464, p < .001, a significant main effect of time, F (6.11, 439.86) 
= 3.84, η2p = .051, p < .001, a significant main effect of group, F (3, 72) = 10.59, η2p 
= .306, p < .001, a significant stimulus by group interaction, F (3, 72) = 11.90, η2p 
= .332, p < .001, a significant time by group interaction, F (18.33, 439.86) = 3.03, η2p 
= .112, p < .001, a significant stimulus by time interaction, F (6.13, 441.50) = 3.51, 
η2p = .046, p = .002, and a significant stimulus by time by group interaction, F (18.40, 
441.50) = 4.03, η2p = .144, p < .001. 
To explore this significant stimulus by time by group interaction, we 
calculated the PVT bias score by subtracting gift certificates PVT from spider PVT 
for each participant per segment. Hence, a PVT bias score that is significantly greater 
than 0 would indicate an attentional bias towards the spider, whereas a PVT bias score 
that is significantly lower than 0 would indicate an attentional bias towards gift 
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certificates. Means and standard errors of PVT bias scores are depicted in Figure 1. 
For each segment within each motivational group, we performed multiple one-sample 
t-tests in which the PVT bias score was compared to 0 (which indicates no significant 
bias). The ambivalent group showed a greater PVT on the spider during S1 – S7, and 
S10 (all ps < .040), but not during S8 and S9 (both ps > .070). The engagers group 
demonstrated a greater PVT on the spider during S1 – S10 (all ps < .018). The 
avoiders group only showed a greater PVT on the spider during S1 – S3, S5, S8, and 
S9 (all ps < .046), but not during S4, S6, S7, and S10 (all ps > .068). The indifferent 
group demonstrated a greater PVT on the spider during S1 – S7, and S9 – S10 (all ps 
< .023), but not during S8, t (30) = 1.65, p = .110.  
To further explore if different motivational groups demonstrated different time 
courses of eye movements, we performed multiple one-way ANOVAs in which PVT 
bias score was tested as a function of group (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. 
indifferent) within each segment. We observed a significant main effect of group 
during S1, F (3, 72) = 7.97, η2p = .249, p < .001, S2, F (3, 72) = 6.86, η2p = .222, p 
< .001, S3, F (3, 72) = 7.01, η2p = .226, p < .001, S4, F (3, 72) = 8.78, η2p = .268, p 
< .001, S5, F (3, 72) = 7.73, η2p = .244, p < .001, S6, F (3, 72) = 3.87, η2p = .139, p 
= .013, S7, F (3, 72) = 11.98, η2p = .333, p < .001, S8, F (3, 72) = 13.35, η2p = .357, p 
< .001, S9, F (3, 72) = 8.47, η2p = .261, p < .001, but not during S10, F (3, 72) = 1.44, 
p = .239. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) showed that during S1, S2, S5, and 
S6, the engagers group had a significantly higher PVT bias score than avoiders and 
indifferent groups (all ps < .021). During S7, S8, and S9, the engagers group had a 
significantly higher PVT bias score than all other groups (all ps < .002). During S3, 
the engagers group had a significantly higher PVT bias score than avoiders and 
indifferent groups (both ps < .026), and similarly, the ambivalent group had a 
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significantly higher PVT bias score than avoiders and indifferent groups (both ps 
< .018). During S4, the ambivalent group had a significantly higher PVT bias score 
than avoiders and indifferent groups (both ps < .001), and the engagers group also had 
a significantly higher PVT bias score than the avoiders group (p = .019).  
Together, these results suggest that there are significant differences in their 
attentional biases to threat between some of the motivational groups and the sample as 
a whole, and between different motivational groups, thus confirming our second and 
third hypotheses.  
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Table 2. Study 1: Eye Movement Indices by Group 
 All Participants (N = 76)  Ambivalent (N = 12)  Engagers (N = 15)  Avoiders (N = 18)   Indifferent (N = 31) 
 Spider GC  Spider GC  Spider GC  Spider GC  Spider GC 
               
PVT (%) 11.89  
(13.31) 
2.43 
(2.97) 
 15.16 
(15.61) 
0.96 
(1.20) 
 23.03 
(17.05) 
3.01 
(3.63) 
 6.81 
(9.06) 
1.86 
(2.01) 
 8.18 
(8.69) 
3.04 
(3.37) 
                
AFF (ms) 430.87  
(254.70) 
349.37 
(189.34) 
 560.05 
(333.70) 
293.33 
(233.60) 
 382.07 
(122.91) 
410.12 
(136.21) 
 423.17 
(266.58) 
262.56 
(173.14) 
 407.44 
(257.40) 
384.81 
(187.73) 
               
PFF (%) 8.26  
(16.00) 
0.73 
(2.48) 
 9.47 
(11.53) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 29.10 
(24.47) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
 2.49 
(4.30) 
1.76 
(3.65) 
               
FFD (ms) 349.36  
(298.21) 
199.44 
(195.30) 
 368.35 
(226.33) 
207.96 
(255.52) 
 360.85 
(159.75) 
196.41 
(195.43) 
 231.32 
(262.94) 
158.41 
(151.35) 
 404.98 
(375.08) 
221.42 
(197.65) 
               
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. GC: Gift Certificates; PVT: Proportion of Viewing Time; AFD: Average 
Fixation Duration; PFF: Probability of First Fixation; FFD: First Fixation Duration. 
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Table 3. Study 1: Segment-Specific Eye Movement Indices by Group 
Index Group S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 S8 S9 S10 
            
PVT 
Spider (%)  
All 
Participants  
(N = 76) 
10.56 
(16.40) 
12.90 
(19.30) 
12.51 
(18.82) 
11.67 
(16.97) 
10.05 
(19.15) 
5.88 
(9.34) 
8.97 
(16.35) 
11.06 
(17.44) 
9.68 
(16.10) 
10.63 
(14.44) 
           
Ambivalent  
(N = 12) 
12.61 
(13.80) 
12.63 
(17.21) 
24.57 
(34.01) 
26.28 
(27.94) 
8.51 
(11.11) 
3.35 
(3.37) 
6.73 
(7.29) 
6.37 
(6.54) 
3.63 
(5.10) 
5.17 
(6.94) 
           
Engagers  
(N = 15) 
26.03 
(26.69) 
30.95 
(28.99 
23.51 
(18.74) 
19.34 
(16.49) 
27.22 
(34.36) 
13.89 
(16.11) 
27.29 
(29.18) 
30.94 
(29.21) 
25.88 
(28.17) 
16.52 
(17.59) 
           
Avoiders 
(N = 18) 
2.37 
(3.00) 
3.71 
(4.24) 
6.31 
(9.44) 
1.94 
(2.56) 
0.56 
(0.64) 
3.44 
(4.82) 
3.11 
(4.59) 
5.29 
(7.62) 
5.71 
(7.54) 
7.81 
(10.61) 
           
Indifferent 
(N = 31) 
7.05 
(9.52) 
9.61 
(13.99) 
6.12 
(7.91) 
7.96 
(10.84) 
7.86 
(10.62) 
4.41 
(6.27) 
4.39 
(5.23) 
6.60 
(8.19) 
6.48 
(8.35) 
11.53 
(16.13) 
PVT  
GC (%) 
           
All 
Participants  
(N = 76) 
1.34 
(2.24) 
1.17 
(2.09) 
1.59 
(2.54) 
2.50 
(4.11) 
2.20 
(3.63) 
1.34 
(2.06) 
0.98 
(1.72) 
2.53 
(4.38) 
2.09 
(3.00) 
1.61 
(2.54) 
           
Ambivalent  
(N = 12) 
0.58 
(0.91) 
0.17 
(0.25) 
0.43 
(0.66) 
0.62 
(0.65) 
0.13 
(0.23) 
0.43 
(0.79) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
2.56 
(3.95) 
0.68 
(1.02) 
0.43 
(0.53) 
           
Engagers  
(N = 15) 
2.20 
(2.73) 
2.28 
(3.57) 
1.38 
(1.98) 
3.47 
(5.11) 
1.73 
(2.27) 
2.53 
(3.12) 
0.47 
(0.70) 
0.76 
(0.99) 
1.68 
(2.23) 
2.78 
(3.91) 
           
Avoiders 
(N = 18) 
0.33 
(0.51) 
0.54 
(0.70) 
1.41 
(1.95) 
1.89 
(2.98) 
2.64 
(4.24) 
1.23 
(1.68) 
0.99 
(1.42) 
1.07 
(1.77) 
1.30 
(1.24) 
2.43 
(3.06) 
           
Indifferent 
(N = 31) 
1.81 
(2.67) 
1.38 
(1.82) 
2.24 
(3.31) 
2.98 
(4.22) 
1.18 
(1.78) 
1.60 
(2.25) 
4.23 
(5.84) 
3.30 
(4.02) 
1.03 
(1.24) 
2.00 
(2.74) 
            
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. GC: Gift Certificates; PVT: Proportion of Viewing Time.  
74	
Figure 1. Study 1: Proportion of Viewing Time Bias Scores by Segment 
 
Note: Error bars are ±1 standard error.
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5.3.4 Do Ambivalent Individuals Experience More Persistent Spider Fear and 
More Negative Mood State at the End of the Study? 
Spider fear and mood state were measured through the SUDS and PANAS at three 
different time points in the current study: time 1, in the beginning of the study; time 2, 
immediately after participants saw the spider; and time 3, at the end of the study. To 
test our fourth hypothesis, we conducted separate analyses exploring the impact of 
motivation on positive affect, negative affect, and spider fear.  
To examine the impact of motivation on positive affect, we first conducted a 
mixed ANOVA, in which time (time 1 vs. time 2 vs. time 3) was entered as the 
within-subject factor and group (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) 
was entered as the between-subject factor. Means and standard errors of positive 
affect ratings by time are depicted in Figure 2. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2 (2) = 13.93, p = .001, therefore degrees 
of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .920). This 
analysis revealed a significant main effect of time, F (1.84, 169.36) = 8.70, η2p = .077, 
p < .001, a significant time by group interaction, F (5.52, 169.36) = 2.27, η2p = .069, p 
= .044, but no main effect of group, F (3, 92) = 0.93, p = .430. To explore this 
significant interaction, we conducted repeated measures ANOVAs in which positive 
affect was tested as a function of time (time 1 vs. time 2 vs. time 3) in each group. We 
observed a significant main effect of time for the indifferent group, F (2, 78) = 13.66, 
η2p = .259, p < .001, such that positive affect remained constant from time 1 to time 2, 
p = .924, but decreased significantly from time 2 to time 3, p = .001. However, we 
observed no main effect of time for other groups (all ps > .177), such positive affect 
remained relatively stable over time for the ambivalent, engagers, and avoiders 
groups. To examine if different groups reported different levels of positive affect at 
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each of the time points, we conducted one-way ANOVAs in which positive affect was 
tested as a function of group (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent). 
Results showed no significant main effect of group at any time point (all ps > .238). 
For negative affect, we conducted the same mixed ANOVA in which time 
(time 1 vs. time 2 vs. time 3) was entered as the within-subject factor and group 
(ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) was entered as the between-
subject factor. Means and standard errors of negative affect ratings by time are 
depicted in Figure 3. This analysis showed a significant main effect of time, F (2, 
184) = 75.08, η2p = .449, p < .001, a significant main effect of group, F (3, 92) = 9.99, 
η2p = .246, p < .001, and a significant time by group interaction, F (6, 184) = 4.59, η2p 
= .130, p < .001. To better understand this interaction, we conducted follow-up 
repeated measures ANOVAs and observed a significant quadratic trend between time 
and negative affect (all ps < .001) for all four groups, such that all participants 
reported a significant increase in negative affect from time 1 to time 2 (all ps < .046), 
and a significant decrease from time 2 to time 3 (all ps < .017). However, while we 
observed a significant linear trend between time and negative affect for the engagers, 
avoiders, and indifferent groups (all ps < .027), such that they all reported a significant 
decrease in negative affect from time 1 to time 3, there was no significant linear trend 
between time and negative affect for the ambivalent group, F (1, 15) = 1.39, p = .256, 
such that they reported no significant change in negative affect from time 1 to time 3. 
In addition, we also conducted one-way ANOVAs to examine if different groups 
reported different levels of negative affect at each of the time points. Results showed 
a significant main effect of group on negative affect at time 2, F (3, 92) = 6.25, η2p 
= .169, p < .001, and time 3, F (3, 92) = 17.89, η2p = .368, p < .001, but not at time 1, 
F (3, 92) = 1.37, p = .256. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that at time 
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2, the avoiders and ambivalent groups reported significantly higher negative affect 
than the indifferent group (both ps < .007). However, at time 3, the ambivalent group 
reported significantly higher negative affect than all other groups (all ps < .001). 
With respect to spider fear ratings, we conducted the same mixed ANOVA in 
which time (time 1 vs. time 2 vs. time 3) was entered as the within-subject factor and 
group (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) was entered as the 
between-subject factor. Means and standard errors of spider fear ratings by time are 
depicted in Figure 4. This analysis revealed a significant main effect of time, F (2, 
184) = 68.91, η2p = .428, p < .001, a significant main effect of group, F (3, 92) = 
11.33, η2p = .270, p < .001, and a significant time by group interaction, F (6, 184) = 
4.65, η2p = .132, p < .001. To explore this time by group interaction, we conducted 
follow-up repeated measures ANOVAs and observed a significant quadratic trend 
between time and SUDS (all ps < .001) for all four groups, such that all participants 
reported a significant increase in spider fear from time 1 to time 2 (all ps < .001, with 
the exception of the indifferent group, p = .573), and a significant decrease from time 
2 to time 3 (all ps < .006). However, while we observed a significant linear trend 
between time and spider fear for the engagers, avoiders, and indifferent groups (all ps 
< .005), such that they all reported a significant decrease in SUDS from time 1 to time 
3, there was no significant linear trend between time and spider fear for the 
ambivalent group, F (1, 15) = 0.34, p = .569, such that they reported no significant 
change in spider fear from time 1 to time 3. In addition, we also conducted one-way 
ANOVAs to examine if different groups reported different levels of negative affect at 
each of the time points. Results showed a significant main effect of group on negative 
affect at time 2, F (3, 92) = 8.31, η2p = .213, p < .001, and time 3, F (3, 92) = 18.41, 
η2p = .375, p < .001, but not at time 1, F (3, 92) = 2.22, p = .091. Post hoc 
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comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that at time 2, the avoiders and ambivalent 
groups reported significantly higher spider fear than the indifferent group (both ps 
< .001). However, at time 3, the ambivalent group reported significantly higher 
negative affect than all other groups (all ps < .007), and the engagers and avoiders 
groups reported significantly higher negative affect than the indifferent group (both ps 
< .001).  
In summary, all four groups reported heightened negative affect and spider 
fear immediately after seeing the spider. Positive affect, on the other hand, decreased 
significantly for the indifferent group and remained relatively constant for all other 
groups. Whereas the levels of negative affect and spider fear dropped significantly 
below baseline for other groups at the end of the study, the ambivalent group 
experienced sustained levels of negative affect and spider fear, thus confirming our 
fourth hypothesis.  
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Figure 2. Study 1: Ratings on Positive Affect by Time 
 
Note: Note: For ambivalent group, N = 16; for engagers group, N = 18; for avoiders group, N = 22; for indifferent group, N = 40. Error bars are 
±1 standard error. 
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Figure 3. Study 1: Ratings on Negative Affect by Time 
 
Note: Note: For ambivalent group, N = 16; for engagers group, N = 18; for avoiders group, N = 22; for indifferent group, N = 40. Error bars are 
±1 standard error. 
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Figure 4. Study 1: Ratings on Spider Fear by Time 
 
Note: Note: For ambivalent group, N = 16; for engagers group, N = 18; for avoiders group, N = 22; for indifferent group, N = 40. Error bars are 
±1 standard error.
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5.3.4 Do Ambivalent Individuals Report More Spider-Related Thoughts and Show 
Greater Performance Disruption During the MRT? 
In the current study, performance on the MRT was measured through variance in response 
time. We also calculated the proportion of reported thoughts that were related to the spider. 
Means and standard deviations of MRT measures are presented in Table 4. To examine the 
impact of motivation on MRT performance, we conducted multiple one-way ANOVAs in 
which each MRT measure was tested as a function of group (i.e., ambivalent vs. engagers vs. 
avoiders vs. indifferent). We observed a significant main effect of group for mean RRT 
variance, F (3, 92) = 2.92, η2p = .087, p = .038, and for the proportion of spider-related 
thoughts, F (3, 92) = 10.54, η2p = .256, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) 
revealed that the engagers group displayed higher mean RRT variance than the indifferent 
group, p = .041, indicating poorer performance throughout the MRT. In addition, the 
engagers group also reported a higher proportion of spider-related thoughts than the avoiders 
and indifferent groups (both ps < .001), indicating more spider-related thoughts. Hence, the 
ambivalent group did not experience more spider-related thoughts or perform more poorly on 
the MRT, thus rejecting our fifth hypothesis.   
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Table 4. Study 1: MRT Measures by Group 
 Ambivalent  
(N = 16) 
Engagers  
(N = 18) 
Avoiders  
(N = 22) 
Indifferent  
(N = 40) 
F 
      
Mean RRT variance 7.89 
(0.40) 
8.28 
(0.52) 
7.98 
(0.36) 
7.93 
(0.49) 
2.92* 
       
Proportion of spider-
related thoughts % 
44.79 
(21.92) 
56.48 
(20.92) 
35.26 
(17.30) 
30.00 
(13.32) 
10.54*** 
      
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets; RRT: Rhythmic 
Response Time. One-way ANOVAs were performed to examine between-group differences. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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5.4 Discussion  
The purpose of Study 1 was to examine the impact of motivation on attentional biases to 
threat, and the relation between approach and avoidance motivation in the context of spider-
related anxiety. Specifically, we aimed to examine: (1) if a sample of spider-fearful 
individuals could be assigned to different groups based on their motivation to attend to vs. 
avoid attending to the spider; (2) if the sample of spider-fearful individuals would exhibit 
attentional biases to threat that are different from some of the motivational groups; (3) if 
different motivational groups would exhibit attentional biases to threat that are different from 
one another; (4) ambivalent individuals would experience more persistent spider fear and 
more negative mood state at the end of the study; and (5) ambivalent individuals would report 
more spider-related thoughts and show greater performance disruption during the MRT. 
In general, the current data provided support to the first four hypotheses but not the 
last one. Based on their motivation ratings, we were able to divide a sample of spider-fearful 
individuals into four different sub-groups, thus confirming our first hypothesis. More 
importantly, when spider-fearful individuals were divided into different motivational groups, 
they demonstrated different attentional biases to threat as measured by eye tracking 
technology. Our sample, as a whole, consistently demonstrated facilitated attention to the 
spider, which was not observed in some of the motivational groups. Moreover, the engagers 
group showed more facilitated attention to threat than the avoiders and indifferent groups, 
whereas the ambivalent group displayed a sudden increase in their visual attention towards 
the spider in segment 3 and segment 4. Hence, our second and third hypotheses were 
supported. At the end of the study, ambivalent individuals reported more negative mood state 
and greater spider fear than any other groups, thus confirming our fourth hypothesis. 
Ambivalent individuals, however, did not report more spider-related thoughts or performed 
more poorly on the MRT. Hence, our fifth hypothesis was not supported.  
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The most important finding was that our sample of spider-fearful individuals was not 
a homogenous group. Historically, psychological research has conceptualized anxiety as 
resulting from a dominance of avoidance motivation over approach motivation (e.g., Fowles, 
1987). In the current study, however, not every spider-fearful individual endorsed strong 
motivation to avoid attending to the spider. Instead, a significant proportion of our 
participants endorsed strong motivation to attend to the spider. The current study also 
revealed that approach motivation and avoidance motivation can interact with each other: 
some participants were low on one and high on the other (e.g., engagers or avoiders), some 
participants were high on both (e.g., ambivalent), and some participants were low on both 
(e.g., indifferent). Hence, anxious individuals can be classified into four motivational groups, 
rather than two (i.e., engagers and avoiders) as suggested by leading models of anxiety (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Categorizing spider-fearful individuals on the 
basis of their motivation towards the spider was further supported by eye movement data, 
self-report measures, and response time measures. Different motivational groups 
demonstrated different patterns of visual attention towards the spider during the MRT. 
Similarly, different motivational groups also reported different levels of mood state and 
spider fear, and performed differently on the MRT. If we had treated our sample as a 
homogenous group and analyzed the data as a whole, we would have missed this huge range 
of variance and drawn conclusions that are misrepresentative at best.  
Interestingly, only a minority of our anxious sample endorsed ambivalent motivation 
towards the spider. The proportion of ambivalent individuals in Study 1 (approximately 17%) 
is somewhat consistent with findings from previous research. Nelson et al. (2015) reported 
that 20 out of 161 participants (approximately 12%) indicated having ambivalent motivation 
towards threat images, using the same motivation measures and classification system. While 
our sample consisted of individuals who reported clinical levels of spider fear, participants 
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from Nelson et al.’s study (2015) included individuals with various levels of trait anxiety. 
Our results suggest that the proportion of ambivalent individuals may be higher in clinical 
populations. Alternatively, if we consider this experiment as an exposure for spider-fearful 
individuals (as they had to stay in the vicinity of a live tarantula by themselves for about 40 
minutes), ambivalent individuals were the only group whose anxiety did not decline in 
response to prolonged exposure. Hence, the proportion of ambivalent individuals may 
represent the proportion of spider-fearful individuals who do not respond to a single session 
of exposure therapy. This percentage (approximately 17%) is consistent with what has been 
reported by past studies, ranging from 15-20% (see Andersson et al., 2009; Zlomke & Davis, 
2008).  
Surprisingly, a significant proportion of our sample (approximately 42%) endorsed 
indifferent motivation towards the spider, whereas only 19% of participants were classified as 
indifferent by Nelson et al. (2015). Our data revealed that the indifferent group reported 
lower levels of negative mood state and spider fear at both time 2 (immediately after seeing 
the spider) and time 3 (at the end of the study). However, indifferent individuals scored 
similarly to other groups on the FSQ that was administered prior to their participation in the 
study. There are two potential explanations. One is that these individuals may have had very 
limited exposure to spiders in the past and upon seeing the tarantula, they realized that 
spiders were not as threatening as they had anticipated, thus rendering them indifferent to the 
spider during the task. The other is that this group may not have liked the spider very much 
but, because the spider was well contained in the terrarium, they may have appraised the 
situation as “safe” and felt no need to monitor or avoid it.  
Another purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between motivation and 
attentional bias to threat in the context of spider anxiety. We hypothesized that different 
motivational groups would demonstrate different attentional bias to threat. Our results 
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provide strong support to this hypothesis. However, it should be noted that the differences 
noted in the current study were rather nuanced: some groups demonstrated facilitated 
attention to threat, whereas others did not. Nonetheless, our findings support the modulating 
effect of motivation on attentional bias to threat, as proposed by Cisler and Koster (2010).  
We also observed that ambivalent individuals displayed a unique pattern of eye 
movements over the course of the MRT: the PVT bias score suddenly increased in segments 
3 and 4, indicating increased facilitated attention to the spider during segment 3 and 4. Other 
groups showed a more consistent pattern of eye movements over time: engagers had the 
greatest facilitated attention to the spider from segment 1 to segment 9, whereas avoiders and 
indifferent groups had least facilitated attention to the spider from segment 1 to segment 9. 
We do not have any a priori theory to account for this behaviour of the ambivalent group. 
However, such viewing pattern seems to suggest a difficulty in disengaging from threat, as 
outlined in the Attentional Maintenance Model of Anxiety (Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001). Once ambivalent individuals attended to the spider, their attention might 
have been captured by the threat stimulus for some periods of time (e.g., segments 3 and 4) 
before they were able to switch their attention away from it.  
One interesting finding was that the baseline level of spider fear and negative affect 
was sustained for ambivalent individuals whereas it declined for everyone else. All 
participants reported a significant increase in spider fear and negative mood state upon seeing 
the tarantula, which is consistent with the observation that anxious individuals show fear 
activation in the beginning of exposure therapy (see Kamphuis & Telch, 2000). At the end of 
the study, the engagers, avoiders, and indifferent groups reported a level of spider fear and 
negative mood state that was significantly lower than what they experienced in the beginning 
of the study (i.e., before seeing the tarantula). This significant decrease in spider fear is 
consistent with the observation that anxious individuals show fear habituation over the course 
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of exposure therapy (see Kashdan, Adams, Read, & Hawk, 2012). On the contrary, the 
ambivalent group did not exhibit this fear habituation. Instead, they reported a level of spider 
fear and negative mood state that were significantly higher than that of other groups. This 
finding is also consistent with Nelson et al.’s (2015) observation that ambivalent individuals 
reported the highest level of anxiety. Together, our results provide evidence consistent with 
Gray and McNaughton’s (2000) hypothesis that anxiety can be elicited as a result of a 
conflict between approach and avoidance goals.  
Results from the current study did not support the hypothesis that ambivalent 
individuals would have more spider-related thoughts and perform more poorly on the MRT. 
We hypothesized that ambivalent individuals would experience difficulty deciding where to 
allocate their attention and as a result, more cognitive resources would be devoted to 
rectifying this dilemma (i.e., whether to monitor or avoid the threat), thus causing more 
spider-related thoughts and poorer performance on the MRT. In fact, the only significant 
differences we observed were between the engagers, avoiders and indifferent groups, such 
that engagers reported more spider-related thoughts than avoiders and indifferent individuals, 
and performed more poorly than indifferent individuals. Previous work in our lab indicates 
that more on-task thoughts predicted better task performance (see Seli, Cheyne, Xu, Purdon, 
& Smilek, 2015; Xu, 2014). Therefore, it is not surprising that participants who had a higher 
number of off-task thoughts (i.e., spider-related thoughts) did not perform as well on the 
MRT. However, more research is needed to further examine if there are any meaningful 
differences between ambivalent and other groups in their MRT performance.  
There are several limitations to the current study. The first limitation is the small 
sample size. As close to half of our participants endorsed an indifferent attitude towards the 
spider, we had fewer than 20 participants in the ambivalent and engagers group and barely 
above 20 participants in the avoiders group. This small sample size introduced more variance 
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in our data and limited our ability to conduct appropriate analyses to examine some of our 
research questions. We recommend future researchers to recruit more participants and 
potentially individuals who have been diagnosed with a spider phobia. Another limitation is 
that we only measured spider fear using subjective reports. We are confident that subjective 
reports provided reliable measures of spider fear in the present study, as there was a 
significant correlation between the one-item SUDS and the negative affect subscale of 
PANAS, and we were able to detect fear activation and habituation using these measures. 
However, future studies should consider including objective measures of spider fear, such as 
the behavioural avoidance test (e.g., Van Bockstaele et al., 2011), the approach-avoidance 
task (e.g., Rinck & Becker, 2007), and startle response to spider pictures (e.g., Kashdan et al., 
2012). Moreover, we recommend measuring spider fear at multiple time points throughout 
the study (e.g., once every segment), which would allow us to examine how anxiety evolves 
over time and its relation to motivation and attentional bias to threat. Lastly, we lost a 
considerable amount of data because of the portable eye tracking technology we used in the 
current study. We were unable to access some of the participants’ eye movements in one 
segment and many of our participants had a low tracking ratio. Future researchers might want 
to consider using more reliable portable eye tracking technology.  
In summary, Study 1 examined the impact of motivation on attentional bias to threat, 
and the interaction between approach and avoidance motivation, in the context of spider-
related anxiety. A sample of spider-fearful individuals were divided into four different groups 
based on their motivation to approach and avoid the spider, and they demonstrated different 
types of attentional biases to threat. Individuals who were ambivalent about whether to 
approach or avoid the spider experienced sustained levels of spider fear and negative mood 
state, but did not report more spider-related thoughts or performed more poorly on an 
attentionally demanding task. Our findings support the modulating effect of motivation on 
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attentional biases to threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010). The current study also provides evidence 
for the important role that ambivalent motivation plays in the development and maintenance 
of anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2000).  
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Chapter 6 
Study 2: Attentional Biases to Threat and Motivation in Eating-Related Anxiety 
6.1 Introduction 
In Study 1, we divided a sample of spider-fearful individuals into four different groups based 
on their motivation to pay attention to and avoid paying attention to threat (i.e., a live spider). 
In addition, we observed different patterns of attentional biases to threat in different 
motivational groups. Interestingly, we identified a subset of participants who reported 
ambivalent motivation about where to deploy their attention. Similar to Nelson et al. (2015), 
ambivalent individuals were characterized by higher anxiety, and their fear over the spider 
failed to decrease. These findings suggest that ambivalent motivation is both interesting and 
important to study. However, in both the Nelson et al. (2015) study and Study 1, the number 
of participants reporting ambivalent motivation was low. As reviewed in earlier chapters, 
there are two types of threat stimuli: one that signals bodily harm (e.g., a spider in spider-
fearful individuals), and the other signals a threat to personal goals (e.g., images of high 
calorie food in restrained eaters). The first type of threat stimuli is more likely to evoke 
avoidance motivation as there are evolutionary values in self-preservation. The second type 
of threat stimuli only evokes anxiety from certain populations as they involve a conflict 
between incompatible goals. Hence, an approach-avoidance conflict is inherent to the second 
type of threat. Stimuli such as images of high calorie food might provide a better opportunity 
to study ambivalent motivation.  
The primary purpose of Study 2 was to examine the impact of motivation on 
attentional biases to threat, and the relation between approach and avoidance motivation, in a 
sample of individuals who identified themselves as restrained eaters. We reasoned that people 
who are restraining their caloric intake may have more ambivalence about whether or not to 
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attend to images of food cues. On the one hand, food may be appealing; but on the other 
hand, images of tempting food may threaten dieting goals.  
Restrained eating, more commonly referred to as “dieting”, is a popular practice 
among young women in today’s society. A recent study revealed that among a large group of 
female university students, 43% engaged in restrained eating, despite 78% having a healthy 
weight for their height (Fayet, Petocz, & Samman, 2012). Decades of research have 
demonstrated that individuals with eating-related anxiety, such as those with an eating 
disorder or engage in restrained eating, exhibit attentional biases to food stimuli. Food 
deprivation is a common feature of restrained eating, which is typically associated with 
enhanced motivation to approach food stimuli. More recently, there is emerging evidence 
suggesting that some restrained eaters might experience an approach-avoidance conflict with 
high calorie food (Ahern et al., 2010; Werthmann et al., 2015). Hence, it is possible that 
restrained eaters might experience different motivation towards the same food stimuli and, 
subsequently, show different attentional biases. Unfortunately, most studies to date have not 
measured approach and avoidance motivation as separate constructs, nor have they examined 
the extent to which motivation influences attentional biases to threat.  
According to the Goal Conflict Model of Eating (Stroebe et al., 2008), restrained 
eaters are particularly at risk for developing an eating disorder because they are subject to a 
chronic conflict between two goals—one is the enjoyment of eating, and the other is the fear 
of weight gain. One reason why restrained eaters may want to avoid food images is the 
concept of “thought-shape fusion”, which refers to the idea that even looking at images of 
high calorie food can cause some people to feel more “fat” (Coelho et al., 2012). Thought-
shape fusion has been shown to be closely linked to eating pathology (Coelho et al., 2014). 
For those who are ambivalent towards high calorie food, it is likely that they may endorse 
more thought-shape fusion and engage in more restrained eating behaviours.  
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The current study was designed to address the following questions: (1) do restrained 
eaters experience significant differences in their motivation to attend to vs. avoid attending to 
images of high calorie food? (2) do restrained eaters exhibit significant differences in their 
attentional biases to threat? and (3) do ambivalent individuals engage in more restrained 
eating behaviours, endorse more thought-shape fusion, and experience more negative mood 
state as a result of viewing food images? 
 In Study 2, individuals who identified themselves as restrained eaters on a self-report 
measure underwent a passive viewing task in which they were presented with images pairs 
consisting of one high calorie food and one neutral object for 5 seconds. Participants were 
seated in front of a screen with their chin in a chin rest and instructed to look at each image 
pair as they wished. Their eye movements were recorded using a stationary eye tracker. 
Participants were then presented with a random subset of 15 food images and asked to rate 
for each their motivation to look and their motivation to avoid looking during the passive 
viewing task. Mood state was assessed before the viewing task and after the motivation 
ratings were taken.  
 We tested the following hypotheses in the current study: (1) a sample of restrained 
eaters could be assigned to different groups based on their motivation to attend to vs. avoid 
attending to food images; (2) the sample as a whole would exhibit attentional biases to threat 
that are different from some of the motivational groups; (3) different motivational groups 
would exhibit attentional biases to threat that are different from one another; and (4) relative 
to other groups, ambivalent individuals would report more restrained eating behaviours, 
thought-shape fusion, and negative mood state at the end of the study.  
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6.2 Methods 
6.2.1 Participants  
University students (N = 251) who scored in the top 20th percentile of the Concern for Dieting 
subscale of the Restraint Scale (Herman & Polivy, 1975) were recruited from the University 
of Waterloo. Participants received course credits or cash remuneration (six Canadian dollars 
per person) in exchange for their participation. The study was advertised through an online 
sign-up system and posters on campus. The Concern for Dieting scale of the Restraint Scale 
(RS-CD) was used as it has better reliability and validity than the other subscale of the 
measure (Stroebe, 2008; van Strien, Breteler, & Ouwens, 2002).  
Of the original 251 participants, we excluded data from two participants due to 
noncompliance with task instructions, 16 participants due to failed calibration of the eye 
tracker, seven participants due to computer difficulties (e.g., crashed data files), and one 
participant due to missing data. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 225 participants (35 
males) with a mean age of 19.8 years (SD = 2.4). Participants reported an average score of 
10.83 on the RS-CD (SD = 2.23), and a mean BMI of 23.25 (SD = 4.07). There were no 
significant differences between males and females in any subjective or behavioural measure 
(all ps > .088). Hence, gender was not included in our data analyses. Outliers on self-report 
measures and eye movement indices (i.e., three standard deviations above or below the 
means) were corrected by replacing them with the next highest or lowest values. All 
participants were informed that the purpose of this study was to examine how motivation 
influences one’s eye movements towards visual stimuli, without any explicit reference to 
food. Inclusion criterion (i.e., participants had to score in the top 20% on the RS-CD) was 
only communicated to participants upon completing the study. The protocol received ethical 
clearance from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo and all 
participants provided informed consent. 
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6.2.2 Self-Report Measures 
6.2.2.1 Restraint Scale  
The Restraint Scale (RS; Polivy, Herman, & Warsh, 1978) was designed to identify 
individuals who restrict their food intake as to achieve a desired weight. The original scale 
includes 10 items and consists of two subscales: one measuring Concern for Dieting (RS-CD; 
6 items) and the other measuring Weight Fluctuation (RS-WF; 4 items). Participants 
completed the RS-CD as part of the screening process and only those who scored in the top 
20% (i.e., with a minimum score of 8) were invited to participate in this study. On this scale, 
participants reported the frequency of their concern for dieting (e.g., “How often are you 
dieting”) by choosing one of the options provided (e.g., from “never” to “always”). A higher 
total score on the RS-CD represents more restrained eating. The RS has demonstrated 
satisfactory validity and reliability in normal-weight populations (Heatherton, Herman, 
Polivy, King, & McGree, 1988; van Strien, Herman, Engels, Larsen, & van Leeuwe, 2007).  
 
6.2.2.2 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
Participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 
1988) immediately before and after the Eye Movement Attention Task. The PANAS consists 
of 20 items measuring mood state (i.e., how the individual is feeling at the moment). This 
measure generates two subscales: one measuring positive affect and the other measuring 
negative affect (10 items per scale). Using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 “very slightly or not 
at all” to 5 “extremely”), participants rated the extent to which each item was consistent with 
their current mood state. The PANAS has demonstrated good validity and internal 
consistency (Crawford & Henry, 2004). The PANAS was included to assess changes to 
participants’ mood state after viewing food images.   
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6.2.2.3 Trait Thought Shape Fusion Scale: Short Version 
Participants completed the Thought-Shape Fusion scale (TSF; Coelho et al., 2013) at the end 
of this study. The original TSF scale is a 34-item questionnaire that measures a general 
tendency towards thought-shape fusion (Shafran et al., 1999). The short version consists of 
18 items from the original scale. The first 14 items measure the general concept of thought-
shape fusion (i.e., likelihood, moral, and feeling aspects) and the last 4 items measure specific 
experiences of thought-shape fusion (i.e., frequency, impact, uncontrollability, and 
importance of suppressing eating-related thoughts). On a 5-point Likert scale (from 0 “not at 
all” to 4 “totally or always”, participants rate the extent to which they agree with each item 
(e.g., “Just picturing myself gaining weight can really make me gain weight”). The TSF has 
demonstrated excellent validity and reliability in both clinical and healthy populations 
(Coelho et al., 2013; Coelho et al., 2014).  
 
6.2.2.4 Other Questions 
At the end of this study, participants were asked to answer the following question “how long 
has it been since you last ate”, rounded to the nearest half hour. This question was included to 
control for the potential influence of hunger on motivation ratings and eye movements. 
Analyses showed no significant correlation between time since last food intake and any of the 
outcome measures (all ps > .107), suggesting no impact of hunger. Participants also reported 
their current height and weight, based on which their Body Mass Index (BMI) was 
calculated. 
 
6.2.3 Material and Stimuli 
The images for the Eye Movement Attention Task were selected from Food-pics, which is a 
large database of food pictures collated by Blechert, Meule, Busch, and Ohla (2014). We 
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selected 60 high calorie food images based on their caloric density (with a minimum of 
123kcal/100g, Mean = 323kcal/100g, SD = 120kcal/100g). The selected food images were 
generally high in their total caloric content (Mean = 1134kcal, SD = 1502kcal) and highly 
palatable (Mean = 59.8, SD = 6.4), according to normative ratings provided by Food-pics. 
We also selected 60 neutral images that had no caloric content, including tools, household 
objects, and office supplies. All food images were paired with neutral images and each image 
pair was matched as best as possible with respect to brightness, complexity, familiarity, and 
recognisability, according to normative ratings provided by Food-pics. Paired-sample t-tests 
revealed no significant difference between food and neutral images in any of these 
dimensions (all ps > .245).  
 
6.2.4 Eye Movement Measures 
6.2.4.1 Eye Movement Attention Task 
The Eye Movement Attention Task (EMAT; Nelson et al., 2015) is an eye-tracking task that 
measures attentional bias to images. In the EMAT, participants were told that image pairs 
would be presented on the computer screen and they were to look at these images freely. In 
each trial, participants had to fixate on a centrally located cross first, after which a high 
calorie food image was presented simultaneously with a neutral image. The image pair was 
displayed for five seconds, followed by a 500ms interval before the appearance of the next 
fixation cross. 
For each participant, there were two practice trials and 60 testing trials in total. Half 
of the image pairs were presented side-by-side and the rest were presented one above the 
other, in a semi-random fashion (with no more than three trials to have the same presentation 
arrangement consecutively). We selected this presentation style to reduce the predictability of 
the image locations, such that participants would be less likely to initiate fixations towards 
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the left and top images first (e.g., Waechter et al., 2013). Each image (512 × 384 pixels) was 
displayed such that its closest edge was 80 pixels from the centre of the screen (2.7° visual 
angle for horizontal positioning and 2.5° visual angle for vertical positioning), on a light grey 
background.  
 
6.2.4.2 Eye-Tracking Procedure  
We used the SR Research Ltd. EyeLink 1000TM (Mississauga, Ontario, Canada) desktop-
mounted eye-tracking system to record participants’ eye movements during the EMAT. 
Participants were positioned in a chin and forehead rest and situated approximately 65 cm 
from a 19-inch LCD colour monitor (resolution: 1280 × 1024). Participants first underwent a 
process known as calibration, which required participants to gaze at nine dots on the 
computer monitor while the position of their eye was determined. Once the camera was 
calibrated, participants proceeded to the EMAT during which their eye movements were 
recorded.  
 
6.2.4.3 Eye Movement Indices 
Recorded eye movement data was coded using the EyeLink Data Viewer software (SR 
Research Ltd., 2015). Within each trial, we defined the following two areas of interest (AOIs) 
by annotating the relevant spatial region in the EyeLink Data Viewer software: (1) food 
image, and (2) neutral image. For each AOI, as per Nelson et al. (2015), we generated the 
following eye movement indices: (1) time to first fixation (TTFF), i.e., the amount of time it 
takes for the participant to have their first fixation on a particular AOI; (2) first fixation gaze 
duration (FFGD), i.e., the average length of time before the participant shifts their gaze off a 
particular AOI; and (3) proportion of viewing time (PVT), i.e., percentage of trial time spent 
on a particular AOI. These three indices allow us to examine: (1) initial orienting of attention, 
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as a shorter TTFF indicates an attentional bias towards the current image; (2) maintenance of 
attention, as a higher FFGD indicates sustained attention towards the current image; and (3) 
selective attention, as a higher PVT indicates more attention being paid to the current image.  
In addition, we also divided each 5000ms testing trial into ten 500ms intervals and 
calculated the PVT for each of the ten time intervals (for more details see Nelson et al., 
2015), which allows the examination of the time-course of attentional allocation. The ten 
500ms intervals are labelled as: T1 = 0-500ms, T2 = 501-1000ms, T3 = 1001-1500ms, T4 = 
1501-2000ms, T5 = 2001-2500ms, T6 = 2501-3000ms, T7 = 3001-3500ms, T8 = 3501-
4000ms, T9 = 4001-4500ms, and T10 = 4501 to 5000ms.  
It should be noted that some of these eye tracking measures (e.g., PVT on food 
images vs. PVT on neutral images) are not redundant to one another, as there were additional 
stimuli to food and neutral images (e.g., grey space between two pictures) and participants 
generally spent a substantial amount of time viewing the background.  
 
6.2.5 Motivation Measures 
Immediately after the EMAT, participants completed a rating task in which they were 
presented with a selection of the images they had viewed in the EMAT. For each image, on a 
9-point Likert Scale (from 1 “No motivation at all” to 9 “Very strong motivation”), 
participants provided two separate reports of motivation: (1) “how motivated were you to 
look towards this image?”, i.e., approach motivation, and (2) “how motivated were you to 
look away from this image?”, i.e., avoidance motivation. A total number of 30 images (15 
food images and 15 neutral images) were randomly presented to each participant. The neutral 
images were used as fillers in the rating task and therefore not included in data analysis.  
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6.2.6 Procedures 
Participants first completed the RS-CD online and only those with a total score of 8 (i.e., 
scoring in the top 20%) were invited to participate in this study. Participants were tested 
individually in the laboratory. Upon their arrival, participants first completed the PANAS, 
after which they were calibrated on the eye tracker and underwent the EMAT. In the EMAT, 
high calorie food images were presented on a computer screen together with neutral images 
and participants were asked to look at these images freely for five seconds per trial. At the 
same time, their eye movements were recorded using a desktop-mounted eye-tracking 
system. Immediately after viewing the images, participants were asked to indicate their levels 
of motivation for looking towards and away from randomly selected images from the EMAT. 
Participants then completed the PANAS and TSF, and reported time since last food intake, 
weight, and height. In total, the procedure lasted roughly 40 minutes. 
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6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Do Restrained Eaters Experience Significant Differences in Their Motivation to 
Attend to Vs. Avoid Attending to Food Images? 
In order to assess motivation to attend to and avoid attending to food images, each participant 
was presented with a random selection of food images from the EMAT (15 high calorie food 
images and 15 neutral images). For each image, participants provided two separate reports of 
their motivation to look towards the images (i.e., approach motivation) and motivation to 
look away from the images (i.e., avoidance motivation). We aggregated motivation ratings 
across 15 food images and calculated the average for each rating. Overall, ratings on 
approach and avoidance motivation were moderately negatively correlated r = -.44, p < .001, 
but not redundant.  
To test our first hypothesis, we divided the sample into four groups based on their 
motivation ratings, as per Nelson et al. (2015): (1) ambivalent, i.e., those who scored 5 or 
above on both approach and avoidance motivation (N = 27); (2) engagers, i.e., those who 
scored 5 or above on approach motivation and below 5 on avoidance motivation (N = 166); 
(3) avoiders, i.e., those who scored 5 or above on avoidance motivation and below 5 on 
approach motivation (N = 14); and (4) indifferent, i.e., those who scored below 5 on both 
approach and avoidance motivation (N = 18). Means and standard deviations of motivation 
ratings for each group are presented in Table 5. Hence, our first hypothesis was confirmed: 
restrained eaters can be assigned to different groups based on their motivation to attend to vs. 
avoid food stimuli.  
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Table 5. Study 2: Motivation Ratings by Group 
 N Approach motivation Avoidance motivation 
    
All Participants 225 6.29 (1.38) 3.64 (1.43) 
    
    Ambivalent 27 6.32 (0.90) 5.80 (0.85) 
    
    Engagers 166 6.76 (0.93) 3.11 (0.93) 
     
    Avoiders 14 3.51 (1.24) 6.13 (0.81) 
    
    Indifferent 18 4.12 (0.82) 3.39 (1.30) 
    
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets.  
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6.3.2 Do Restrained Eaters Exhibit Significant Differences in Their Attentional 
Biases to Threat? 
We aimed to test the following two hypotheses: (1) the sample as a whole would 
exhibit attentional biases to threat that are different from some of the motivational 
groups, and (2) different motivational groups would exhibit attentional biases to threat 
that are different from one another. Similar to Study 1, there were two ways to 
measure attentional biases to threat in the current study. One was to aggregate eye 
movement data collected in each image pair and look at the overall pattern of eye 
movements. The other was to directly examine the time-course of eye movements 
within each EMAT trial (e.g., proportion of viewing time). We followed both 
approaches in testing each of our hypotheses.   
We first aggregated eye movement data across EMAT trials and calculated the 
following eye movement indices: time to first fixation (TTFF), first fixation gaze 
duration (FFGD), and proportion of viewing time (PVT). Means and standard 
deviations of these indices are presented in Table 6. Collectively (when all four 
groups were combined), participants were significantly faster in having their first 
fixations on food than neutral images, t (225) = 13.75, p < .001, and spent 
significantly longer on their first fixation on food than neutral images, t (225) = -4.04, 
p < .001. They also spent a greater proportion of time looking at food than neutral 
images, t (225) = -9.19, p < .001. In general, our sample of restrained eaters 
demonstrated facilitated attention to food images.  
To examine the impact of motivation on initial orienting of attention, we 
conducted a 2 (Image type: food vs. neutral) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. 
avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed ANOVA on TTFF. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of image type, F (1, 221) = 39.32, η2p = .151, p < .001, no main effect of 
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group, F (3, 221) = 0.53, p = .664, and a significant image type by group interaction, 
F (3, 221) = 4.62, η2p = .059, p = .004. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that 
first fixations were faster towards food than neutral images for the ambivalent, t (26) 
= 3.06, p = .005, engagers, t (165) = 14.00, p < .001, and indifferent groups, t (17) = 
2.83, p = .012, but not for the avoiders group, t (13) = 1.13, p = .280.  
To examine the impact of motivation on maintenance of attention, we 
conducted the same 2 (Image type: food vs. neutral) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. 
engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) mixed ANOVA on FFGD. We observed no 
main effect of image type, F (1, 221) = 0.13, p = .722, and no main effect group, F (3, 
221) = 1.25, p = .292. However, there was a significant image type by group 
interaction, F (3, 221) = 15.12, η2p = .170, p < .001. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests 
showed that the engagers group had longer first gazes on food than neutral images, t 
(165) = -10.35, p < .001, whereas the avoiders group had shorter first gazes on food 
than neutral images, t (13) = 2.83, p = .014. In contrast, there was no significant 
difference in their first gaze durations towards food vs. neutral images for the 
ambivalent, t (26) = -0.99, p = .329, and indifferent groups, t (17) = -0.44, p = .664. 
To examine the impact of motivation on selective attention, we conducted a 2 
(Image type: food vs. neutral) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. 
indifferent) mixed ANOVA on PVT. This analysis showed no main effect of image 
type, F (1, 221) = 2.04, p = .154, and no main effect of group, F (3, 221) = 0.64, p 
= .591. However, there was a significant image type by group interaction, F (3, 221) = 
17.02, η2p = .188, p < .001. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that the engagers 
group had higher proportions of viewing time on food than neutral images, t (165) = -
12.40, p < .001, whereas the avoiders group had lower proportions of viewing time on 
food than neutral images, t (13) = 2.99, p = .010. In contrast, there was no significant 
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difference in their proportions of viewing time on food vs. neutral images for the 
ambivalent, t (26) = -1.80, p = .084, and indifferent groups, t (17) = -0.92, p = .370. 
We then divided each 5000ms EMAT trial into ten 500ms intervals (i.e., T1-
T10) and calculated the proportion of viewing time (PVT) for food and neutral images 
within each time interval. Means and standard errors of proportion of viewing time 
are presented in Table 7. Collectively (when all four groups were combined), 
participants demonstrated some interesting changes in their viewing pattern over the 
course of each EMAT trial. We conducted a 2 (Image type: food vs. neutral) x 10 
(Time: T1-10) repeated measures ANOVA on PVT. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated for main effect of time, χ2 (44) = 675.24, p 
< .001, and image type by time interaction, χ2 (44) = 296.46, p < .001, therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε 
= .482 for time, and ε = .691 for image type by time). This analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of time, F (4.34, 972.26) = 74.80, η2p = .250, p < .001, and a 
significant image type by time interaction, F (6.22, 1393.00) = 9.04, η2p = .039, p 
< .001. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that participants spent significantly 
more time looking at neutral than food images during T1 (0-500ms), t (224) = 5.31, p 
< .001, and marginally more time looking at food than neutral images during T10 
(4500-5000ms), t (224) = -1.90, p = .059. There was no significant difference in PVT 
between food and neutral images during other time intervals (all ps > .070). In 
general, our sample of restrained eaters demonstrated attentional avoidance of food 
images in the first 500ms and facilitated attention to food images in the last 500ms.   
Next, we examined if different motivational groups demonstrated different 
trends in their eye movements over the course of each EMAT trial. We first 
conducted a 2 (Image type: food vs. neutral) x 4 (Group: ambivalent vs. engagers vs. 
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avoiders vs. indifferent) x 10 (Time: T1-10) repeated measures ANOVA on 
proportion of viewing time. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of sphericity 
had been violated for main effect of time, χ2 (44) = 664.62, p < .001, and image type 
by time interaction, χ2 (44) = 254.70, p < .001, therefore degrees of freedom were 
corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .488 for time, and ε = .744 
for image type by time). This analysis revealed a significant main effect of image 
type, F (1, 221) = 7.31, η2p = .032, p = .007, a significant main effect of time, F (4.39, 
970.50) = 31.19, η2p = .124, p < .001, a significant image type by group interaction, F 
(3, 221) = 6.91, η2p = .086, p < .001, and a significant image type by time by group 
interaction, F (20.08, 1479.47) = 3.70, η2p = .048, p < .001. However, there was no 
significant main effect of group, F (3, 221) = 1.69, p = .170, no significant group by 
time interaction, F (13.17, 970.50) = 1.47, p = .123, and no significant image type by 
time interaction, F (20.08, 1479.47) = 0.73, p = .641. 
To explore this significant image type by time by group interaction, we 
calculated the PVT bias score by subtracting neutral images PVT from food images 
PVT for each participant per time interval. Hence, a PVT bias score that is 
significantly greater than 0 would indicate an attentional bias towards food images, 
whereas a PVT bias score that is significantly lower than 0 would indicate an 
attentional bias towards neutral images. Means and standard errors of PVT bias scores 
are depicted in Figure 5. For each interval within each motivational group, we 
performed multiple one-sample t-tests in which the PVT bias score was compared to 0 
(which indicates no significant bias). The ambivalent group showed a greater PVT on 
neutral images during T1, t (26) = -2.18, p = .039, and marginally so during T8, t (26) 
= -1.95, p = .062, but no bias during other intervals (all ps > .093). The engagers 
group showed a greater PVT on neutral images during T1, t (165) = -5.98, p < .001, 
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but a greater PVT on food images during T2-T10 (all ps < .031). The avoiders group 
demonstrated a greater PVT on food images during T1, t (13) = 3.27, p = .006, and a 
greater PVT on neutral images during T6, t (13) = -2.10, p = .056, and T7, t (13) = -
2.31, p = .038, but no bias during other intervals (all ps > .109). The indifferent group 
demonstrated a greater PVT on neutral images during T6, t (17) = -2.88, p = .010, and 
no bias during other intervals (all ps > .305).  
To further explore if different motivational groups demonstrated different time 
courses of eye movements, we performed multiple one-way ANOVAs in which PVT 
bias score was tested as a function of group (ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. 
indifferent) within each time interval. We observed a significant main effect of group 
during T1, F (3, 221) = 6.90, η2p = .086, p < .001, T3, F (3, 221) = 2.81, η2p = .037, p 
= .040, T4, F (3, 221) = 2.86, η2p = .037, p = .038, T5, F (3, 221) = 4.25, η2p = .055, p 
= .006, T6, F (3, 221) = 8.38, η2p = .102, p < .001, T7, F (3, 221) = 3.48, η2p = .045, p 
= .017, T8, F (3, 221) = 5.69, η2p = .072, p < .001, and T9, F (3, 221) = 2.74, η2p 
= .036, p = .045. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) showed that during T1, the 
avoiders group had a significantly higher PVT bias score than other groups (all ps 
< .047). During T4, the ambivalent group had a significantly higher PVT bias score 
than the avoiders group, p = .036. During T5, T6, T7, and T8, the engagers group had 
a significantly higher PVT bias score than the avoiders group (all ps < .025). In 
addition, the engagers group also had a significantly higher PVT bias score than the 
indifferent group during T6, p < .001, and the ambivalent group during T8, p = .010.  
Together, these results suggest that there are significant differences in their 
attentional biases to threat between some of the motivational groups and the sample as 
a whole, and between different motivational groups, thus confirming our second and 
third hypotheses.  
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Table 6. Study 2: Eye Movement Indices by Group 
 All Participants 
(N = 225) 
 Ambivalent 
(N = 27) 
 Engagers 
(N = 166) 
 Avoiders 
(N = 14) 
 Indifferent 
(N = 18) 
Food Neutral  Food Neutral   Food Neutral  Food Neutral  Food Neutral 
               
TTFF 
(ms) 
689.18 
(204.68) 
975.42 
(276.25) 
 709.69 
(258.23) 
916.20 
(218.35) 
 673.28 
(196.94) 
1002.49 
(282.78) 
 810.80 
(125.14) 
903.41 
(309.93) 
 710.51 
(214.00) 
870.61 
(233.22) 
               
FFGD 
(ms) 
317.85 
(83.42) 
299.74 
(77.70) 
 1238.83 
(408.78) 
1115.13 
(446.84) 
 1453.63 
(419.55) 
1048.66 
(352.64) 
 1079.10 
(421.85) 
1576.86 
(408.96) 
 1197.91 
(336.59) 
1151.22 
(363.34) 
               
PVT  
(%) 
52.80 
(10.40) 
40.33 
(10.35) 
 50.92 
(13.28) 
42.13 
(12.35) 
 54.97 
(8.72) 
38.34 
(8.91) 
 37.26 
(10.94) 
54.72 
(12.41) 
 47.71 
(6.87) 
44.78 
(7.50) 
               
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. TTFF: Time To First Fixation; FFGD: First Fixation Gaze Duration; PVT: 
Proportion of Viewing Time. Food: food images; Neutral: neutral images.
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Table 7. Study 2: Time-Specific Eye Movement Indices by Group 
Index Group T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10 
            
PVT food images (%)  
All Participants  
(N = 225) 
48.91 
(4.51) 
45.46 
(3.53) 
46.10 
(4.02) 
46.93 
(4.13) 
47.02 
(4.18) 
47.40 
(4.36) 
47.87 
(5.10) 
48.62 
(5.34) 
48.74 
(5.24) 
49.64 
(5.24) 
           
Ambivalent  
(N = 27) 
47.65 
(4.99) 
45.56 
(3.34) 
45.41 
(3.20) 
47.05 
(4.16) 
46.76 
(3.62) 
46.94 
(3.72) 
46.39 
(4.24) 
46.37 
(3.45) 
47.44 
(4.62) 
48.97 
(3.83) 
           
Engagers  
(N = 166) 
48.71 
(4.27) 
45.57 
(3.58) 
46.32 
(4.24) 
46.88 
(4.10) 
47.23 
(4.40) 
47.63 
(4.62) 
47.90 
(5.14) 
48.85 
(5.40) 
48.95 
(5.39) 
49.72 
(5.62) 
           
Avoiders 
(N = 14) 
51.67 
(6.21) 
43.90 
(3.85) 
45.06 
(3.84) 
45.70 
(4.03) 
45.01 
(3.82) 
45.73 
(3.06) 
46.17 
(4.42) 
47.40 
(5.08) 
48.02 
(4.59) 
48.96 
(4.97) 
           
Indifferent 
(N = 18) 
50.40 
(3.38) 
45.44 
(2.95) 
45.84 
(3.13) 
48.15 
(4.43) 
47.08 
(2.59) 
47.24 
(3.46) 
51.07 
(5.25) 
50.86 
(6.31) 
49.31 
(5.28) 
50.45 
(3.38) 
PVT neutral images (%) 
           
All Participants  
(N = 225) 
51.64 
(5.45) 
44.79 
(4.58) 
45.71 
(3.69) 
46.37 
(4.59) 
46.72 
(4.73) 
47.16 
(4.85) 
47.40 
(5.09) 
47.97 
(5.37) 
48.14 
(5.62) 
48.99 
(5.86) 
           
Ambivalent  
(N = 27) 
51.63 
(7.21) 
44.63 
(5.29) 
46.52 
(4.11) 
45.44 
(4.44) 
47.38 
(5.57) 
47.51 
(5.41) 
47.06 
(4.92) 
48.45 
(5.41) 
46.91 
(3.95) 
48.31 
(5.55) 
           
Engagers  
(N = 166) 
52.11 
(5.12) 
44.58 
(4.39) 
45.47 
(3.66) 
46.14 
(4.46) 
46.30 
(4.34) 
46.55 
(4.50) 
46.94 
(4.76) 
47.35 
(4.84) 
47.88 
(5.45) 
48.72 
(5.98) 
           
Avoiders 
(N = 14) 
46.00 
(4.36) 
45.73 
(4.07) 
47.02 
(4.09) 
48.14 
(4.18) 
48.34 
(4.10) 
48.47 
(3.64) 
49.31 
(4.71) 
50.22 
(4.88) 
50.08 
(5.86) 
50.99 
(6.53) 
           
Indifferent 
(N = 18) 
51.65 
(3.84) 
46.25 
(5.51) 
45.72 
(2.67) 
48.51 
(5.65) 
48.27 
(6.70) 
51.19 
(6.08) 
50.61 
(7.12) 
51.25 
(8.37) 
50.92 
(7.93) 
50.93 
(4.09) 
            
Note: Time intervals are in 500-ms segments. Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. PVT: Proportion of Viewing Time.
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Figure	5.	Study	2:	Proportion	of	Viewing	Time	Bias	Scores	by	Time	Interval	
Note:	Time intervals are in 500-ms segments. Error bars are ±1 standard error.	-8
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6.3.3 Do Ambivalent Individuals Report More Restrained Eating Behaviours, Thought-
Shape Fusion, and Negative Mood State? 
In the current study, restrained eating behaviours and thought-shape fusion were measured 
through the RS-CD and TSF, whereas mood state were measured through PANAS before and 
after the EMAT task. To test our third hypothesis, we conducted different analyses exploring 
the impact of motivation on restrained eating, thought-shape fusion, and mood state.  
Means and standard deviations of self-report measures are presented in Table 8. We 
conducted multiple one-way ANOVAs in which Concerns for Dieting score and Thought-
Shape Fusion total score were tested as a function of group (i.e., ambivalent vs. engagers vs. 
avoiders vs. indifferent). To rule out the possibility that different motivational groups might 
be different in their BMI and time since last food intake (which might in turn influence 
restrained eating and thought-shape fusion), we extended the same one-way ANOVA to BMI 
and time since last food intake. We observed a significant main effect of group for Concerns 
for Dieting score, F (3, 221) = 3.52, η2p = .046, p = .016, and Thought Shape Fusion total 
score, F (3, 221) = 5.02, η2p = .064, p = .002, but not for BMI or time since last food intake 
(both ps > .940). Post hoc comparisons (Tukey’s HSD) revealed that the ambivalent group 
scored higher on the Concerns for Dieting subscale and Thought Shape Fusion scale than the 
engagers and indifferent groups (all ps < .033) but not the avoiders group (both ps > .165).  
To examine the impact of motivation on mood state, we conducted a mixed ANOVA, 
in which time (time 1 vs. time 2) was entered as the within-subject factor and group 
(ambivalent vs. engagers vs. avoiders vs. indifferent) was entered as the between-subject 
factor. For positive affect, this analysis revealed a significant main effect of group, F (3, 221) 
= 3.54, η2p = .046, p = .016, such that the engagers group reported higher positive affect than 
the indifferent group at both time 1 and time 2, p = .019. There was also a significant main 
effect of time, F (1, 221) = 56.23, η2p = .203, p < .001, such that all participants reported a 
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decrease in positive affect from time 1 to time 2. However, there was no significant time by 
group interaction, F (3, 221) = 0.36, p = .784. Means and standard errors of positive affect 
ratings by time are depicted in Figure 6. For negative affect, this analysis revealed a 
significant main effect of group, F (3, 221) = 7.14, η2p = .088, p < .001, such that the avoiders 
group reported higher negative affect than the engagers and indifferent groups at both time 1 
and time 2, both ps < .001. There was also a significant main effect of time, F (1, 221) = 
27.04, η2p = .109, p < .001, such that all participants reported a decrease in negative affect 
from time 1 to time 2. However, there was no significant time by group interaction, F (3, 
221) = 0.24, p = .866. Means and standard errors of negative affect ratings by time are 
depicted in Figure 7. 
In summary, the ambivalent group reported more restrained eating behaviours and 
greater thought-shape fusion, but did not demonstrate increased negative affect as a result of 
viewing food images. Instead, all participants reported a significant decrease in both positive 
and negative affect. Hence, our third hypothesis was partially confirmed. 
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Table 8. Study 2: Self-Report Measures by Group 
 Ambivalent  
(N = 27) 
Engagers  
(N = 166) 
Avoiders  
(N = 14) 
Indifferent  
(N = 18) 
F 
      
BMI 23.63 
(3.62) 
23.21 
(4.29) 
23.21 
(4.40) 
23.05 
(2.23) 
.09 
      
Time since last food intake 
(in hours) 
3.83 
(3.86) 
3.80 
(4.03) 
3.11 
(3.20) 
3.75 
(4.30) 
0.13 
      
RS-CD score 12.00 
(2.73) 
10.67 
(2.13) 
11.21 
(2.26) 
10.17 
(1.82) 
3.52* 
       
TSF total score 38.37 
(12.26) 
31.55 
(11.89) 
30.43 
(9.66) 
25.00 
(9.15) 
5.35** 
      
Note: Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets; RRT: rhythmic response 
time. BMI: Body Mass Index; RS-CD: Concerns for Dieting subscale from Restraint Scale; 
TSF: Thought-Shape Fusion scale short version. One-way ANOVAs were performed to 
examine between-group differences. * p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Figure	6.	Study	2:	Ratings	on	Positive	Affect	by	Time	
 
Note: For ambivalent group, N = 27; for engagers group, N = 166; for avoiders group, N = 14; for indifferent group, N = 18. Error bars are ±1 
standard error.
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Figure	7.	Study	2:	Ratings	on	Negative	Affect	by	Time 
Note: For ambivalent group, N = 27; for engagers group, N = 166; for avoiders group, N = 14; for indifferent group, N = 18. Error bars are ±1 
standard error.
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6.4 Discussion  
The purpose of Study 2 was to examine the impact of motivation on attentional bias to threat, 
and the relation between approach and avoidance motivation in the context of eating-related 
anxiety. Specifically, we aimed to examine: (1) if a sample of restrained eaters could be 
assigned to different groups based on their motivation to attend to vs. avoid attending to food 
images; (2) if the sample of restrained eaters would exhibit attentional biases to threat that are 
different from some of the motivational groups; (3) if different motivational groups would 
exhibit attentional biases to threat that are different from one another; and (4) if ambivalent 
individuals would report more restrained eating behaviours, thought-shape fusion, and 
negative mood state.  
In general, our results provided support to the first three hypotheses and partially 
confirmed the last one. Participants who identified themselves as restrained eaters indeed 
experienced significant differences in their motivation regarding looking at or avoid looking 
at food images, thus confirming our first hypothesis. More importantly, different motivational 
groups demonstrated different attentional biases to threat, as indicated by their eye 
movements. Our sample, as a whole, consistently demonstrated facilitated attention to food 
images, which was not observed in some of the motivational groups. Specifically, the 
engagers group showed facilitated attention to food, the avoiders group showed attentional 
avoidance of food, and the ambivalent and indifferent groups mostly showed no attentional 
bias. With regards to time-course of eye movements, the ambivalent group started with 
attentional avoidance and then showed no attentional bias, the engagers group started with 
attentional avoidance and then switched to facilitated attention, the avoiders group started 
with facilitated attention and then switched to attentional avoidance, and the indifferent group 
mostly showed no attentional bias. Hence, our second and third hypotheses were supported. 
Ambivalent individuals reported more restrained eating behaviours and thought-shape fusion, 
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but did not experience more negative mood state at the end of the study. Therefore, our fourth 
hypothesis was partially supported.  
 The current data demonstrated that our sample of restrained eaters was not a 
homogenous group. Traditionally, psychological research has mostly focused on the link 
between restrained eating and motivation to approach food stimuli. When deprived of certain 
food items, participants demonstrated strong cravings for those foods (Kemps & Tiggemann, 
2009; Kemps et al., 2013). However, restrained eaters may also be motivated to avoid food 
because of their dieting goals, thus creating an approach-avoidance conflict (Werthmann et 
al., 2015). In fact, it was proposed that some restrained eaters may be torn between approach 
and avoidance goals, which accounts for the inconsistent findings with respect to their 
attentional biases to food cues (Ahern et al., 2010). Indeed, the current study revealed that not 
every retrained eater endorsed strong motivation to approach images of high calorie food. 
Moreover, we observed a significant interaction between approach and avoidance motivation: 
some participants were low on one and high on the other (e.g., engagers or avoiders), some 
participants were high on both (e.g., ambivalent), and some participants were low on both 
(e.g., indifferent). The current study again showed that anxious individuals can be classified 
into four motivational groups, as suggested by Nelson et al. (2015).  
Most critically, different motivational groups displayed different patterns of visual 
attention towards food images. In fact, motivation played a key role in determining how 
restrained eaters allocated their attention when confronting images of high calorie food. If we 
had treated restrained eaters as one homogenous group, then our conclusion would have been 
very different. Overall, restrained eaters had faster first fixations to food, longer first fixations 
on food, and a greater proportion of viewing time on food, suggesting facilitated attention to 
threat. However, when we divided participants based on their motivation ratings, we 
observed different, sometimes opposite, patterns of visual attention to food cues. The 
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engagers group still displayed the same facilitated attention towards food. However, the 
avoiders group showed attentional avoidance of food, and the ambivalent and indifferent 
group showed no consistent attentional bias. The same observation applied to the time course 
of attentional biases to threat. Restrained eaters, as a whole, displayed attentional avoidance 
of food during the first 500ms and facilitated attention towards food between 4500-5000ms. 
Only the engagers group demonstrated this avoidant-vigilant pattern in their attentional biases 
to food. The avoiders group showed an opposite pattern of visual attention over the time 
course (i.e., vigilant-avoidant), and the ambivalent and indifferent groups did not follow 
either an avoidant-vigilant or vigilant-avoidant pattern. These results, together with those 
from Study 1, have provided convincing evidence to the hypothesized moderating effect of 
motivation on attentional biases to threat, as proposed by Cisler and Koster (2010).  
Our results also suggest that attentional biases to food cues change significantly over 
time, especially for the avoiders and engagers groups. Avoiders seemed to follow a vigilant-
avoidant pattern in their visual attention to food images, as proposed by Mogg and Bradley 
(1998). On the contrary, engagers seemed to follow the opposite pattern in their visual 
attention to food images. It is possible that the attentional bias displayed during the first 
500ms of the stimulus presentation was more driven by automatic, bottom-up processes (e.g., 
threat detection mechanism), whereas the attentional bias displayed during the later portions 
of the stimulus presentation was more driven by strategic, top-down processes (e.g., emotion 
regulation).  
Similar to Study 1, only a minority of participants in Study 2 endorsed an ambivalent 
motivation towards images of high calorie food (approximately 12%). In fact, the majority of 
our sample was categorized as engagers (approximately 76%). This proportion is far higher 
than what was reported in Study 1 (approximately 19%) and by Nelson et al. (2015) 
(approximately 33%). Such strong motivation to look towards images of high calorie food 
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provides support to the hypothesis that restrained eaters have stronger cravings and are prone 
to overeating when exposed to palatable food (see Kakoschke, Kemps, & Tiggemann, 2015; 
Kemps et al., 2013). Furthermore, it should be noted that strong motivation to look towards 
high calorie food does not necessarily translate into strong motivation to consume high 
calorie food. Participants might be overly motivated to look at food images in the laboratory 
because there was no opportunity for them to eat the food and hence, their dieting goals were 
not fully activated. It is possible that if we asked participants for their motivation to eat and to 
restrict eating, we might observe a lower proportion of engagers and a higher proportion of 
ambivalent individuals. Future researchers should consider examining if there is a 
correspondence between approach and avoidance motivation in looking behaviours, and 
approach and avoidance motivation in eating behaviours.  
 One finding from the current study is of particular importance to clinical practice. 
Ambivalent individuals scored the highest on the Concerns for Dieting subscale and Thought 
Shape Fusion scale. Our sample consisted of individuals who scored in the top 20% on the 
Concerns for Dieting subscale that was administered during a screening process. The fact that 
some of our participants (i.e., ambivalent individuals) were more restrained than others 
highlights the important role ambivalence plays in eating pathology. Our result provides 
strong evidence to the close link between restrained eating behaviours and approach-
avoidance conflict towards palatable food, as proposed by Stroebe et al. (2008). 
Furthermore, there is extensive research showing that self-reported restrained eating 
predicts increased eating pathology (for a review, see Stice, 2002). If ambivalence is 
associated with more restrained eating behaviours, then this ambivalence should also predict 
more eating pathology. In fact, results from our study support this hypothesis: ambivalent 
individuals scored significantly higher than engagers and indifferent groups on the Thought 
Shape Fusion scale. Thought shape fusion refers to the belief that thinking about eating high 
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calorie food leads to perceptions of weight gain and increased body dissatisfaction (Coelho et 
al., 2013). A significant body of research has demonstrated that greater thought shape fusion 
predicts more eating pathology (see Coelho et al., 2012; Coelho et al., 2014). Hence, the 
current study has extended the Goal Conflict Model of Eating (Stroebe et al., 2008) by 
showing a close link between an ambivalent attitude towards high calorie food and cognitive 
distortions that are central to eating pathology.  
Interestingly, ambivalent individuals did not show increased negative mood state as a 
result of viewing high calorie food. Instead, all participants reported a significant decrease in 
their positive and negative affect from the beginning to the end of the study. In Study 1, 
ambivalent individuals maintained their baseline levels of spider fear and negative mood state 
at the end of the task. However, we were not able to replicate this finding in Study 2. It is 
possible that differences in study design and stimuli might have contributed to different 
results. Relative to a live tarantula (as in Study 1), images of high calorie food might not be 
perceived to be as threatening (as in Study 2). High calorie food is anxiety provoking to 
restrained eaters because eating it can potentially lead to weight gain (Papies et al., 2008). 
Merely looking at food images may not carry the same emotional intensity. Therefore, we 
recommend that future researchers should considering using real food stimuli, e.g., a bogus 
taste test (see Werthmann et al., 2011).  
There are several limitations to the current study. Firstly, engagers were overly 
represented in our sample. Despite our rather large sample size, we had fewer than 20 
participants in the avoiders and indifferent groups. Hence, the size of the engagers group was 
almost ten times greater than the avoiders and indifferent groups. Unbalanced sample sizes 
might have limited the statistical power of our analyses. We believe that the over-
representation of engagers might be a result of the following two limitations to our study 
design. One is that we recruited individuals who self-identified as restrained eaters. We were 
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unable to distinguish participants who were successful in restrained eating from those who 
were not. Some researchers proposed that the Restraint Scale does not measure actual dieting 
behaviours but unsuccessful dieting attempts (e.g., van Strien et al., 2007). It is possible that 
some of our participants had an intent to restrict but were not actively restricting food intake. 
This limitation can be addressed by including in-person assessment to determine if 
participants are currently restricting. The other limitation is that we presented our participants 
with images of high calorie food. As discussed earlier, participants might be highly motivated 
to look at high calorie food, but it does not necessarily translate into strong motivation to eat 
it. We recommend future researchers to use stimuli that might be more ecologically relevant 
(e.g., providing participants with real food). Another limitation is that we did not control for 
hunger in the current study. We are confident that participants’ levels of hunger did not 
confound our results, as we measured the time since last food intake and it did not correlate 
with any outcome measures. However, future studies should consider actively controlling for 
participants’ food intake prior to their participation in the laboratory (for an example, see 
Nijs, Muris, Euser, & Franken, 2010).  
In summary, Study 2 examined the impact of motivation on attentional bias to threat, 
and the relation between approach and avoidance motivation in the context of eating-related 
anxiety. A sample of self-identified restrained eaters were divided into four different groups 
based on their motivation to approach and avoid images of high calorie food. Different 
motivational groups demonstrated different patterns of attentional biases to threat. Individuals 
who were ambivalent about whether to look towards or away from food images reported 
more restrained eating behaviours and greater thought shape fusion, both of which are closely 
linked to eating pathology. Ambivalent individuals, however, did not report more negative 
mood state as a result of viewing food images. Therefore, Study 2 provides evidence to the 
important role that ambivalent motivation plays in the development and maintenance of 
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anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2000). Results also support the modulating effect of 
motivation on attentional bias to threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
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Chapter 7 
Study 3: The Impact of Brief Mindfulness Training on Attentional Scope 
7.1 Introduction 
The primary purpose of Study 3 was to examine the extent to which a single session of 
mindfulness meditation influences attentional scope, including the scope of perceptual 
attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires. There is a plethora of research 
showing that anxiety is characterized by a narrowed scope of attention and difficulties in 
expanding this narrowed scope of attention. There is also a large body of research 
demonstrating that mindfulness-based interventions are effective in treating anxiety. There is 
some emerging evidence suggesting that mindfulness can broaden one’s attentional scope. 
Nonetheless, research on this topic is scarce and findings have been rather mixed. In addition, 
there are significant methodological limitations to the studies that are currently available. The 
present study aimed to address the following questions in a single-session experiment: (1) 
does brief mindfulness training improve mood state; (2) does brief mindfulness training 
broaden the scope of perceptual attention; (3) does brief mindfulness training broaden the 
scope of conceptual attention; and (4) does brief mindfulness training broaden the scope of 
thought-action repertoires.  
Given research on this topic is still in its early stage, we decided to recruit the general 
population rather than anxious individuals in the current study. There are two benefits in 
doing so: one is that all previous studies were conducted with the general population and we 
would be able to compare our results directly to those that have been published, and the other 
is that there is a more urgent need to further research the general effectiveness of mindfulness 
in expanding attentional scope rather than its specificity for anxiety conditions. 
In Study 3, individuals with no history of meditation practice were randomly assigned 
to receive 15 minutes of: mountain meditation, passive progressive muscle relaxation, or 
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listening to an audiobook. We decided to administer a 15-minute intervention as this was the 
duration of the original mountain meditation exercise developed by Kabat-Zinn (2014). 
Immediately before and after these activities, participants reported their mood state and 
completed tasks that measured their scope of perceptual attention and conceptual attention. 
At post-test, participants were also tested on their scope of thought-action repertoires. 
 We tested the following hypotheses in the current study: (1) mountain meditation 
would lead to more positive mood state than relaxation and control conditions; (2) mountain 
meditation would lead to a broader scope of perceptual attention than relaxation and control 
conditions; (3) mountain meditation would lead to a broader scope of conceptual attention 
than relaxation and control conditions; and (4) mountain meditation would lead to a broader 
scope of thought-action repertoires than relaxation and control conditions.   
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7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Participants  
Undergraduate students (N = 219) with no prior experience of mindfulness meditation were 
recruited from the University of Waterloo. Participants received course credits or cash 
remuneration (eight Canadian dollars per person) in exchange for their participation. This 
study was advertised through an online sign-up system and posters on campus. Before 
signing up for this study, potential participants were asked if they had any prior experience of 
mindfulness meditation and only novices were invited to take part in this experiment. Out of 
the original 219 participants, data from six participants were discarded due to noncompliance 
with task instructions. We also discarded data from two participants who had difficulty 
understanding English, two participants who had difficulty staying focused, and one 
participant due to computer difficulties. The final sample consisted of 208 participants (59 
males) with a mean age of 20.3 years (SD = 2.4).  
Outliers on self-report and cognitive measures (three standard deviations above or 
below the means) were corrected by replacing them with the next highest or lowest values. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: mindfulness 
meditation (N = 71), passive progressive muscle relaxation (N = 71), and audiobook (N = 66). 
There were no significant differences in age between three conditions (p = .77). Regardless of 
their group assignment, all participants were informed that the purpose of the present study 
was to examine the impact of different relaxation strategies on information processing, and 
there was no explicit reference to mindfulness meditation. The protocol received ethical 
clearance from the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo and all 
participants provided informed consent.  
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7.2.2 Self-Report Measures 
7.2.2.1 Positive and Negative Affect Schedule  
Participants completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 
1988) immediately before and after intervention. The PANAS consists of 20 items measuring 
mood state (i.e., how the individual is feeling at the moment). This measure generates two 
subscales: one measuring positive affect and the other measuring negative affect (10 items 
per scale). Using a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 “very slightly or not at all” to 5 “extremely”), 
participants rated the extent to which each item was consistent with their current mood state. 
The PANAS has demonstrated good validity and internal consistency (Crawford & Henry, 
2004). The PANAS was included to assess the impact of intervention on mood state. 
 
7.2.3 Cognitive Measures  
7.2.3.1 Navon Letter Task 
The Navon Letter Task (Navon, 1977) used in the present study was modeled after the work 
of Förster et al. (2006). In this task, a series of global letters, each comprised of small local 
letters was presented on the computer screen. The horizontal and vertical lines of each global 
letter were made up from seven closely spaced local letters. On each trial, participants were 
first presented with a fixation cross in the centre of the screen for 500ms. Next, a global 
composite letter was displayed and participants had five seconds to make a response. 
Participants were instructed to press the “L” key if a given stimulus contained the letter “L” 
and to press the “F” key if a given stimulus contained the letter “F”. They were also told that 
the target letter (“F” or “L”) would only occur at one level (either global or local). In total, 
each participant was given eight practice trials and 32 testing trials (half featuring a global 
target and half featuring a local target). There were eight different combinations: an L made 
of Hs, an L made of Ts, an F made of Hs, an F made of Ts, an T made of Ls, an H made of 
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Ls, an T made of Fs, and an H made of Fs. We followed established procedures and adjusted 
response times using a natural logarithm transform (see Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). 
Trials with incorrect responses (3.2% of the pre-test sample and 2.7% of the post-test sample) 
or with response times more than three standard deviations from the means (0.83% of the 
pre-test sample and 0.75% of the post-test sample) for each stimulus were removed. The 
number of exclusions did not vary by condition (both ps > .80). We included this task to 
measure the scope of perceptual attention. 
 
7.2.3.2 Categorization Task 
The Categorization Task (Isen & Daubman, 1984) used in this study was based on the work 
of Smith and Trope (2006). In this task, participants were presented with a general category 
and then had to rate a set of items on a 10-point scale (1: definitely does not belong to the 
category; 5: does not belong to the category, but is very similar to members of that category; 
6: does belong to the category, but is not a very good example of it; 10: definitely does belong 
to the category). For each trial, participants saw a general category on top of the screen, a 
specific item below it, and a 10-point rating scale with 1, 5, 6, and 10 labeled accordingly. 
Nine items were presented for each category (e.g., “vehicle”), including three excellent 
exemplars (e.g., “car”, “bus”), three moderate exemplars (e.g., “boat”, “truck”), and three 
weak exemplars (e.g., “feet”, “tractor”). Items were selected based on Rosch’s (1975) norms 
and as in Isen and Daubman (1984), moderate and excellent exemplars were included as 
fillers only. Each category always started with an excellent exemplar and the remaining items 
were presented in a random order. Each participant was given two categories (“furniture” and 
“vehicle”) in the pre-test and two new categories (“clothing” and “vegetable”) in the post-
test. Trials with responses that went beyond the 10-point rating scale (0.61% of the pre-test 
sample and 0.70% of the post-test sample) were removed. The number of exclusions did not 
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vary by condition (both ps > .18). We included this task to measure the scope of conceptual 
attention.  
 
7.2.3.3 Twenty Statements Task 
The present study employed a modified, open-ended Twenty Statement Task following the 
work of Fredrickson and Branigan (2005). In this task, participants were first presented with 
a hypothetical stressful situation (i.e., being put on an academic probation due to failing 
multiple courses and not being able to return to university until the next academic year). 
Participants were asked to imagine the scenario as vividly as possible and then list all the 
things they would like to do in response to this situation. Each participant was given twenty 
blank lines that began with “I would ____” and they were instructed to use as many as 
needed. Following data collection, we reviewed the qualitative data and subsequently had 
two independent coders classify each response as either problem solving (e.g., “visit my 
academic advisor”) or negative reaction (e.g., “blame myself”). Inter-rater reliability 
(Cohen’s Kappa) was 0.91. Inter-rater averages were calculated and significant discrepancies 
were resolved through discussion. The total number of statements participants completed was 
tallied, with a possible range from 0 to 20. We included this task to measure the scope of 
thought-action repertoires in response to a stressful event.  
 
7.2.4 Intervention 
7.2.4.1 Mindfulness Intervention 
Participants in the meditation group listened to a 15-minute audio recording of “Mountain 
meditation” (Kabat-Zinn, 2014), in which they were instructed to imagine themselves as 
being a mountain while observing the many qualities of and seasonal changes to this 
mountain. This exercise also encouraged participants to adopt the same stance towards their 
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own life experiences and cultivate a sense of rootedness. This exercise was particularly 
designed to broaden the scope of awareness in both space (e.g., from one’s individual self to 
a much bigger context that a mountain is situated in) and time (e.g., from one’s present 
moment to the many seasons and changes a mountain would have experienced). It has been 
used extensively in Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (Segal et al., 2002) and 
Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1994). We chose the mountain meditation 
as our mindfulness intervention for two reasons: (1) the mountain meditation specifically 
targets broadening the scope of attention, and (2) almost all previous studies have studied 
breathing meditation, which does not specifically target broadening the scope of attention.  
 
7.2.4.2 Relaxation Intervention 
Participants in the relaxation condition listened to a 15-minute audio recording of “Passive 
progressive muscle relaxation” (Feldman, Greeson, & Senville, 2010), in which they were 
instructed to notice sensations of tension in various muscle groups throughout their body for 
10 seconds each, and then allow these muscles to relax completely. In this exercise, 
participants were asked to pay attention to their muscles in an ordered structure, starting with 
hands and facial muscles and continuing slowly down the body. This particular exercise was 
a modified version of Jacobson’s (1938) relaxation techniques and has been widely used as 
an active control condition in mindfulness research (Feldman et al., 2010). We opted for a 
passive version without active tensing of muscles to eliminate the potential confound of 
physical movement as per Feuille and Pargament (2015).  
 
7.2.4.3 Audiobook Control  
Participants in the audiobook condition were asked to sit quietly. The first two chapters 
“Loomings” and “The carpet-bag” from an audiobook version of Herman Melville’s “Moby 
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Dick” (Wills, 2007) were then played through a pair of speakers. We used a narrated story 
because the extent to which it required auditory attention was comparable to the other two 
conditions. Moreover, asking participants to listen to an audiobook is a commonly used 
control condition in mindfulness research (S. Johnson, Gur, David, & Currier, 2013; Kramer, 
Weger, & Sharma, 2013; Xu, Purdon, Seli, & Smilek, 2017). We included this exercise as a 
passive control condition.  
 
7.2.5 Procedure 
Participants were tested individually. Upon their arrival, participants first completed the 
Navon Letter Task and Categorization Task, and indicated their mood state on the PANAS. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of the following interventions: a 15-minute 
mountain meditation, a 15-minute passive progressive muscle relaxation, or listening to an 
audiobook for 15 minutes, with instructions to follow along as best as they could. After 
intervention, the PANAS, Navon Letter Task, and Categorization Task were re-administered, 
and participants also completed the Twenty Statements Task. In total, the procedure lasted 
roughly 45 minutes.  
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7.3 Results 
7.3.1 Does Mountain Meditation Improve Mood State? 
Means and standard deviations of the positive and negative affect scores by group are 
presented in Table 9. To test whether mindfulness meditation improved positive mood state, 
we conducted a mixed ANOVA on positive affect scores, in which time (pre-test vs. post-
test) was entered as the within-subject factor and group (meditation vs. relaxation vs. 
audiobook) was entered as the between-subject factor. We observed a significant main effect 
of time, F (1, 205) = 78.95, η2p = .278, p < .001, and a significant time by group interaction, 
F (2, 205) = 17.27, η2p = .144, p < .001, but no main effect of group, F (2, 205) = 0.33, p = 
.721. To understand the significant time by group interaction, we performed a paired-sample 
t-test on positive affect for each intervention group. This analysis showed that positive affect 
stayed constant for the meditation group, t (70) = 1.32, p = .193, but decreased significantly 
for the relaxation group, t (70) = 4.30, p < .001, and the audiobook group, t (65) = 10.1, p 
< .001.  
To test whether mindfulness was associated with lower negative affect, we repeated 
this analysis on negative affect scores. We found a significant main effect of time, F (1, 205) 
= 127.32, η2p = .383, p < .001, a significant main effect of group, F (2, 205) = 3.05, η2p 
= .029, p = .049, and a significant time by group interaction, F (2, 205) = 3.32, η2p = .031, p 
= .038. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests revealed that all groups reported a significant 
decrease in negative affect from pre- to post-intervention (all ps < .001). Follow-up one-way 
ANOVAs showed a main effect of group on negative affect at post-test, F (2, 205) = 9.14, η2p 
= .089, p < .001, but not at pre-test, F (2, 205) = 1.03, p = .358. Post hoc comparisons 
(Tukey’s HSD) revealed that at post-test, both meditation and relaxation groups reported 
significantly lower negative affect than the control group (both ps < .004). These data 
provided partial support for our first hypothesis. 
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7.3.2 Does Mountain Meditation Broaden the Scope of Perceptual Attention?  
In this study, the scope of perceptual attention was measured through the Navon Letter Task. 
Faster responses to the global targets indicate a broad scope of attention, whereas faster 
responses to the local targets indicate a narrow scope of attention. Reaction time measures are 
presented in Table 9. To determine if mindfulness meditation broadened the scope of 
perceptual attention, we performed a mixed ANOVA on response times with time (pre-test 
vs. post-test) and target (global vs. local) as within-subject factors and group (meditation vs. 
relaxation vs. audiobook) as a between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of 
time, F (1, 205) = 294.41, η2p = .590, p < .001, a significant main effect of target, F (1, 205) = 
45.46, η2p = .181, p < .001, a significant time by target interaction, F (1, 205) = 35.11, η2p 
= .146, p < .001, but no main effect of group, no time by group interaction, no target by 
group interaction, and no time by target by group interaction (all ps > .087). In general, 
regardless of their assigned condition, participants responded to all targets faster during post-
test than pre-test. We conducted follow-up 2 (Target: global vs. local) x 3 (Condition: 
meditation vs. relaxation. vs. audiobook) mixed ANOVAs and found a main effect of target 
at both pre-test, F (1, 205) = 74.07, η2p = .265, p < .001, and post-test, F (1, 205) = 6.79, η2p 
= .032, p = .01, but no main effect of group or time by group interaction at either pre-test 
(both ps > .18) or post-test (both ps > .64). Hence, all participants responded faster to global 
than local targets both before and after intervention, suggesting a global focus of attention at 
both pre- and post-test. These results do not support our second hypothesis. 
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Table 9. Study 3: Changes to Mood State and Attentional Scope for All Participants  
Measures Meditation group (N = 71)  Relaxation group (N = 71)  Audiobook group (N = 66) 
Pre-test Post-test Paired t  Pre-test Post-test Paired t  Pre-test Post-test Paired t 
Mood states 
Positive affect 25.04 (6.99) 24.15 (7.97) 1.32  25.45 (5.87) 22.42 (7.80) 4.29***  26.97 (6.90) 20.45 (7.90) 10.10*** 
Negative affect 13.41 (3.06) 11.28 (1.64) 7.01***  14.03 (3.90) 10.97 (1.55) 9.11***  14.30 (4.22) 12.50 (3.12) 4.19*** 
            
Scope of perceptual attention 
Global targets RT 771.78 
(159.00) 
674.84 
(111.53) 
7.32***  763.08 
(151.37) 
681.31 
(142.08) 
6.69***  788.99 
(179.06) 
692.42 
(144.31) 
6.99*** 
Local targets RT 852.08 
(202.45) 
685.43 
(133.00) 
12.68***  803.74 
(132.58) 
688.29 
(120.91) 
9.73***  843.09 
(206.03) 
702.95 
(127.66) 
10.33*** 
            
Scope of conceptual attention 
N of weak  
exemplars included 
3.34 (2.35) 4.13 (2.55) -4.00**  4.03 (2.62) 4.96 (2.62) -4.47***  3.58 (3.13) 4.36 (2.52) -3.17** 
Typicality ratings  
of weak exemplars 
4.03 (1.29) 4.67 (1.29) -2.38*  4.46 (1.24) 5.11 (1.27) -2.76**  4.24 (1.59) 4.83 (1.27) -2.24* 
            
Scope of action tendencies 
Total N of statements -- 8.92 (3.74) --  -- 8.86 (3.54) --  -- 8.09 (2.93) -- 
N of problem-solving -- 5.13 (2.85) --  -- 4.46 (2.54) --  -- 4.23 (2.24) -- 
% of problem-solving -- 61.3 (26.8) --  -- 52.4 (24.2) --  -- 54.2 (24.9) -- 
Note: RT: response time, in ms; N: Number. Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. Paired-sample t-tests were performed 
to examine differences between pre- and post-tests within each group; For scope of perceptual attention, t-tests were performed on logarithm-
transformed response time. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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7.3.3 Does Mindfulness Meditation Broaden the Scope of Conceptual Attention? 
Scope of conceptual attention was assessed with the Categorization Task. A broader 
scope of conceptual attention is represented by two measures: a greater number of weak 
exemplars to be classified as “belonging to the category” (i.e., rated 6 or higher), and higher 
typicality ratings of weak exemplars (see Smith & Trope, 2006). Means and standard 
deviations of these indices are presented in Table 9. We first checked whether our items were 
correctly labelled as strong, moderate, or weak exemplars of the categories. A 3 (Category: 
strong vs. moderate vs. weak) x 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) repeated-measures ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of category, F (2, 414) = 2237.57, η2p = .915, p < .001, such 
that participants indeed considered the strong items (M = 9.58, SD = 0.54) as the best 
exemplars, the moderate items (M = 7.94, SD = 0.94) less typical, followed by the weak 
items (M = 4.57, SD = 1.18).  
We next examined whether intervention influenced how many of the weak items were 
included in the respective categories (i.e., rated 6 or higher). We performed a mixed 
ANOVA, in which time (pre-test vs. post-test) was entered as the within-subject factor and 
group (meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) was entered as the between-subject factor. 
This analysis revealed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 205) =18.06, η2p = .081, p 
< .001, such that all participants were more likely to include weak exemplars as belonging to 
the categories at post-test, but no main effect of group or time by group interaction (both 
ps > .12). We then administered the same analysis to the actual ratings of the weak exemplars. 
We again observed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 205) =43.94, η2p = .176, p < .001, 
such that all participants rated weak exemplars as more typical of the category at post-test, 
but no main effect of group or time by group interaction (both ps > .08). These results suggest 
that participants in all three conditions exhibited a broadened scope of conceptual attention 
after intervention, thus rejecting our third hypothesis.  
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7.3.4 Does Mindfulness Meditation Broaden the Scope of Thought-Action Repertoires?  
In this study, the scope of thought-action repertoires was measured using the Twenty 
Statements Task. A higher number indicates broader thought-action repertoires. The numbers 
of completed statements and the proportion of problem-solving statements are presented in 
Table 9. To answer this question, we conducted a one-way ANOVA in which the number of 
all statements, the number of problem-solving statements, and the proportion of problem-
solving statements were tested as a function of group. Contrary to our hypothesis, this 
analysis revealed no main effect of group for the number of all statements, F (2, 205) =1.22, 
p = .297, the number of problem-solving statements, F (2, 205) = 2.30, p = .103, or the 
proportion of problem-solving statements, F (2, 205) = 2.43, p = .091, thus rejecting our 
fourth hypothesis.  
 
7.3.5 Follow-up Analyses: Participants with an Initial Narrow Focus of Perceptual 
Attention 
We observed that approximately 75% of participants displayed a global focus of perceptual 
attention at pre-test (i.e., responded faster to global than local targets in the Navon Letter 
Task), which may have created a ceiling effect. We selected those who were narrowly 
focused at pre-test (i.e., did not demonstrate a global precedence in the Navon Letter Task, N 
= 51) and conducted the same series of analyses on this subset only. One-way ANOVAs 
showed that there were no significant differences between the meditation group (N = 16), 
relaxation group (N = 19), and control group (N = 16) in any of the measures administered at 
pre-test (all ps > .077).  
Changes to mood state and attentional scope measures are presented in Table 10. To 
examine if mindfulness meditation improved mood state, we conducted a 3 (Group: 
meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) x 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) mixed ANOVA. 
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For positive affect, we observed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 48) = 23.52, η2p 
= .329, p < .001, a significant main effect of group, F (2, 48) = 8.07, η2p = .252, p = .001, and 
a significant time by group interaction, F (2, 48) = 6.25, η2p = .206, p = .004. For negative 
affect, we found a significant main effect of time, F (1, 48) = 37.41, η2p = .438, p < .001, a 
significant time by group interaction, F (2, 48) = 3.75, η2p = .135, p = .031, but no main effect 
of group, F (2, 48) = 0.10, p = .908. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that positive 
affect stayed constant for the meditation group, t (15) = 0.91, p = .379, and the relaxation 
group, t (18) = 1.78, p = .093, but decreased significantly for the audiobook group, t (15) = 
5.91, p < .001. In addition, negative affect remained constant for the audiobook group, t (15) 
= 1.62, p = .126, but decreased significantly for the meditation group, t (15) = 3.64, p = .002, 
and the relaxation group, t (18) = 5.58, p < .001. 
To examine if mindfulness meditation broadened the scope of perceptual attention, 
we administered a 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) x 2 (Target: global vs. local) x 3 (Group: 
meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) mixed ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of time, F (1, 48) = 45.79, η2p = .488, p < .001, a significant main effect of target, 
F (1, 48) = 25.53, η2p = .347, p < .001, a significant time by target interaction, F (1, 48) = 
6.08, η2p = .112, p = .017, but no main effect of group, no time by group interaction, no target 
by group interaction, and no time by target by group interaction (all ps > .23). In general, all 
participants responded to all targets faster during post-test relative to pre-test. Follow-up 2 
(Target: global vs. local) x 3 (Group: meditation vs. relaxation. vs. audiobook) mixed 
ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of target at pre-test, F (1, 48) = 76.92, η2p = .616, 
p < .001, and a trending main effect of target at post-test, F (1, 48) = 3.84, η2p = .074, p 
= .056, but no main effect of group or time by group interaction at either pre-test (both 
ps > .30) or post-test (both ps > .24). Hence, all participants responded faster to local than 
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global targets at pre-test, and this difference was trending towards statistical significance at 
post-test.  
For scope of conceptual attention, we first examined the impact of intervention on the 
number of weak exemplars that were included in the respective categories. A 3 (Group: 
meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) x 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a trending main effect of time, F (1, 48) = 3.52, η2p = .068, p = .067, no significant 
main effect of group, F (2, 48) = 2.73, p = .08, and a trending time by group interaction, F (2, 
48) = 3.04, η2p = .112, p = .057. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests revealed that whereas those 
in the relaxation group were more likely to include weak exemplars after intervention, t (18) 
= -2.33, p = .031, the other two groups did not (both ps > .12). For typicality ratings of the 
weak exemplars, the same mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 
48) = 7.58, η2p = .136, p = .008, no main effect of group, F (2, 48) =1.94, p = .154, and a 
trending time by group interaction, F (2, 48) = 2.84, η2p = .106, p = .063. Follow-up paired-
sample t-tests revealed that while typicality ratings for weak exemplars remained constant for 
the audiobook group, t (15) = 0.31, p = .765, ratings increased significantly for the meditation 
group, t (15) = -2.90, p = .011, and relaxation group, t (18) = -2.84, p = .011.  
For the scope of thought-action repertoires, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
main effect of group for the number of problem-solving statements, F (2, 48) = 3.69, p 
= .032, and the proportion of problem-solving statements, F (2, 48) = 3.29, p = .046, but not 
for the number of all statements, F (2, 48) = 0.36, p = .700. Follow-up independent-sample t-
tests showed that the meditation group reported a greater number of problem-solving 
statements than the relaxation group, t (33) = 2.49, p = .018, and audiobook group, t (30) = 
2.07, p = .047. Similarly, the meditation group reported a higher proportion of problem-
solving statements than the relaxation group, t (33) = 2.53, p = .016, and audiobook group, t 
(30) = 2.07, p = .47. There were no significant differences between relaxation and audiobook 
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groups, in either the number or proportion of completed problem-solving statements (both 
ps > .83). 
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Table 10. Study 3: Changes to Mood State and Attentional Scope for Participants with an Initial Narrow Focus of Perceptual Attention  
Measures Meditation group (N = 16)  Relaxation group (N = 19)  Audiobook group (N = 16) 
Pre-test Post-test Paired t  Pre-test Post-test Paired t  Pre-test Post-test Paired t 
Mood states 
Positive affect 28.56 (5.50) 27.31 (6.82) 0.91  25.00 (5.63) 22.42 (7.52) 1.78  24.44 (5.27) 16.38 (4.94) 5.91*** 
Negative affect 13.75 (3.53) 11.31 (1.62) 3.64**  14.84 (3.76) 10.84 (1.17) 5.58***  13.13 (4.01) 11.88 (2.60) 1.62 
            
Scope of perceptual attention 
Global targets RT 804.96 
(141.07) 
686.54 
(104.27) 
5.04***  882.72 
(133.65) 
749.41 
(159.83) 
4.80***  871.73 
(168.20) 
757.22 
(138.21) 
2.59* 
Local targets RT 752.96 
(140.83) 
662.19 
(100.30) 
4.60***  820.47 
(121.68) 
725.56 
(120.46) 
3.64**  787.01 
(167.23) 
708.15 
(106.26) 
2.36* 
            
Scope of conceptual attention 
N of weak  
exemplars included 
3.56 (2.13) 4.81 (2.56) -1.65  3.89 (2.96) 5.47 (2.72) -2.33*  3.44 (2.31) 2.81 (1.42) 1.08 
Typicality ratings  
of weak exemplars 
3.91 (1.24) 5.01 (1.16) -2.90*  4.51 (1.45) 5.41 (1.24) -2.84*  4.32 (1.83) 4.18 (1.08) 0.31 
            
Scope of action tendencies 
Total N of statements -- 8.25 (2.62) --  -- 7.68 (2.75) --  -- 7.38 (3.50) -- 
N of problem-solving -- 6.00 (2.99) --  -- 3.84 (2.12) --  -- 3.94 (2.65) -- 
% of problem-solving -- 71.5 (21.3) --  -- 51.3 (25.3) --  -- 53.2 (28.1) -- 
Note: RT: response time, in ms; N: Number. Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. Paired-sample t-tests were performed 
to examine differences between pre- and post-tests within each group; For scope of perceptual attention, t-tests were performed on logarithm-
transformed response time.  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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7.3.6 Follow-up Analyses: Participants with an Initial Broad Focus of Perceptual 
Attention 
We also selected those who were broadly focused at pre-test (i.e., demonstrated a global 
precedence in the Navon Letter Task, N = 157) and conducted the same series of analyses on 
this subset only. One-way ANOVAs showed that there were no significant differences 
between the meditation group (N = 55), relaxation group (N = 52), and control group (N = 50) 
in any of the measures administered at pre-test (all ps > .101) with the exception of positive 
affect, F (2, 154) = 4.05, η2p = .050, p = .019.  
Changes to mood state and attentional scope measures are presented in Table 11. To 
examine if mindfulness meditation improved mood state, we conducted a 3 (Group: 
meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) x 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) mixed ANOVA. 
For positive affect, we observed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 154) = 55.37, η2p 
= .264, p < .001, a significant time by group interaction, F (2, 154) = 11.44, η2p = .129, p 
< .001, but no main effect of group, F (2, 154) = 0.37, p = .695. For negative affect, we found 
a significant main effect of time, F (1, 154) = 89.57, η2p = .368, p < .001, a main effect of 
group, F (2, 154) = 4.25, η2p = .052, p = .016, but no time by group interaction, F (2, 154) = 
0.98, p = .378. Follow-up paired-sample t-tests showed that positive affect stayed constant 
for the meditation group, t (54) = 1.00, p = .320, but decreased significantly for the relaxation 
group, t (51) = 3.93, p < .001, and audiobook group, t (49) = 8.31, p < .001. Negative affect 
decreased significantly for all three groups (all ps < .001).  
To examine if mindfulness meditation broadened the scope of perceptual attention, 
we administered a 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) x 2 (Target: global vs. local) x 3 (Group: 
meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) mixed ANOVA. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect of time, F (1, 154) = 256.14, η2p = .625, p < .001, a significant main effect of 
target, F (1, 154) = 140.51, η2p = .477, p < .001, a significant time by target interaction, F (1, 
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154) = 80.56, η2p = .343, p < .001, a borderline time by target by group interaction, F (2, 154) 
= 2.88, η2p = .036, p = .059. However, there was no main effect of group, no time by group 
interaction, and no target by group interaction (all ps > .14). In general, all participants 
responded to all targets faster during post-test relative to pre-test. Follow-up 2 (Target: global 
vs. local) x 3 (Group: meditation vs. relaxation. vs. audiobook) mixed ANOVAs revealed a 
significant main effect of target at pre-test, F (1, 154) = 247.39, η2p = .616, p < .001, and at 
post-test, F (1, 154) = 20.17, η2p = .116, p < .001, but no main effect of group or time by 
group interaction at either pre-test (both ps > .18) or post-test (both ps > .47). Hence, all 
participants responded faster to global than local targets at both pre-test and post-test.  
For scope of conceptual attention, we first examined the impact of intervention on the 
number of weak exemplars that were included in the respective categories. A 3 (Group: 
meditation vs. relaxation vs. audiobook) x 2 (Time: pre-test vs. post-test) mixed ANOVA 
revealed a main effect of time, F (1, 154) = 14.78, η2p = .088, p < .001, no significant main 
effect of group, F (2, 154) = 1.92, p = .150, and no time by group interaction, F (2, 154) = 
0.70, p = .500. For typicality ratings of the weak exemplars, the same mixed ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of time, F (1, 154) = 39.60, η2p = .205, p < .001, no main 
effect of group, F (2, 154) =1.81, p = .167, and no time by group interaction, F (2, 154) = 
0.86, p = .426.  
For the scope of thought-action repertoires, a one-way ANOVA revealed no 
significant main effect of group for the number of all statements, F (2, 154) =1.47, p = .234, 
the number of problem-solving statements, F (2, 154) = 0.53, p = .589, or the proportion of 
problem-solving statements, F (2, 154) = 0.79, p = .457. 
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Table 11. Study 3: Changes to Mood State and Attentional Scope for Participants with an Initial Broad Focus of Perceptual Attention  
Measures Meditation group (N = 55)  Relaxation group (N = 52)  Audiobook group (N = 50) 
Pre-test Post-test Paired t  Pre-test Post-test Paired t  Pre-test Post-test Paired t 
Mood states 
Positive affect 24.02 (7.07) 23.24 (8.09) 1.00  25.62 (6.00) 22.42 (7.98) 3.93***  27.78 (7.20) 21.76 (8.25) 8.31*** 
Negative affect 13.31 (2.94) 11.27 (1.66) 5.95***  13.73 (3.95) 11.02 (1.67) 7.35***  14.68 (4.25) 12.70 (3.27) 3.85*** 
            
Scope of perceptual attention 
Global targets RT 762.13 
(163.77) 
671.43 
(114.25) 
5.79***  719.36 
(133.65) 
656.42 
(127.80) 
4.99***  762.51 
(175.84) 
671.69 
(141.31) 
6.94*** 
Local targets RT 880.92 
(209.43) 
692.19 
(141.17) 
12.59***  797.63 
(136.97) 
674.67 
(119.32) 
9.35***  861.03 
(215.39) 
701.28 
(134.73) 
11.98*** 
            
Scope of conceptual attention 
N of weak  
exemplars included 
3.28 (2.43) 3.93 (2.53) -1.77  4.08 (2.51) 4.77 (2.59) -1.79  3.62 (3.37) 4.86 (2.60) -3.03** 
Typicality ratings  
of weak exemplars 
4.06 (1.31) 4.57 (1.32) -2.94**  4.44 (1.17) 5.01 (1.28) -3.46**  4.22 (1.52) 5.04 (1.27) -4.47*** 
            
Scope of action tendencies 
Total N of statements -- 8.69 (3.10) --  -- 9.08 (3.32) --  -- 8.08 (2.34) -- 
N of problem-solving -- 4.71 (2.20) --  -- 4.56 (2.21) --  -- 4.28 (2.03) -- 
% of problem-solving -- 58.6 (27.1) --  -- 52.6 (23.8) --  -- 54.8 (23.6) -- 
Note: RT: response time, in ms; N: Number. Standard deviations from the mean are presented in brackets. Paired-sample t-tests were performed 
to examine differences between pre- and post-tests within each group; For scope of perceptual attention, t-tests were performed on logarithm-
transformed response time.  * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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7.4 Discussion 
 
The purpose of Study 3 was to examine whether a single session of mountain meditation 
broadens attentional scope, as compared to relaxation and control conditions. Specifically, we 
aimed to examine: (1) if mountain meditation leads to more positive mood state; (2) if 
mountain meditation leads to a broader scope of perceptual attention; (3) if mountain 
meditation leads to a broader scope of conceptual attention; and (4) if mountain meditation 
leads to a broader scope of thought-action repertoires. Results suggest that all participants, 
regardless of their assigned condition, displayed a global focus of perceptual attention and a 
broadened scope of conceptual attention at post-test. Meditation did not lead to broader 
thought-action repertoires. Meditation, however, prevented positive affect from decreasing 
over time. Hence, our results only provided support to our first hypothesis only.  
As participants from all three conditions demonstrated a global focus of perceptual 
attention and a broadened scope of conceptual attention at post-test, our results did not seem 
to support the broadening hypothesis as outlined in the mindfulness-to-meaning theory 
(Garland et al., 2015). However, this absence of time by group interaction might be a result 
of having too many participants enter the study with a global focus of perceptual attention 
(approximately 75% of our sample). When we administered the same analyses to participants 
who were narrowly focused at pre-test, we found more salient effects of mountain meditation. 
Meditation, as compared to relaxation and audiobook conditions, resulted in a much broader 
range of problem-solving action tendencies. In addition, meditation and relaxation reduced 
negative affect, prevented positive affect from decreasing, and broadened the scope of 
conceptual attention. The sample size for these analyses was quite modest (sample size for 
each of the three conditions ranging from 16 - 19), so these findings must be considered 
preliminary and modest.  
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In fact, the observed global precedence effect in the Navon Letter Task at both pre-
test and post-test is consistent with findings from previous studies. It has been repeatedly 
demonstrated that healthy individuals display facilitated processing of global information in 
the Navon Letter Task (Andres & Fernandes, 2006; Navon, 1977). The finding that 
mindfulness meditation did not have any specific impact on this global precedence effect is 
not unique to this study. Instead, in a study conducted by Chan and Woollacott (2007), they 
found that both novices and meditators responded faster to global targets. Similarly, Colzato 
et al. (2016) found that the global precedence effect (as measured through the Navon Letter 
Task) was unaffected by the type of meditation. The robust presence of the global precedence 
effect in the Navon Letter Task among healthy individuals might have contributed to the lack 
of significant findings on the broadening effect of mindfulness. Results from the current 
study seem to confirm this hypothesis: when we excluded globally focused participants from 
our analysis, meditation demonstrated a greater impact on the scope of problem solving and 
conceptual attention. Hence, we recommend that future researchers consider recruiting 
participants who are likely to have a narrow focus of attention at baseline, such as individuals 
with anxiety disorders or high trait anxiety. Alternatively, mood induction procedures (for an 
example, see Nelson et al., 2015) can be used to heighten state anxiety, which has been 
shown to narrow attentional scope (Finucane, 2011; Finucane & Power, 2010). 
Our results also suggested that the Navon Letter Task might be subject to a significant 
practice effect and therefore may lack reliability, which is consistent with more recent 
research examining responses over time (Dale & Arnell, 2013; Gerlach & Krumborg, 2014). 
We chose the Navon Letter Task because it is one of the most commonly used measures of 
attentional scope. In future studies, researchers might want to consider using other tasks to 
measure the scope of perceptual attention, such as the visual matching task developed by 
Kimchi and Palmer (1982). 
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Interestingly, when we excluded globally focused participants from our analysis, 
mountain meditation did lead to a broadened scope of problem solving in response to a 
stressful situation. Those who practiced mindfulness not only reported the greatest number 
but also the highest proportion of problem-solving action tendencies in the Twenty 
Statements Task. In fact, this finding is consistent with the key hypothesis highlighted in the 
mindfulness-to-meaning theory: mindfulness evokes a decentered, broadened mode of 
awareness and allows individuals to generate more adaptive appraisals of distressing events 
(Garland et al., 2015). Past research has focused solely on using affect-neutral measures to 
examine the impact of mindfulness on scope of attention (e.g., Navon Letter Task, 
Categorization Task, Remote Associates Task, etc.) and only some reported significant 
findings. Our results not only replicated this observation (i.e., the lack of significant findings 
in Navon Letter Task and Categorization Task), but also suggested a promising research 
direction. Future studies should consider utilizing attentional measures that are more 
ecologically valid and involve affective stimuli, e.g., Flanker Task with emotional faces 
(Fenske & Eastwood, 2003), Attention Cueing Task with emotional faces (Fox et al., 2001), 
and Gaze Navigation Task (Marguc, Forster, & Van Kleef, 2011). 
The current study included a mindfulness exercise that aims at promoting a global, 
decentered, and metacognitive perspective, which can be quite different from typical 
mindfulness practices that primarily focus on breathing and bodily sensations. In this study, 
meditation prevented positive affect from decreasing, while passive progressive muscle 
relaxation and audiobook control did not. However, in a similar study (Xu et al., 2017), we 
compared a 10-minute breathing meditation with an audiobook control condition, and found 
that positive affect decreased significantly in both conditions. It is possible that different 
types of mindfulness practice may have different effects, as suggested by Garland, Gaylord, 
146	
and Fredrickson (2011). Mountain meditation may allow individuals to savour their positive 
experience by facilitating positive reappraisals of adversity.  
Despite some of our insignificant results, the current study had several important 
implications for future research exploring the broadening effect of mindfulness. Firstly, past 
research has focused exclusively on the scope of perceptual attention while ignoring the 
scope of conceptual attention and thought-action repertoires. There is merit in considering 
attentional scope as a multifaceted construct and including measures that might be more 
ecologically relevant (e.g., our Twenty Statements Task). Secondly, it is important to adopt a 
pre-post study design when investigating the impact of mindfulness on attentional scope. If 
we had not included a pre-test measure, we would have made very different conclusions 
based on some of the results we observed. Lastly, it would be critical for future researchers to 
include both passive and active control conditions when studying the impact of mindfulness 
training on attentional processes. This would allow us to examine whether or not the benefits 
of mindfulness are due to relaxation or other cognitive processes.  
There are several limitations to the current study. The first limitation is that the 
majority of our participants displayed a global focus of perceptual attention at pre-test, which 
has significantly constrained our ability to examine the extent to which mindfulness 
meditation helps to broaden a narrow focus of attention. Although new analyses based on 
those who were narrowly focused at pre-test revealed more a salient effect of mindfulness 
meditation, our results are still limited by the relatively small sample size. We opted for 
unselected, healthy individuals because research in this area is still at its initial phase and we 
wanted to be able to compare our results to that from previous studies. However, we do 
recommend future studies to focus on the broadening effect of mindfulness among anxious 
individuals who are more likely to display a narrow focus of attention (see Najmi et al., 
2012). The second limitation is the lack of significant findings with regards to the impact of 
147	
mindfulness on the scope of perceptual and conceptual attention. Even after excluding 
globally focused participants from our analyses, mindfulness did not confer any advantage to 
relaxation in broadening conceptual attention. However, mindfulness did demonstrate 
advantage relative to relaxation in the Twenty Statements Task. Unlike the Navon Letter 
Task and the Categorization Task, the Twenty Statements Task utilized a real-life, 
emotionally charged example—our undergraduate participants were asked to imagine being 
placed on academic probation. We chose the Navon Letter Task and the Categorization Task 
because they were the most commonly used measures in attentional scope literature. 
However, our results seem to suggest that tasks that induce some level of stress might be 
better suited for this line of research. Finally, the current study only included one particular 
type of mindfulness practice, i.e., mountain meditation. It is not clear if mountain meditation 
is more effective than other forms of mindfulness meditation (e.g., breathing meditation) in 
broadening the scope of attention.   
In summary, the present study examined the effect of mindfulness training on the 
scope of perceptual attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires. 
Participants from all three conditions exhibited a global focus of perceptual attention and a 
broadened scope of conceptual attention at post-test. Mountain meditation, however, 
prevented positive affect from decreasing. For those who displayed an initial narrow focus of 
perceptual attention, meditation broadened conceptual attention and also led to a broader 
scope of problem solving. Therefore, the present study provides some preliminary support to 
the hypothesis that mindfulness training enhances emotion regulation through broadening the 
scope of attention (Garland et al., 2015).  
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Chapter 8 
General Discussion 
8.1 Summary of Research 
The purpose of the current research program was twofold: firstly, we aimed to explore the 
impact of motivation on attentional biases to threat in different domains of anxiety; and 
secondly, we attempted to examine the extent to which mindfulness meditation broadens 
attentional scope. Extensive research in the last several decades has demonstrated a close link 
between anxiety and a wide range of attentional processes, among which attentional bias and 
attentional scope are two constructs that have attracted much research attention. Anxious 
individuals are characterized by several types of attentional biases to threat, including 
facilitated attention, difficulty disengaging, and attentional avoidance. Anxious individuals 
are also known to have a narrow scope of attention and experience difficulties in expanding 
their attentional scope. More recent research has begun to show that motivation might have a 
modulating effect on attentional biases to threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Furthermore, there 
is preliminary evidence suggesting that anxious individuals can be separated into different 
groups based on their motivation to approach and avoid threat (Nelson et al., 2015). 
Meanwhile, there is good reason to expect that mindfulness is a promising means of 
broadening attentional scope, which then improves emotion regulation (Garland et al., 2015). 
However, research on these two topics is scarce and rather inconclusive.  
The current program of research addressed these two issues in three separate studies. 
Study 1 explored the relation between motivation, attentional biases to a live tarantula, and 
anxiety in spider-fearful individuals. Study 2 examined the relation between motivation, 
attentional biases to images of high calorie food, and anxiety in restrained eaters. Study 3 
evaluated the general effectiveness of a brief mindfulness meditation in broadening the scope 
of perceptual attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires in healthy 
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individuals. We decided to use a live spider and images of high calorie food as threat stimuli 
because the former signals physical threats and the latter signals threats to personal goals, 
thus allowing us to compare the extent to which these two stimuli elicit different motivation. 
It should be noted that we opted for the general population rather than anxious individuals in 
study 3 for two reasons: (1) it remains unclear whether or not mindfulness broadens 
attentional scope in the general population, let alone anxious individuals; and (2) studying the 
general population would allow us to compare our results to those from previous studies.   
 Study 1 revealed that a sample of spider-fearful individuals experienced significant 
differences in their motivation to pay attention to vs. avoid paying attention to a live spider. 
Moreover, different motivational groups demonstrated attentional biases to threat that were 
different from the sample as a whole and also different from one another. Particularly, the 
engagers group consistently showed facilitated attention to threat, whereas the avoiders and 
indifferent groups did not. The ambivalent group, on the other hand, displayed a sudden 
increase in their visual attention towards the spider in some of the segments. Interestingly, 
ambivalent individuals reported significantly higher levels of spider fear and negative mood 
state at the end of the study than all other groups.  
 Study 2 again demonstrated that a sample of restrained eaters experienced significant 
differences in their motivation to look at vs. avoid looking at food images. Different 
motivational group again demonstrated attentional biases to threat that were different from 
the sample as a whole and also different from one another. Particularly, the engagers group 
showed facilitated attention to threat, the avoiders group showed attentional avoidance of 
threat, and the ambivalent and indifferent groups mostly showed no attentional bias. With 
respect to the time course of visual attention, the ambivalent group started with attentional 
avoidance and then showed no attentional bias, the engagers group started with attentional 
avoidance and then switched to facilitated attention, the avoiders group started with 
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facilitated attention and then switched to attentional avoidance, and the indifferent group 
mostly showed no attentional bias. Interestingly, ambivalent individuals also reported more 
restrained eating behaviours and endorsed greater thought-shape fusion, both of which are 
closely linked to eating pathology.  
 Study 3 showed that all participants displayed a global focus of perceptual attention 
and a broadened scope of conceptual attention at post-test, regardless of which intervention 
they received. A brief mindfulness meditation did not broaden thought-action repertoires, as 
compared to relaxation and control conditions. Meditation, however, prevented positive 
affect from decreasing over time. For participants who showed a narrow focus of perceptual 
attention at pre-test, both meditation and relaxation reduced negative affect, prevented 
positive affect from decreasing, and broadened the scope of conceptual attention. Moreover, 
meditation resulted in a broader range of problem-solving action tendencies when 
participants encountered a hypothetical stressful situation.  
 Together, Study 1 and Study 2 provided strong evidence in support of the 
hypothesized link between motivation and attentional biases to threat among anxious 
individuals, as proposed by leading cognitive models of anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Mogg & Bradley, 1998). Moreover, the current research program advanced our 
understanding of motivation in the context of anxiety disorders by acknowledging and 
examining the interaction between motivation to approach threat and motivation to avoid 
threat. When two samples of anxious individuals were divided into the same four 
motivational groups, they consistently demonstrated many meaningful and significant 
differences on a variety of different measures (e.g., self-report measures, response time 
measures, and eye movement measures). Overall, our findings provide strong support to the 
classification system proposed by Nelson et al. (2015).  
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The fact that our two-item self-report measure of motivation significantly predicted 
participants’ eye movements towards threatening stimuli in two different contexts (i.e., both 
spider-related and eating-related anxiety) showed the robust modulating effect of motivation 
on attentional biases to threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Approach and avoidance motivation 
was associated with participants’ eye movements not only in the initial time frame of stimuli 
presentation (e.g., probability of first fixation in Study 1, and time to first in Study 2) but also 
over the time course of stimuli presentation (e.g., proportion of viewing time from S1 to S10 
in Study 1, and proportion of viewing time from T1 to T10 in Study 2).  
 Results from Study 1 and Study 2 also provide strong support to the hypothesis that 
approach-avoidance conflict (a.k.a., ambivalence towards threat) plays a critical role in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety (Gray & McNaughton, 2000; McNaughton & Gray, 
2000). An ambivalent motivation towards threat was associated with sustained anxiety in 
spider-fearful individuals and greater eating pathology in restrained eaters. It should be noted 
that only a subset of our anxious participants was classified as ambivalent. Hence, our results 
do not support the hypothesis that ambivalence is a precursor for significant anxiety (Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000), as the majority of anxious participants in the current research did not 
endorse an ambivalent motivation towards threat. Instead, our results were in favour of 
Nelson et al.’s (2015) conclusion that ambivalence exacerbates and prolongs anxiety within 
anxious populations. We believe that ambivalence might indicate the intensity of anxiety 
rather than the presence of anxiety.  
With regards to the broadening effect of mindfulness, evidence is far from conclusive. 
In fact, Study 3 showed no extra benefits of mountain meditation in broadening the scope of 
perceptual attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires, as compared to 
relaxation and control conditions. Mindfulness, however, demonstrated potentials in 
broadening attentional scope for those who presented with a narrow focus of perceptual 
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attention but not those who presented with a broad focus of perceptual attention. Such effects 
were strongest when participants were tested on a more ecologically valid, stress-related task. 
Combined, these findings offered some preliminary evidence in support of the mindfulness-
to-meaning theory (Garland et al., 2015). Mindfulness might be an effective strategy in 
expanding one’s perspective and building resources for challenging situations, which is in 
favour of the broaden-and-build theory (Fredrickson, 2001).  
 
8.2 Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
Traditionally, attentional biases to threat have been considered a unique feature that 
distinguishes anxious from non-anxious populations (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998; Williams et al., 1988). There are generally two ways to study attentional 
biases to threat: one is to examine how anxious individuals process threatening stimuli 
differently from non-anxious individuals (e.g., Mogg et al., 1995; Mogg et al., 1992), and the 
other is to induce a state of anxiety and examine how anxiety influences attentional 
processing of threatening stimuli in non-anxious individuals (e.g., Fox et al., 2001; Nelson et 
al., 2015). The underlying assumption is that anxious individuals are a homogenous group 
who likely exhibit the same attentional biases to threat. However, the current program of 
research challenged this assumption and highlighted the possibility that the link between 
anxiety and attentional biases is much more nuanced than we previously understood.  
Individuals with the same level of anxiety displayed attentional biases in different 
directions and with various intensities. The relation between anxiety and attentional biases 
was modulated by one’s motivation to approach and to avoid threat. There was a significant 
and consistent correspondence between approach motivation and facilitated attention towards 
threat, and between avoidance motivation and attentional avoidance of threat. Most 
importantly, not all anxious individuals endorsed the same motivational state: some were 
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engagers, others were avoiders; some were indifferent, others were ambivalent. Different 
motivational states predicted different types of attentional biases to threat. If we had not 
measured motivation, we would have concluded that anxious individuals are characterized by 
either facilitated attention towards threat or no attentional bias at all. Neither of these 
conclusions would have been accurate. In fact, the modulating effect of motivation on 
attentional biases might have explained the null and at times inconsistent findings in the 
current literature—a hypothesis that was raised by some researchers (e.g., Ahern et al., 2010; 
Werthmann et al., 2015). The heterogeneity of anxious individuals, whether in their 
motivational states or attentional biases to threat, has been largely ignored in current theories 
of anxiety. The nuanced relation between motivation, attentional biases, and anxiety calls for 
a more integrative model.  
 A two-factor model of motivation has been one of the most influential theories in 
psychological research: rewards elicit approach motivation and punishments elicit avoidance 
motivation. The hypothesis that approach and avoidance motivation are two distinct systems 
is rudimentary to many psychological theories (Fowles, 1987; Gray, 1970; Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Despite its many benefits, this theoretical view is dualistic in nature and does not leave 
space for approach motivation to interact with avoidance motivation. The current program of 
research challenged and further expanded the two-factor model of motivation in several 
ways. Firstly, not all anxious individuals are predominantly avoidant of threat. In fact, the 
majority of our samples were either indifferent (as in Study 1) or approaching (as in Study 2) 
in response to threat. Secondly, a subset of our participants was highly motivated to approach 
and to avoid threat at the same time. In fact, these ambivalent individuals reported greater 
anxiety than other participants. Lastly, approach and avoidance motivation were not 
necessarily opposite constructs. In fact, there was no significant correlation between approach 
and avoidance motivation in Study 1 and a weak-to-moderate negative correlation in Study 2. 
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Our results suggest that there are merits in examining the interaction between approach and 
avoidance motivation in the context of anxiety. Within a group of anxious individuals, some 
might endorse an ambivalent motivation towards threat and therefore experience greater and 
prolonged anxiety than others. Ambivalence can be an important factor in the process of 
diagnosis (i.e., determining who is likely to experience heightened anxiety) and prognosis 
(i.e., determining who is likely to have poorer response to exposure treatment). Hence, a new 
model is needed to account for the important role that ambivalence plays in the development 
and maintenance of anxiety. Current theories, on the other hand, are rather incomplete (e.g., 
Gray & McNaughton, 2000) or lack generalizability (e.g., Stroebe et al., 2008).  
 After decades of rigorous study, it is well established that mindfulness-based 
interventions are an effective treatment for anxiety disorders (e.g., Hofmann et al., 2010; 
Vollestad et al., 2012). Research has now moved beyond the efficacy of mindfulness and into 
the realm of identifying its underling mechanisms. Among many models that have been 
proposed to date, attention regulation appears to be the most promising account (Holzel et al., 
2011). Our results continued to provide support to the hypothesis that attention is the 
“building block” for mindfulness training (Chambers, Lo, & Allen, 2008). For those who 
were narrowly focused, mountain meditation broadened their scope of conceptual attention 
and thought-action repertoires. Most critically, this broadening effect cannot be solely 
explained by relaxation. Hence, our results also confirmed the theory that relaxation is a 
secondary feature of mindfulness but not a mechanism of action (for a review, see Baer, 
2003). The current research was one of the first studies to examine the broadening hypothesis 
as outlined in the mindfulness-to-meaning theory (Garland et al., 2015). Although our results 
were modest at best, it appeared that mindfulness is potentially effective in expanding one’s 
scope of attention, which can lead to better problem solving and more positive mood state. 
One unique contribution of the mindfulness-to-meaning theory is that it offers a bridge 
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between traditional Buddhist teachings (e.g., the transient nature of suffering, a global 
outlook on life) and modern scientific research (e.g., attentional scope, cognitive processing 
of information). Our study is the first of many steps to validate and improve this theoretical 
account.  
 The current program of research has many implications for clinical practice in the 
domain of anxiety disorders. Based on our results, motivation, especially ambivalent 
motivation, plays a crucial role in the development and maintenance of anxiety. Currently, 
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy is considered the gold standard treatment for anxiety 
disorders (for a review, see Otte, 2011). Treatment usually involves intentionally exposing 
anxious individuals to their perceived threatening stimuli and challenging their maladaptive 
interpretations (for an example, see Antony & Norton, 2008). Our studies revealed that a 
brief exposure did not result in fear habituation for anxious individuals who were ambivalent 
about whether or not to approach or to avoid threat (as in Study 1). This might potentially 
explain the high dropout rate for anxious individuals receiving Cognitive Behavioural 
Therapy (Fernandez, Salem, Swift, & Ramtahal, 2015; Hofmann & Smits, 2008). These 
ambivalent individuals might benefit from a more integrative approach that combines 
traditional Cognitive Behavioural Therapy techniques (e.g., exposure) and therapies that 
address ambivalence, such as Motivational Interviewing (Rollnick & Miller, 2009; Rollnick, 
Miller, Butler, & Aloia, 2008). 
In addition, self-reports of ambivalent motivation might be an effective screening tool 
for identifying individuals at risk for eating disorders. Ambivalent participants endorsed more 
restrained eating behaviours and greater thought-shape fusion than other restrained eaters (as 
in Study 2). Hence, clinicians can administer either the procedure utilized in the current 
research (i.e., presenting clients with images of high calorie food and asking for approach and 
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avoidance motivation) or a simple self-report questionnaire (e.g., Experienced Ambivalence 
Towards Eating scale, as in Stroebe et al., 2008).  
Lastly, for anxious clients who present with a very narrow focus of attention and 
struggle with seeing the bigger picture, clinicians might consider administering mindfulness 
practices that are designed to broaden one’s scope of attention, such as mountain meditation 
(Kabat-Zinn, 2014). Even for other types of mindfulness practices such as breathing 
meditation, there might be some merits in emphasizing the need to go beyond one’s own 
existence (e.g., switching from thoughts, feelings, and bodily sensations, to a greater 
environment, space, and time) and see suffering in a broader perspective (e.g., painful events 
are rather transient).  
 
8.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
Despite the many strengths embodied in the current program of research, there were several 
limitations that warrant further discussion and offer directions for future research. Firstly, 
motivation to approach and to avoid threat was either measured during or after the eye-
tracking task, not prior to the eye-tracking task. Hence, there is a possibility that motivation 
ratings were influenced by a variety of other variables. For example, participants might adjust 
their motivation ratings based on their perception of how they behaved in the task. Those 
who spent a greater proportion of time looking at threatening stimuli might have inferred that 
they were highly motivated to approach threat. Similarly, those who paid little attention to 
threatening stimuli might have inferred that they were highly motivated to avoid threat. 
Hence, our motivation ratings and eye movement data might have been correlated measures 
of attention, thus explaining the moderating effect of motivation on attentional biases to 
threat. Furthermore, participants might gauge their motivation ratings based on their levels of 
state anxiety. Those who were more anxious might have reported higher motivation to avoid 
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threat, whereas those who were less anxious might have reported higher motivation to 
approach threat. The current program of research revealed significant correlations between 
motivation, attentional biases to threat, and mood state. However, given our study design, we 
were unable to specify the direction of such relations. In order to overcome this limitation, 
future studies can measure motivational states a priori and see if baseline motivation predicts 
subsequent attentional biases and changes in state anxiety. Future studies can also manipulate 
motivational states using incentives and directly measure the impact of motivation on 
attentional bias and state anxiety.  
 Secondly, the current program of research heavily relied on self-report measures in 
selecting eligible participants. It is possible that some of our participants might not be as 
anxious as they indicated on the questionnaires. For example, some might tend to generalize 
their fear and over-endorse negative items (e.g., afraid of everything about spiders). Some 
participants, on the other hand, might be tempted to present in a way that is socially desirable 
(e.g., dieting is usually considered appealing amongst university students). In both cases, 
participants would have scored higher on the screening measures but might not have 
experienced heightened anxiety during the study. Nonetheless, we are confident that our 
screening procedures were sufficient for the purposes of the current research. We selected 
questionnaires that are the most commonly used to measure fear of spiders (for a review, see 
Muris & Merckelbach, 1996) and restrained eating (for a review, see Lowe & Thomas, 
2009). Both measures (i.e., Fear of Spiders Questionnaire, and Restraint Scale) have been 
proven to have satisfactory psychometric properties (Klein et al., 2011; Szymanski & 
O'Donohue, 1995). In addition, the cut-off scores used in our studies were equivalent to if not 
stricter than those from past studies (Hollitt et al., 2010; Rinck & Becker, 2007; Siegel & 
Warren, 2013; Veenstra et al., 2010). However, we do recommend that future researchers 
include interview-based, more objective screening procedures to verify whether or not 
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participants are indeed highly anxious. Such measures might include the Anxiety and Related 
Disorder Interview Schedule (Brown & Barlow, 2014) for spider fear and the Eating Disorder 
Examination (Fairburn, 2008) for restrained eating.  
 There are some inherent limitations to the cognitive measures we adopted in the 
current program of research. In Study 1 and Study 2, attentional biases to threat were 
measured through tracking participants’ eye movements. We encountered many technical 
difficulties with the iView XTM head-mounted eye-tracking system (SensoMotoric 
Instruments, 2009), including calibration problems, low tracking ratios, and significant loss 
of data. On the other hand, we had fewer problems with the EyeLink 1000TM desktop-
mounted eye-tracking system (SR Research Ltd., 2015). Future researchers might want to 
carefully consider choosing between portable and stationary eye-tracking systems: the 
stationary one is generally more robust in tracking eye movements, whereas the portable one 
permits measuring eye movements in real-life environments. In addition, it should be noted 
that some eye movement indices are not as reliable as others. Waechter et al. (2013) found 
that the reliability of eye movement indices for first fixations is poor. To account for this 
limitation, we paid particular attention to the proportion of viewing time and conducted time-
sequence analyses based on this index. In Study 3, we used the Navon Letter Task and the 
Categorization Task to measure the scope of perceptual and conceptual attention. One 
limitation of the Navon Letter Task is that most individuals demonstrate a global focus of 
perceptual attention and this global precedence effect is rather robust (Andres & Fernandes, 
2006). Hence, the Navon Letter Task might have limited our ability to examine the extent to 
which different interventions influence the scope of perceptual attention.  
 The current program of research is also very narrow in its scope of coverage. Study 1 
and Study 2 only explored the relation between motivation and attentional biases to threat in 
two discreet domains of anxiety, i.e., spider-related anxiety and eating-related anxiety. Our 
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results might or might not be generalizable to other types of anxiety, e.g., social anxiety, 
generalized anxiety, and specific phobia. More research is needed to replicate and extent our 
findings using different sets of stimuli and appropriate populations. Study 3 examined the 
impact of mindfulness meditation on three facets of attentional scope, i.e., perceptual 
attention, conceptual attention, and thought-action repertoires. Despite our insignificant 
results, it remains to be seen if other types of mindfulness practice such as breathing 
meditation and loving-kindness meditation might have the same or less influence on 
attentional scope. Future researchers can also consider using other tasks to measure 
attentional scope, such as the Flanker Task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) and the Remote 
Associates Task (Rosch, 1975).  
 Lastly, we did not limit our participants to anxious individuals in Study 3, which 
might have contributed to our lack of significant findings. Our rationale for recruiting general 
populations was that there had been limited and contradictory evidence for the broadening 
effect of mindfulness and the current research aimed to clarify the exact impact of 
mindfulness on attentional scope. By not limiting our participants to a certain population, we 
were able to compare our results to those from other studies. However, as demonstrated in 
Study 3, most participants presented with a global focus of attention at baseline and 
mindfulness only broadened the scope of conceptual attention and thought-action repertoires 
for those who were narrowly focused at pre-test. This might explain the reason why findings 
on this topic have been largely inconsistent. We highly recommend future researchers to 
continue this line of research but limit their participants to those who are more likely to 
display a narrow focus of attention at baseline. For example, future studies might want to 
follow the approach of Xu et al. (2017) and recruit participants who are high in trait anxiety. 
There is a possibility that the broadening effect of mindfulness, as proposed by Garland et al. 
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(2015), is only present for anxious individuals who have difficulties expanding their narrow 
attentional scope.  
 
8.4 Conclusion  
In summary, the current program of research indicates that anxious individuals can be 
divided into different groups based on their motivation to approach and avoid threat, and 
different motivation groups may demonstrate different types of attentional biases to threat. In 
addition, anxious individuals with ambivalent motivation (i.e., high motivation to approach 
and to avoid threat at the same time) endorse greater and prolonged anxiety. Mindfulness, on 
the other hand, seems to have potentials in broadening the scope of attention for those 
individuals who have a narrow focus of attention at baseline. Compared to relaxation and 
control conditions, mindfulness practice is particularly helpful for improving problem solving 
in stressful scenarios. Combined, the current research highlights the important role that 
attentional processes play in the development and maintenance of anxiety. Our results 
suggest that ambivalent motivation might be the key to better understanding and reducing 
attentional biases and anxiety, while mindfulness training might offer a promising approach 
to broadening the scope of attention. These findings provide important implications to both 
theoretical research and clinical practice in the area of anxiety disorders.  
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0128. 1010. 0116. 1132. 
0046. 1262. 0491. 1112. 
0022. 1235. 0049. 1004. 
0008. 1038. 0510. 1142. 
0025. 1155. 0115. 1143. 
0095. 1058. 0042. 1033. 
0110. 1036. 0107. 1028. 
0007. 1130. 0313. 1018. 
0020. 1265. 0028. 1035. 
0081. 1086. 0474. 1230. 
0053. 1055. 0375. 1200. 
0037. 1092. 0286. 1145. 
0048. 1313. 0006. 1208. 
0012. 1129. 0125. 1225. 
0089. 1080. 0027. 1274. 
0050. 1139. 0140. 1019. 
0040. 1237. 0400. 1259. 
0135. 1012. 0083. 1251. 
0061. 1276. 0103. 1250. 
0074. 1052. 0289. 1049. 
0143. 1007. 0347. 1246. 
0126. 1146. 0122. 1084. 
0013. 1238. 0036. 1314. 
0093. 1226. 0001. 1152. 
0174. 1059. 0078. 1150. 
0017. 1096. 0016. 1016. 
0055. 1261. 0492. 1135. 
0032. 1148. 0002. 1258. 
0167. 1057. 0097. 1140. 
0373. 1029. 0159. 1156. 
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Appendix B 
Mountain Meditation Instructions 
This exercise is normally done in a sitting position, either on the floor or a chair, and begins 
by sensing into the support you have from the chair or the cushion, paying attention to the 
actual sensations of contact. Finding a position of stability and poise, upper body balanced 
over your hips and shoulders in a comfortable but alert posture, hands on your lap or knees, 
arms hanging by their own weight, like heavy curtains, stable and relaxed. Actually sensing 
into your body, feeling your feet…(pause 3 seconds) legs…(pause 3 seconds) hips…(pause 3 
seconds) lower and upper body…(pause 5 seconds) arms…(pause 3 seconds) 
shoulders…(pause 3 seconds) neck…(pause 3 seconds) and head...(pause 5 seconds).  
And when you are ready, allowing your eyes to close, bringing awareness to breath, 
the actual physical sensations, feeling each breath as it comes in and goes out (pause 5 
seconds) letting the breath be just as it is, without trying to change or regulate it in any way 
(pause 5 seconds) allowing it to flow easily and naturally, with its own rhythm and pace, 
knowing you are breathing perfectly well right now, nothing for you to do (pause 10 
seconds).  
Allowing the body to be still and sitting with a sense of dignity, a sense of resolve, a 
sense of being complete, whole, in this very moment, with your posture reflecting this sense 
of wholeness…(pause 20 seconds). 
As you sit here, letting an image form in your mind’s eye, of the most magnificent or 
beautiful mountain you know or have seen or can imagine…(3 seconds), letting it gradually 
come into greater focus…(pause 3 seconds) and even if it doesn’t come as a visual image, 
allowing the sense of this mountain and feeling its overall shape, its lofty peak or peaks high 
in the sky, the large base rooted in the bedrock of the earth’s crust, it’s steep or gently sloping 
sides…(pause 5 seconds) 
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Noticing how massive it is, how solid, how unmoving, how beautiful, whether from 
afar or up close… (pause 20 seconds). Perhaps your mountain has snow blanketing its top 
and trees reaching down the base, or rugged granite sides…(pause 3 seconds) there may be 
streams and waterfalls cascading down the slopes…(pause 3 seconds) there may be one peak 
or a series of peaks, or with meadows and high lakes…(pause 25 seconds). 
Observing it, noting its qualities and when you feel ready, seeing if you can bring the 
mountain into your own body, so that your body and the mountain in your mind’s eye 
become one. So that as you sit here, you share in the massiveness and the stillness and 
majesty of the mountain, you become the mountain…(pause 5 seconds). 
  Grounded in the sitting posture, your head becomes the lofty peak, supported by the 
rest of your body and affording a panoramic view. Your shoulders and arms the sides of the 
mountain. Your hips and legs the solid base, rooted to your cushion or your chair, 
experiencing in your body a sense of uplift from deep within your pelvis and spine...(pause 3 
seconds). 
  With each breath, as you continue sitting, becoming a little more a breathing 
mountain, alive and vital, yet unwavering in your inner stillness, completely what you are, 
beyond words and thought, a centered, grounded, unmoving presence…(pause 30 seconds). 
As you sit here, becoming aware of the fact that as the sun travels across the sky, the 
light and shadows and colours are changing virtually moment by moment in the mountain’s 
stillness, while the surface teems with life and activity… streams, melting snow, waterfalls, 
plants and wildlife…(pause 5 seconds). 
As the mountain sits, seeing and feeling how night follows day and day follows night. 
The bright warming sun, followed by the cool night sky studded with stars, and the gradual 
dawning of a new day…(pause 20 seconds). 
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Through it all, the mountain just sits, experiencing change in each moment, constantly 
changing, yet always just being itself. It remains still as the seasons flow into one another and 
as the weather changes moment by moment and day by day, calmness abiding all 
change…(pause 15 seconds). 
In summer, there is no snow on the mountain expect perhaps for the very peak or in 
crags shielded from direct sunlight. In the fall, the mountain may wear a coat of brilliant fire 
colours. In winter, a blanket of snow and ice. 
  In any season, it may find itself at times enshrouded in clouds or fog or pelted by 
freezing rain. People may come to see the mountain and comment on how beautiful it is or 
how it’s not a good day to see the mountain, that it’s too cloudy or rainy or foggy or dark. 
(pause 5 seconds). 
None of this matters to the mountain, which remains at all times its essential self. 
Clouds may come and clouds may go, tourists may like it or not. The mountain’s 
magnificence and beauty are not changed one bit by whether people see it or not, seen or 
unseen, in sun or clouds, boiling or frigid, day or night. It just sits, being itself…(pause 3 
seconds). 
At times visited by violent storms, buffeted by snow and rain and winds of 
unthinkable magnitude. Through it all, the mountain sits (pause 20 seconds). Spring comes, 
trees leaf out, flowers bloom in the high meadows and slopes, birds sing in the trees once 
again. Streams overflow with the waters of melting snow. 
  Through it all, the mountain continues to sit, unmoved by the weather, by what 
happens on its surface, by the world of appearances…(pause 3 seconds) remaining its 
essential self, through the seasons, the changing weather, the activity ebbing and flowing on 
its surface…(pause 15 seconds). 
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In the same way, as we sit here, we can learn to experience the mountain, we can 
embody the same central, unwavering stillness and groundedness in the face of everything 
that changes in our own lives, over seconds, over hours, over years (pause 5 seconds).  
In our lives, we experience constantly the changing nature of mind and body and of 
the outer world. We have our own periods of light and darkness, activity and inactivity, our 
moments of colour and our moments of drabness.  
It’s true that we experience storms of varying intensity and violence in the outer 
world and in our own minds and bodies, buffeted by high winds, by cold and rain, we endure 
periods of darkness and pain, as well as the moments of joy and uplift, even our appearance 
changes constantly, experiencing a weather of it’s own…(pause 15 seconds). 
By becoming the mountain, we can link up with its strength and stability and adopt 
them for our own. We can use its energies to support our energy to encounter each moment 
with mindfulness and equanimity and clarity...(pause 3 seconds). 
  It may help us to see that our thoughts and feelings, our preoccupations, our 
emotional storms and crises, even the things that happen to us are very much like the weather 
on the mountain. We tend to take it all personally, but its strongest characteristic is 
impersonal.  
The weather of our own lives is not to be ignored or denied, it is to be encountered, 
honoured, felt, known for what it is, and held in awareness… And in holding it this way, we 
come to know a deeper silence and stillness and wisdom.  
Mountains have this to teach us and much more if we can let it in…(pause 10 
seconds). So if you find you resonate in some way with the strength and stability of the 
mountain in your sitting, it may be helpful to use it from time to time, to remind you of what 
it means to sit mindfully with resolve and with wakefulness, in true stillness…(pause 5 
seconds) 
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So, in the time that remains, continue to sustain the mountain on your own, in silence, 
moment by moment, until you hear the sound of the bells…(approximately 5 minutes until 
sound of bells). 
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Appendix C 
Passive Progressive Muscle Relaxation Instructions 
Settle back as comfortably as you can in a comfortable chair and focus on what I am going 
to be telling you. I am going to be asking you to pay attention to sensations of tension in 
different muscle groups and then allow these muscles to relax completely, one at a time.  
First, close your eyes comfortably. Now pay attention to your right fist and notice 
the sensations of tension there. Hold it, study the tension, study it [5 seconds], and now 
relax. Let your hand rest comfortably again. Notice the difference between the tension you 
were experiencing and the relative relaxation you feel now, and enjoy the contrast. Now, do 
that once again; notice the sensations of tension in your right fist. Hold it [5 seconds], and 
now relax, just let your hand go, getting looser and looser. Notice once again the difference 
between the sensation of tension and that of relaxation. [10 seconds] 
Let's do that with your left fist now. Pay attention to your left fist and notice the 
sensations of tension there. Hold it, study the tension, study it [5 seconds], and now relax. 
Let your hand rest comfortably again. Notice the difference between the tension you were 
experiencing and the relative relaxation you feel now, and enjoy the contrast. [5 seconds]. 
Notice the sensations of tension in your left fist; hold it [5 seconds], and now relax, just let 
your hand go, getting looser and looser. Notice once again the difference between the 
sensation of tension and that of relaxation. [10 seconds] 
Now I'd like you to pay attention to your biceps muscles on your upper arms and 
notice the sensations of tension there. Study the tension, hold it, study it [3 seconds] and 
now relax, letting go further and further. Let the sensation of relaxation flow through your 
arms and compare it to the tightness you felt before. [5 seconds]. Let's do that once again 
now; notice the sensations of tension in your upper arms. Hold that tension, study it [5 
seconds] and now relax, just letting go more and more, further and further, noticing and 
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remembering the difference between muscular tension and muscular relaxation. [10 
seconds]. 
Let us now turn our attention to the muscles in your face, your forehead in 
particular. Notice the sensations of tension on your forehead. Hold that tension, study it, [5 
seconds] and now relax, letting go, further and further. Notice the contrast between the 
tension and the relaxation and enjoy it. [5 seconds] Let's do that once again now. Notice the 
sensations of tension on your forehead. Concentrate on the tension, study it, hold it 15 
seconds] and now relax. Let the muscle in your forehead go. Smooth out your forehead, let 
it relax and enjoy the difference between the tension you were feeling before and the 
relaxation you are feeling now. [10 seconds] 
Now pay attention to your eyes and notice the sensations of tension there. Hold that 
tension, hold it, hold it [5 seconds], and now relax, let your eyes go, letting go more and 
more, further and further. Attend to what it feels like for your eyes to be relaxed rather than 
tense, and enjoy that feeling. [5 seconds] Do that once again now, notice the sensations of 
tension in your eyes and study that tension, study it, hold, it, and now release it, let it go as 
much as you can. Enjoy the feeling of relaxation. [10 seconds] 
This time we're going to concentrate on your jaw. Notice the sensations of tension in 
your jaw. Feel the tension, feel it, study it, hold it, [5 seconds] and now relax, let go of your 
jaw muscles, making them as slack as you can. Study the difference between the tension 
that you felt and the relaxation you feel now. [5 seconds] It's time to do that again; notice 
the sensations of tension in your jaw. Study that tension, hold it, study it [5 seconds] and 
now relax, just let go further and further, more and more. Study the feeling of relaxation and 
enjoy it. [10 seconds] 
We'll finish our focus on the facial muscles by paying attention to the lips. Notice 
the sensations of tension in your lips and study that tension, study it. And now relax, let go 
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of that tension, letting your lips and cheeks totally relax. [5 seconds] Let's do that again; 
notice the sensations of tension in your lips. Hold that tension, study it [5 seconds] and now 
release it, let go, relax your lips and cheeks. Enjoy the difference between the tension and 
the relaxation. [10 seconds] 
Now let's turn our attention to some other large muscle groups in your body, starting 
with the neck. Notice the sensations of tension in your neck. Study the tension in your neck, 
hold it, study it [5 seconds] and now relax, let go further and further, more and more, letting 
your head rest comfortably now on the chair or bed. Notice the difference you feel in your 
neck now that it is relaxed. [5 seconds] Do that once again; notice the sensations of tension 
in your neck; hold it, study it, [5 seconds] and now let go, relax, let your neck relax, your 
head resting comfortably. [10 seconds] 
Now let's concentrate on your shoulders. Notice the sensations of tension in your 
shoulders. Hold it, study the tension [5 seconds], and now let it go; let your shoulders go 
further and further, more and more. See how well you can get the tension to drain 
completely from them and enjoy feeling that tightness dissolves. [5 seconds] Do that once 
again now; notice the sensations of tension in your shoulders. Study that tension, hold it, 
study it, and now relax, let go, just keep letting go more and more, further and further. Let 
the tension wash out of your shoulders. [10 seconds] 
It's time now to focus on the large muscle groups in your legs. We'll start with the 
lower legs. Notice the sensations of tension in your lower legs. Hold that tension, hold it, 
study it, [5 seconds] and now relax, let go, further and further. Feel your legs melting into 
the chair, every last bit of tension draining from them. Notice the difference between the 
tension you experienced before and the relaxation you are feeling now in your legs. [5 
seconds] Let's do that again; notice the sensations of tension in your lower legs. Hold the 
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tension, hold it, study it, [5 seconds] and now relax, let go, further and further, more and 
more. [10 seconds] 
Now pay attention to your thigh muscles. Notice the sensations of tension in your 
thighs. Hold that tension, hold it, study it, [5 seconds] and now release your thigh muscles, 
release the tension and let your legs become heavy against the chair or bed. Notice the 
difference between the tension and the relaxation and enjoy the contrast. [5 seconds] Let's 
do that again now; notice the sensations of tension in your thigh muscles. Hold the tension, 
study it, [5 seconds] and now relax, let go. Just keep letting that tension go more and more, 
further and further. [10 seconds] 
Finally, pay attention to the muscles of your buttocks. Notice the sensations of 
tension in your buttocks. Noticing how the tension feels. Hold it, study it, and now let it go; 
relax the muscles of your buttocks, further and further more and more. [5 seconds] One 
more time; clench the muscles of your buttocks as hard as you can. Hold the tension and 
study it. Hold it, hold it, and now release it. Let the tension drain out of your buttocks and 
enjoy the feeling of being relaxed. [10 seconds] 
Let's review the areas of your body that we have noticed the sensations of tension 
and relaxed. As I name each area scan it for any tension, and release the tension in the area. 
Hands and arms [10 seconds]. Forehead, jaw and lips [10 seconds]. Neck and shoulders [10 
seconds]. Legs and buttocks. [10 seconds]. 
Now sit quietly for a few moments, enjoying the experience of relaxed muscles. 
Breathe slowly and deeply and relish the feelings of relaxation now present throughout your 
body. [2 minutes]. 
I am going to count from 5 to 1. As I count down, you should make yourself more 
aware and alert, ready to move on to the next activity in your day. 5…..4…..3…...2…..1 
Eyes open, wide awake. 
